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Abstract
This dissertation aims at developing and testing the concept of pluralistic security 
community evolved by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s. In essence, a pluralistic security 
community is a union in which war is no longer contemplated as a possible way of 
resolving conflicts among its members.
The conditions for the emergence of a pluralistic security community are threefold:
(a) compatibility of major values; (b) mutual responsiveness and (c) mutual 
predictability of behaviour. Compatibility of major values has often been studied in 
relation to the democratic peace theory but, more than democracy as such, it is the 
conditions underlying its emergence (individualism and the spirit of trade) that foster 
peace. Mutual responsiveness is closely linked to the theory of cybernetics and requires 
the existence of many links between the units of the security community allowing the 
peacehil resolution of conflicts, Mutual predictability of behaviour implies the 
existance of long-term trust between the members of the community. A parallel is 
possible with the rational expectation theoiy in economics. As a conclusion to this part, 
it can be asserted that the concept studied is the main contribution to an embryonic 
theory of international pluralism,
After the analysis of the concept, an attempt is made to apply it in the case of the 
European Union. To test the reality of compatibility of major values, a content analysis 
of the final communiqués of the European Council over the past few years is made. 
Mutual responsiveness is tested thanks to a study of European regional policy and 
redistribution, since the existence of redistribution is a sign of cohesion and trust. 
Finally, mutual predictability of behaviour is tested through the study of European 
security integration (especially the Franco-German partnership, weapons co­
production and through the study of Europe as an ‘actor’ in the world stage).
This concept of pluralistic security community is a valuable tool for explaining some 
features of the global setting like the peaceful long-term coexistence of states at the 
international level. The concept is also very relevant in the European Union as it 
explains one important achievement, of European integration: long-term peace in 
Europe.
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Introduction
“We undertook this inquiry as a contribution to the study of possible ways in which 
men some day might abolish war,”  ^ The classic study of Karl Deutsch and his 
colleagues thus had a clear and grand ambition. As always in such cases, however, it 
failed to deliver the straightforward and definitive answer to the problem of war and 
peace. Still, the notion of security community developed in this book has had a lasting 
influence in international relations theory.^
The main reason for this durability is that this notion has been helpful in explaining at 
once the process of nation-building and that of peacefiil coexistence at the international 
level. In particular, the concept of a pluralistic security community is the main plausible 
explanation for the existence of long-term peace in some regions of the globe. “A 
security community, therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that the members 
of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in 
some other way.”^
The attempt at definition of the notion is worth quoting in its entirety:
A SECURTTY COMMUNITY is a group of people which has become “integrated.”
By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, Of a “sense of 
conuuiuiity” and of institutions and practices strong enougli and widespread enougli 
to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change.”
By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a 
group that they have come to agreement on at least tliis one point: tliat common 
social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peacefiil change.”
’Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light o f  Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
1957), p. 3.
^The notion of security community was actually formulated by Richard W. Van Wagenen in Research 
in the International Organization Field: Some Notes on a Possible Focus (Princeton, N..T: Center 
for Research on World Political Institutions, 1952). But the notion was mainly used by Karl 
Deutsch and is usually associated with his name.
^Deutsch, op. cit., p, 5.
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By PEACEFUL, CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by 
institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force/
To put it in a nutshell, a security community is characterised by the absence of 
violence. “What is essential for integration (...) is not a particular kind of formal 
institutional change, but the attainment of peace and security in the international 
system.”^
A security coimnunity can be either amalgamated or pluralistic. Amalgamation 
implies the formal merger of previously independent units. This process is one of 
national integration. A pluralistic security community “retains the legal independence 
of separate governments. The combined territory of the United States and Canada is an 
example of the pluralistic type. Its two separate governmental units form a security 
community without being merged.”^
The latter form of security community has not been thoroughly studied so far.^ The 
main reason for this is that there is no obvious explanation for the existence of long­
term expectations of peacefiil change in some regions. The image of peace as an 
interval between two wars can suffer a fatal blow if there can be a plausible explanation 
for the existence of peacefiil relations over many decades and sometimes many 
centuries.
Karl Deutsch did not find a recipe for eternal peace. What he actually found was that 
under some, fairly restrictive, conditions, it was possible to reach a condition of 
integiation that makes war almost impossible in the foreseeable future. Unforeseen 
circumstances could possibly ruin this achievement, but in a security community it is 
most probable that no war will occur. This achievement is veiy important and is thus 
worth studying.
This paper concentrates, therefore, on the conditions for the emergence of a security 
community. These conditions (compatibility of major values, mutual responsiveness
'’ibid, p. 5.
^Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), 
p. 30.
^Deutsch, op. cit., p. 6.
“^We know of no thorough investigation into the ways in which certain areas of tlie world have, in tlie 
past, “permanently” eliminated war.” Ibid., p. 4. But Deutsch concentrates mostly on cases of 
amalgamation and little research has been made in the field of pluralism since the 1950s.
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and mutual predictability of behaviour) were initially indicated by Karl Deutsch but 
they have been little studied either by Deutsch or by any other researcher. The 
fulfilment of these three conditions does not necessarily mean that peace is 
mechanically guaranteed. “We do not know whether any other condition might be 
required which we may well have overlooked.”® What seems assured is that there is a 
tendency to have dependable peace if these condi tions are realised.
The choice to concentrate on these conditions was also made because as in all cases 
of integration it is almost impossible to distinguish cause and effect. These conditions 
are also the result of the integrative process and therefore their study is also a study in 
integiation in general. Tins analysis aims at providing the reader with a firamework for 
explaining an integrative process leading to steady peace.
The most, obvious step to take after the initial theoretical study is to proceed to an 
attempt to empirically verify the theory. For this purpose the study of European 
integration is an outstanding case. Europe, after many decades of war and conflict, 
seems now in a steady course of peace.
Why Europe? Tt is obviously (...) in order to proceed to a mutation in a European 
liistory made, especially in tlie last centuries, of so many murderous conflicts. For 
peace, therefore, since it was considered that peace would arise only through a new 
l^olitical construction: the substitution of an integrated political entity to the Nation- 
State system which is in a permanent state of precarious equilibrium, in fact 
necessarily in periodical imbalance.®
This accomplishment is worth studying and, it is possible thanks to the tools of security 
community theory to examine the degree of integration achieved in Europe.
“The preservation and extension of the European security community” ®^ is the least 
controversial aspect of European integration. European integration clearly aims at 
avoiding any return to the previous situation of “territorial rivalry, nationalist animus, 
and (..) uncertain military b a l a n c e . T h e  commonality of this objective does not
“Ibid., p. 13.
®Jeau-Yves Calvez, 'Europe : la signification politique d’lm grand projet international’, in Bertrand 
Badie and Allain Pellet (eds.). Les relations internationales à l'épreuve de la science politique. 
Mélanges Marcel Merle (Paris: Economica, 1993), pp. 171-172.
’®Ian Gambles, ‘European Seciuity Integration in the 1990s’, Chaillot Papers, no. 3, 1991, p. 8.
"ibid., p. 9.
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mean, however, that the degree of integration is automaticaliy sufficient to make war 
impossible, nor that there is agreement on how it might be best achieved.
It is the aim of this paper to evaluate the degree of integration prevailing in the 
European Union with respect to the conditions mentioned by Deutsch. An effort is 
made to operationalise the three aforementioned conditions to allow the testing of the 
degree of integration achieved. The methods used for making the conditions 
operational are certainly open to question as the methodology put to use is obviously 
just one possible way of proceeding and many other possibilities come to mind. Still, 
this attempt uses methods either proposed by Deutsch or fairly easily linked to the 
conditions studied. The result remains utterly delicate and imperfect. The study of 
European integration remains handicapped by the limitations of the methodology used. 
But, it must be borne in mind that there is no perfect way of proceeding. The answer is 
incomplete, but it is still valid.
The empirical part is a useffil complement to the theoretical one. Thanks to the 
conjunction of theory and practice it is hoped that a comprehensive study of both the 
notion and its application is made.
’^More specifically, the aim is to establish if  the construction of a pluralistic security community was 
eventually successful and integration was achieved. For more details on the difference between 
successful and unsuccessfiil integration see Deutsch, op. cit., p. 6 ff.
1. Security and Community: contested ideas 
and imperfect definitions
Secufity and community are basic notions that lie at the heart of this study and have 
therefore to be examined and defined as thoroughly as possible. Neither of these 
notions has been adequately studied in the mainstream international relations literature. 
The concept of community has been used mainly by sociologists and has seldom been 
used in international relations theoiy. The notion of security has been insufficiently 
studied as most scholars preferred to refer to more basic concepts such as peace or 
power. Producing a link between these two concepts is an equally challenging task. At 
first glance, the two words seem completely unrelated. So far, Karl Deutsch is the main 
scholar who has succeeded in linking these words in a helpfiil and innovative way/ It 
will be argued that the two concepts have important links that make their joint use very 
helpfiil.
Security: an ambiguous notion, an important issue
Barry Bu/an, in a seminal book, discussed the problem of national security, He 
considers that security is “an underdeveloped concept,”  ^because it was usually studied 
either as an aftermath of sta te power or as a likely result of world peace.
Security; a contested idea
So far, security has been considered as a second rate concept. In the words of Barry 
Buzan;®
’Karl W. Deutsch et alii, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light o f  Historical Experience (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 
1957).
^Barry Biizan, People, States and Fear, The National Security Problem in International Relations 
(Brighton: Haivester Hill, 1983), pp. 3-9.
% id., pp. 1-2.
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Most of the literature which attempts analysis or prescription is based on the 
concepts of power and peace. Those who favour the approach tluougli power derive 
their thinking from the traditional Realist school of International Relations (...)
Tliose who favour the approach tlirough jieace are more loosely associated into the 
idealist school.
Both of these positions have an internal logic that has to be captured.
On the one hand. Realists'* equate power and security. Realists would argue that in 
an international setting that is akin to the state of nature that Thomas Hobbes 
described in Leviathan, it is quite obvious that the only possible way to ensure one’s 
security is to acquire as much power as possible. If a state is a wolf for another state, 
then the only way to protect oneself in this unstable environment is to be powerful. No 
alliance or union can be considered as anything more than a tactical response to an 
imminent thieat. No attempt to organise the internationd system should ever be 
expected to succeed in the long term. The basic premises to such a view are; (a) the 
existence of international anarchy and (b) the continuing importance of state 
sovereignty. These two conditions are muhially dependent, as sovereignty by definition 
means that there is no overarching authority, which is a (possible) definition of 
anarchy.
Thus, the realist school, while applying widely the concept of security, uses it 
commonly for empirical studies in the field of strategic studies. The concept itself is 
never addressed on its own right, and it is always considered of lesser value than the 
concept of power. Transnational links, supranational and subnational actors are seen as 
of little value, as ultimately power rests on the principal unit of the international system 
(i.e. the state). Efforts to limit the anarchical character of the system are equally 
doomed to failure. Realists consider that as the international order is, in essence, a non-
'’By realism is meant the traditional paradigm of international relations that puts power at its core. 
Discord is tlie main feature of interstate relations. International organisations have only a marginal 
role to play and cannot solve the security dilemma in the anarchic international setting. This view 
has been expressed by many famous scholars such as E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Keimetli 
Waltz, Jolm Herz, Henry Kissinger, Robert Gilpin, Raymond Aron and George Kerman, and its 
basic assumptions owe a lot to Thucidides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Clausewitz. For a 
comprehensive survey of the notion of realism see James Dor Dcrian (ed.), International Theory: 
Critical Investigation (London: Macmillan, 1995). In particular, Martin Wight, ‘Wliy is there no 
International Theory?’; J. Ann Tickner, ‘Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism: A  
Feminist Reformulation’ and James Der Derian, ‘A  Reinterpretation of Realism: Genealogy, 
Semiology, Dromology’.
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co-operative one, it is impossible to imagine a harmonious setting. The reason why is 
that either a co-operative system can be used by a free rider within it,  ^ or a non- 
member can profit from the restraints imposed on the members of the system to 
enhance its power.^ In both cases co-operation is nothing more than a fragile and 
limited reply to problems that have only power as their definitive answer.
On the other hand. Idealists^ usually consider that the basic pattern of the 
international system is not the quest for power but the search for peace. This school 
considers that achieving international peace is possible tluough (a) the improvement of 
oneself by education and thus a gradual change of human nature (b) the 
démocratisation process that should put more control on the deeds of the government 
and (c) an international system that puts more emphasis to collective security and the 
participation of all states in the concert of nations.
Idealists consider it feasible to change human nature in a way that wall enable control 
of its intrinsically violent tendencies. The national system is considered as being 
amendable in a manner that wül institute sufficient checks and balances to provide for 
lasting peace. Finally the international system is considered as being reformable in a 
fashion that will make international co-operation and collective security possible. In 
other words, Idealists think that peace is within reach, and therefore security is but an
^Tiiis analysis owes a lot to Mancur Olson, The Logic o f  Collective Action: Public Goods and the 
Theory o f  Groups CSiQ-sN Schocken Books, 1968).
^Tliis point is made with, great eloquence by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, a Theoretical 
Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 1959). He argues (see pp. 218 ff.) that it is 
of no use for a state (or for a group of states) being virtuous as long as other states can profit from 
their restraint in order to enhance their power. Consequently, tlie anarchical character of the 
international igrstem is self perpetuating. Latency is one of the most important characteristics of 
international anarchy.
^The distinction between realism and idealism was made with great expressiveness by E. H. Carr in 
Iris classic book The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939, An Introduction to the Study o f  International 
Relations (London: Macmillan, 1940). Carr demonstrated that utopianism is an intellectual 
descendent of Enlightment optimism, nineteentli centiuy liberalism and twentieth century 
Wilsonian idealism. International relations have been profoundly influenced by tliis school. In the 
words of Carr (p. 11): “Like other infant sciences, the science of international ix>litics has been 
markedly and frankly utopian. It has been in the initial stage in wliich wishing prevails over 
thinking, generalisation over observation, and in winch little attempt is made at a critical analysis 
of existing facts.” An important number of scholars are generally considered as being idealists. 
Ernst Haas, David Mitrany, Michael Doyle, Bruce Russett and Robert Rosecrance are often viewed 
as belonging to this group. For a stutfr of the realism vs. idealism debate see Athanasios Platias’ 
paper in Dimitri C. Constas and Panayotis I. Tsakonas (eds.), Elliniki Exoteriki Polltiki: Esoterikoi 
kai Diethneis Paramétrai [Greek Foreign Policy: Internal and External Parameters] (Athens: 
Odysseas, 1994), see also Ray Magliroori and Benett Raniberg (eds ), Globalism Versus Realism: 
International Relations' Third Debate (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1982) and Robert N, Berki, 
On Political Realism (London: Dent, 1981).
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imperfect way of addressing international problems. A possible search for security can 
only delay the ultimate quest, which is the one for peace.
This cleavage between the realist and the idealist view follows a similar rift between 
optimists and pessimists.
[Optimists] would go on to argue that it is false to say—or assume—that war is a 
necessary or iiilierent feature of the international political system. [Pessimists] take 
the view that the wave of the friture is not community and peace but several states 
torn apart, with Yugoslavia as a more reliable precursor of the future.^
This division is not just, a matter of academic interest. Tt. is one of political choice and 
therefore has great practical consequences. The realist paradigm implies that the only 
rational policy is one aiming (at the state level) to reduce vulnerability. The idealist 
paradigm, in contrast, implies that by working on various levels (the level of the 
individual, of the state and of the international system), it. is possible to reach per petual 
peace.
Realism and Idealism: a critique of their prem ises
The dichotomy between Realists and Idealists is a very artificial one/ Going beyond 
this rift is essential if a more reliable concept is to be found. Neither of these visions is 
flawless.
The realist view has important, premises that are very much debatable. The first 
premise is the perpetual character of international anarchy. Even non-realists like Barr y 
Buzan agree that a form of anarchy is a constant feature of international relations.*^ 
The most common definition given to anarchy is the absence of an overarching 
authority. This lacking authority means that there is no monopoly of the legitimate use 
of violence.** This conception is not as clear as it seems, for this monopoly can be 
legitimate or not depending on the circumstances. The existence of an overarching
’’Trevor C. Salmon, ‘The Natiue of International Security’ in Roger Carey and Trevor C. Salmon 
(eds.), International Security in the Modern World (London: MacMillan Press, 1992), pp. 7-8.
®The two schools described previously are mere ideal-types. In reality, most of their partisans have 
more subtle positions.
’®See Barry Buzan, ‘Peace, Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International 
Relations’, Journal o f  Peace Research, vol. 21, no. 2, 1984, pp. 112 ff.
"Tliis is a Weberian definition of the state, see Max Weber, Politik als Beruf (Munich and Leipzig: 
1919).
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govermnent does not guarantee its legitimacy, and without legitimacy a government 
(national as well as international) cannot possibly expect to be respected forever. The 
non-existence of an overarching authority does not necessarily intimate that chaos is 
the state of the global system. Anarchy also has the meaning of disorder, of a 
Hobbesian state of nature. According to this view, international relations are a zero 
sum game in which the gains of one of the players are the losses of another.*^ 
Nevertheless, important elements of order are undeniably present in the international 
system. Hedley Bull, for instance, argues that some elements of order exist “because at 
no stage can it be said that the conception of the common interests of states, of 
common rules, accepted and common institutions worked by them, has ceased to exert 
an influence.”*® Elements such as the balance of power or the presence of the great 
powers are important stabilising factors that cannot be completely ruled out in the 
international system. Anarchy is an ambiguous concept that rarely serves intellectual 
clarity. “Wliile anarchy is an important condition of world politics, it is not the only 
one. Strategic interdependence among the actors is at least as fundamental.”*'*
The second important assumption of the realist school relates to the continuing 
import ance of state sovereignty. “The claim to sovereignty makes the state the highest 
form of social unit, and explains its centrality to political analysis.”*^ Even if the 
centrality of the sovereign state in the international system cannot be questioned, the 
concept of sovereignty is Mghly controversial. Sovereign states are meant to be equal. 
But, this legalistic approach does not encapture the reality of international life. All 
states are not equally sovereign, and it is clear that as sovereignty puts a lot of 
emphasis on self-help, it is much more suitable for great powers. Lesser powers have 
to become either junior partners or clients of a great power. The realist paradigm is 
suitable for a system dominated by great powers that have vested interests in
’^For a study of the notion of international anarchy see Richard Ashley, ‘The Powers of Anarchy: 
Theoiy, Sovereignty, and the Domestication of Global Life’, in James Der Derian (ed.), op. cit. and 
Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, 
in ibid.
’^Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f  World Order (London: Macmillan 1977), p. 42.
’'’Helen Milner, ‘The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory: a critique’, Review o f  
Mernational Studies, vol. 17, 1991, p. 85. For an incisive critique of the state of nature theory in 
international relations, see also Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations 
(Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1979).
’^Buzan, People, States and Fear, op. cit., p 4L
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maintaining a world of anarchy and sovereignty where power is the emblematic 
feature. From a realist point of view, no integration other than one based on a (by 
definition) fi'agile and changing balance of power is possible, as “it has been argued 
that political systems become or remain cohesive because of the presence, or threat, of 
force.”*^ Not only is the sovereignty assumption biased in favour of the great powers, 
it also ignores the growing interdependence that limits more and more the possibility 
for efficient action at the state level. This growing interdependence ultimately means “a 
loss o f autonomy in economic decision-making, and (...) increasing political 
enlanglemenls that constrain foreign policy choices.”*^  In other terms, interdependence 
is an inescapable pattern that will grow more and more important. Great powers are 
less vulnerable to it, but they cannot escape it. The relative economic decline of the 
United States and its growing dependence on foreign credits, or the impossibility of a 
national fiscal policy in a Europe characterised by perfect capital mobility and multiple 
currencies*® are but some signs of this growing interdependence.
The idealist view is equally flawed by its own assumptions. These are the possibility 
for mankind to control its violent instincts, the possibility to control state action and 
the possibility to generate a peacefiil international system. It must be borne in mind that 
only the realisation of all of the above conditions can possibly produce the expected 
result, i.e. world peace. Kenneth Waltz argued convincingly that the realisation of any 
of these conditions by only a few states or a few individuals is doomed to fail, as this 
kind of logic has to be totally shared by everybody in order to be reliable.*  ^The idealist 
view also overstates the elements of order included in the international system. The 
fact that there is not a complete disorder does not mean that there could be a complete 
order. Assuming, as the idealist school does, that there is no necessary incompatibility 
of interests is a risky view. Even if all of the interests of the states are not per se
’’’James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories o f  International Relations, 
a Comprehensive Survey (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), p. 431.
’^Beverly Crawford, ‘The New Security Dilemma under International Economic Interdependence’, 
Millennium, vol. 23, no. 1, 1994, p. 27, emphasis in original.
’®See the Mimdell Fleming model as explained in Rudiger Dombusch and Stanley Fischer, 
(New York: MacGrawHill, 1990),
’®“In international politics a partial ‘solution’, such as one major country becoming pacifist, might be 
a real contribution to world peace; but it might as easily hasten the coming of another major war.”, 
op. cit., p. 231.
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incompatible, it is difficult to consider that there is a possibility to avoid conflicts of 
interest forever.
Moreover, idealism assumes that it is possible to build a system of command and 
decision that could be totally rational and not be subject to the usual flaws of the 
decision making process (that is imperfect information, misperceptions, 
misunderstandings etc.). This view is totally unrealistic, since the decision making 
process is dominated by what Herbert Simon called “bounded rationality”.^** At every 
level of the process a lack of information and the impossibility of implementing it 
perfectly makes a totally rational decision impossible. Instead, the decisions are taken 
by a process dominated by experience and by partial information. In reality, therefore, 
there is no hope that the decision process will ever be rational enough to exclude 
completely all mistakes. In the words of Trevor Salmon/*
The fact that individuals are so important has significant implications, because they 
act on their perception of what the world is like. They do not act on the basis of 
wiiat some omniscient, objective observer may know the world to be like.
Machiavelli ensured a lasting influence in political theory by pointing to the 
impossibility of living virtuously in a world dominated by vice. Idealists respond to this 
critique by assuming that a world government or a collective system of governance can 
ensure the rule of virtue in the world. Another prospect is total isolation, a dream 
present in many philosophical treaties. But, as Pierre Hassner argues/^
^^Herbert ^\moïi,Adnünistration Behavior QAqw Y otk:. Macmillan, 1958).
’^Salmon, op. cit., p. 9.
"“Pierre Hassner, ‘Beyond the three traditions: tlie philosophy of war and peace in historical 
International Affairs, vol. 70, no. 4, 1994, pp. 740-741.
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the problem is the same for the Platonic republic or for the Stalinist ‘socialism in 
one coiuitiy’: ties with foreign lands trouble tlie unity of the body politic and the 
exclusive loyalty of the citizens (...) The imperatives of survival tend to replace those 
of the good life; the city risks being dominated by those who defend it, or having to 
imitate those who threaten it and whom it would like to avoid. This is Machiavelli’s 
problem: can one be good alone in a world where everyone else is bad? (...) It is the 
problem of the size o f the states, raised, after the Greeks, by Montesquieu and, in a 
more acute form still, by Rousseau: if it is small, a republic risks losing its existence; 
if  it is big, it risks losing its reasons for existing. In one case, it risks becoming the 
victim of external war; in the other, it risks becoming the victim of domestic 
discord.
Small or universal, the government imagined by the idealists is nothing more than an 
illusion. Peace is always something contingent, something that cannot be guaranteed 
forever. At best, one can hope of achieving peace for the foreseeable future.
Security a s  a helpful concept
The polarisation of international relations theory does not serve intellectual precision. 
Therefore, going beyond these two schools seems indispensable. “The constitution of a 
community of values in Western Europe since the end of World War Tf and the 
conditions created by the end of the cold war and the mostly peaceful revolutions in 
Eastern Europe for the enlargment. of the community demonstrate the growing 
inadequacy of both ‘realistic’ balance-of-power thinking and ‘idealistic’ world- 
govemment ideas in this part of the world, Security is, in that respect, a very helpful 
concept.
Security is, at the same time, an aim of any human condition and “a precondition of 
ordered human condition.” '^* States, as well as individuals, primarily need to ensure a 
pressureless existence. Thus, the fiist and foremost concern of these states is their 
security and not their power as such. Of course, power can provide security but 
security can also be reached by other means. “Direct competition and hostility among 
states” are as much a source of insecurity as are “fragmented and incremental decision 
making procedures, misunderstandings and misperceptions, arms racing, complexity of
^^Emanuel Adler, ‘Europe’s New Security Order: A  Pluralistic Seciuily Community’, in Beverly 
Crawford (ed.). The Future o f  European Security (Berkeley, CA: IAS, UC Berkeley, 1992), p. 287.
‘^'Peter Mangold, National Security> and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 1.
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interests in a complex system of interdependence”/^ Insecurity can therefore be 
addressed by enhancing one’s own power, or it can be addressed by eliminating some 
sources of insecurity by a process of gi owing integration.
BaiTy Buzan claims that three important conditions are imposed on the concept of 
international security by the context of anarchy; (1) the centrality of states as the 
principal referent object of security; (2) the fact that the dynamics of international 
security are highly relational and interdependent between states and (3) under anarchy, 
security can only be relative, never absolute.^*^  However vague and ambiguous the term 
of anarchy seems usefiil for defining the international system. Nevertheless, the 
presence of considerable elements of order (especially in some regional settings) 
bounds anarchy. Instead of anarchy as such the international system could be 
characterised by a state of semi-anarchy in which anarchy and order coexist in various 
amounts depending on the particular issue and on the level of integration of the 
regional subsystem. In this context of semi-anarchy the international ‘violence’ that the 
state of nature implies can take various forms.
In order to have a helpfiil definition of security it is important to address the nature 
of the tlueats against national security. Conventional wisdom, on the one hand, usually 
asserts that there is only one true threat against national security which is military 
attack. This vision underestimates the possibility of having a more subtle indirect threat 
against a state’s security. On the other hand, a growing literature considers that it is 
not possible to exclude any threat on the ground that it is not direct or important 
enough. This vision is unhelpfiil, however, as the notion of security is then so broad 
that it becomes unworkable. Bariy Buzan identifies four main kinds of tlireats: (1) 
military; (2) political; (3) economic; and (4) ecological.^ The number of the sources of 
threats seems of little importance, what is important is their characteristics.
Arnold Wolfers made a seminal definition of the concept of security /®
^^Buzan, People, Slates and Fear, op. cit., pp. 156-172.
^%arry Buzan, Ts international security possible?’ in Ken Booth (ed.), New Thinking about Stt'ategy 
and International Security (London; Harper Collins Academic, 1991), p. 34.
"^Biizan, People, States and Fear, op. cit., chapter 3.
Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1965), p. 150.
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security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in
a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.
This definition makes an uneasy distinction between objective and subjective sense. A 
tlireat even in a subjective sense implies that there should be preparations to match it. 
These preparations can be considered as a threat by another actor. This actor will 
respond to tliis threat and a spiral of insecurity will be on motion. This subjective threat 
will become objective. Insecurity usually calls for more power and competition for 
power has a self-defeating aspect. John Herz named this spiral the “security dilemma” *^* 
meaning that as no state can make a distinction between an offensive or a defensive 
security plan, an actor should always be set for a potential war.
Security can be defined as the protection of the core values of a society fi om external 
threats. The important thing about these threats is neither their objective existence nor 
their source, it is their nature. In order to avoid a definition of security that wül be 
unhelpfiil it is essential to make sure that the threats considered are of violent nature. 
Values, even core values, of a society change over time, but if this change is peaceful 
and does not come from any coercive, violent pressure then it is more of a challenge 
than of a threat. A military invasion, a nuclear accident in another state that will change 
the equilibrium of the ecosystem, the partially violent, subversion of a state’s political 
system in contrast are matters of security, because they can induce a change in the 
values of a society against the will of its members.®** A challenge is an invitation to take 
part in a contest for the achievement of a certain goal whereas a threat aims at 
changing the core values of a society not by a peacefiil process resulting from the 
inability of these values to respond to the changes in life, but by a violent and coercive 
process that wants to impose new values and ways.
So far, the words values or core values has been used without ever being properly 
defined. These values can be both material (values that can be quantified lüce territorial
^®John Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, vol. 2, 1950, 
157-180. See also Robert Jervis, ‘The spiral of international security’, in Richard Little and Michael 
Smith (eds. ). Perspectives on World Politics (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 91-101,
^®Johan Galtung made an interesting distinction between direct (mainly military), structural 
(economic coercion for instance) and cultural violence (coercive legithnisation of the other two 
types of power). See Johan Galtung, 60 Speeches on JFar and Peace (Oslo: PRIG, 1990) and 
Dietrich Fischer, Non-military Aspects o f  Security: A Systems Approach (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
1993), p. 6.
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integrity for instance) and immaterial (values that cannot be quantified like democracy 
or freedom for instance). This distinction is similar to the one made by Raymond Aron 
between material (resources, subjects, territory) and immaterial (values, principles) 
interests.^^ However, this separation does not imply that either of these values is any 
more relevant to the concept of security than the other. Both are needed in order to 
understand this notion.
The notion of core values is very difficult to confine. Wliat is the difference between 
the values that are considered as core values and those that are not? Who decides 
which value is to be a core one? These questions have no practicable answer. A value 
is a core value if a violent threat against it provokes a strong reaction against this 
threat and if its loss changes fundamentally the shape of a society. “Core values can be 
described as those kind of goals for wliich most people are willing to make ultimate 
sacrifices.”^^  The question of which value is a core value is one that is doomed to be 
eternally debated without ever hoping to resolve it. Tlie concept of core value is an 
essentially ‘contested concept’.
Given these premises, the definition of security (as the protection of the core values 
of a society against external threats) acquires a holistic character^^ and does not have 
the bias that the other, more strict, definitions of this notion have. The concept of 
security (defined in this way) “combines many of the strengths of the other two 
concepts [power and peace], and (...) opens up previously neglected area for research 
by pointing to the large potential for idealistic thinking which exists within the fixed, 
but not immutable, factors of the anarchy and the arms race.”^^
^^Raymond Aron, Paix el guerre entre les Nations (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1984). The term of interest 
is oilen used instead of tlie word value in definitions of security. Panayotis Ifestos defines security as 
"all the factors (...) that ensure and preserve the interests of one or many states” (P. Ifestos and C. 
Tsardanidis, To Evropaiko syslima as/alias kai i elliniki exoteriki poli tiki pros to 2000 [The 
European Security System and tlie Greek Foreign Policy towards the year 2000] (Atiiens: Sideris, 
1992), pp. 29-30). The term values is viewed as more accurate as it is more neutral and does not 
have the ‘realist’ connotation of interest.
J., Holsti, International Politics, A Framework fo r Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice 
Hall, 1983), p. 129.
^^The need for a holistic concept of security was first emphasised by Barry Biizan in the conclusion of 
his People, States and Fear, op. cit..
'^’Buzan, ‘Peace, Power and Security’, op. cit., p. 124.
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Community: a neglected concept with interesting prospects
The notion of community has been almost exclusively used by sociologists, the other 
social sciences avoiding its study despite its very common employment in every day 
language in terms like European Community. The first task should be to find a 
functional definition of the concept of community. The second is to study the process 
of conflict resolution within a community. This should provide the necessary 
framework to link this concept with the one of security studied before.
A functional definition of community
Community is a word so widely used in normal eveiy day language that its definition 
seems almost obvious. ^Vhenever a group of people have something in common they 
are spontaneously called a community. In international relations, the term is little 
studied but widely used. There is continuous talk about the Atlantic Community or the 
European Community, but scholars or policy makers seldom define what community 
means to them.
It is indispensable to refer to the definitions of community produced by sociologists. 
Community is usually defined as “a collectivity, the members of which are linked by a 
strong feeling of participation.”^^  Another possible definition is: “communities are 
structural units of cultural and social organization and transmission.”^^  The main 
elements included in a community are: (a) a population (b) a tenitory and (c) a link 
between these elements that makes the community as a whole capable of intervening in 
the lives of its members.Communities are identified by (a) the existence of shared 
values and beliefs, (b) the actuality of many interactions among its members and (c) the 
reality of a reciprocity that expresses some long-term interest and altruism.^^
A. Hillery, ‘Definitions of community: areas of agreement’. Rural Sociology, vol. 20, 1955.
M. Arensberg, ‘Hie Community as object and as sample’ in R. Kônig, Handbook o f  Empirical 
Sociology (Cologne: 1961).
^^The elements of a community, defined above, are very close to the elements of the standard 
definition of the state (a territory, a population and a governing principle). The main difference lies 
in the third principal. A community is able to intervene in its members life, but not necessarily in 
an organised, fonnal and institutionalised way, whereas a state implies a governmental, 
institutionalised intervention principle. The concept of community is far broader and far less 
explicit than the one of state.
^®See Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, Security Communities (Paper presented at the 1994 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association), p. 29.
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A community is also a complex system made up of a set of interlocking or integrated 
subsystems (economic, political, social etc.) fulfilling various ftmctions and of various 
importance. A community is not exclusively characterised by a harmonious population 
or a ‘we feeling’, but a minimum amount of consensus is absolutely required. 
“According to the minimal definition, community is simply a relevant degree of 
interdependence, and hence an objective fact, regardless of whether the governments 
or populations involved are aware of it or not.”'*^
A community, by definition, is a group of people who share ceitain attributes.
Members of a community share values, preferences, and life-styles, They also share 
memories of common experiences. They aspire toward common ends, show 
deference or loyalty to coimnon symbols, and sense common destinies. Most 
important, they identity with one another and distinguish between themselves and 
outsiders.'’^
Two main kinds of community seem possible, one based on kinship, status and 
hierarchy; and another based on territory, contract and individual rights. The former is 
a. ‘community of feeling’, a community based on individual character and on habit, the 
latter is grounded on rational will and market economic logic (the pursuit of individual 
profit and the invisible hand that takes care of the general interest). The former results 
fi-om likeness and from shared-life experience, the latter results from contractual 
relationships rooted on monetary values. This distinction was first made by Ferdinand 
Tonnies in his book Gemeinschafi und Geselschafl (1887). The differentiation is very 
important as Gemeimchaft usually refers to relationships illustrated by the family link 
and as Geselschafl is used to qualify merchant ties or links of political allegiance.
^®Paul Taylor claims: “I mean community in the sense of community of beliefs, values, attitudes and 
loyalties. 1 call tliis a socio-psychological conmiunity...” See Paul Taylor, ‘The Concept of 
Community and tlie European Process’, Journal o f  Common Market Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 1968, p. 
85. For otlier accounts of the idea of conuuunity in international relations theory see Aidrew 
Lihklater, ‘The Problem of Conuuunity in International Relations Theory’, Alternatives, no. 2, 
1990 and Andrew Hurrell, ‘International Society and the Study of Regimes: A  Reflective 
Approach’, in Voider Rittberger (cd.). Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993).
‘‘^ Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis o f  International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 
1988), p. 214.
''^Donald J. Puchala, ‘International Transactions and Regional Integration’, International 
Organization, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, p. 741.
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A Gemeinschafi is therefore a ‘natural’ community but not necessarily a formal one. 
In particular, nations are usually considered as being ‘natural’ communities even 
though there are nothing more than an artificial creation. The claim of being natural is 
one of the bases of nationalism.
[A nation] is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality 
and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, 
horizontal comradesliip. Ultimately it is tliis fraternity that makes it possible, over 
the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as 
willingly to die for such limited imaginings."*^
A nation that considers itself as a natural community is in actuality an “imagined 
community”, a deeply artificial one. The separation between Gemeinschafi and 
Geselschafl is blurred. The usual translation of the word Geselschafl by society does 
not explain the fact that all societies in one way or another claim a natural dimension. 
What is certain, nevertheless, is that a community that claitns for itself a natural 
ascendant seems more solid, more likely to last.
A political community is a particular conmiunity. A seminal definition of this concept 
is provided by Ernst Haas:"^ ^
Political community is a condition in which specific groups and individuals show 
more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political 
authority, in a specific period o f  time and in a definable geographic space.
A political community'*'  ^ is specifically a community in which there is consensus 
concerning the legitimacy of the central political authority and of the political values 
this authority stands for. “A common sovereign or supreme enforcement agency do not 
necessarily imply a political community, if by this is meant a common ‘body politic’. 
Communication in the political sub-system has to be particularly dynamic and efficient.
'’^ Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f  Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1983), p. 16.
"*^ Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting o f  Europe, Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 5, emphasis in original.
'’'’Ernst Haas is very suspicious of the notion of Gemeinschafi and substitutes for it a pluralist model of 
society, a community of competing interests co-existing thanks to an agieement about the rules of 
the institutional system. See ibid., pp. 30-35.
"’^ Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level: Problems o f  Definition and 
Measurement (Princeton N.J: 1953), p. 6.
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“A well developed political cotnmiinity contains everything that is necessary for the 
harmonious coexistence with other communities: civic culture, basic freedoms, law, 
civil society, good institutions, religious and ethnic associations, traditional 
communities such as the family and so on.”^^
Conflict resolution within a  community
In sociology, the study of communities deal specifically with the way communities 
solve the problems they encounter. Previously, the concept of community was defined 
with reference to a minimum consensus or to put it in a different way, with reference to 
certain shared core values. It is, therefore, of great interest to study the pattern of 
conflict resolution that is adopted by a community. A community has to be strong 
enough so that no core values will ever be in danger and flexible enough so that change 
which is useful for the community can still occur. The sialtis quo could be restraining 
the members of the community from better possibilities as it can be a synonym for the 
sine qua non condition of every organised body (that is stability).
Conflicts occur as a failure in the functioning of one of the sub-systems of the 
community can provoke the reaction of the other sub-systems and, depending on the 
importance of the original sub-system, a change of the whole. A community that is 
functioning properly, is one in which all the subsystems are working normally, meaning 
that none of them under or overworks. This implies that (a) the institutions and groups 
of the community are able to respond to the needs and to the demands of the members;
(b) there is a consensus concerning core values so that every member knows what to 
expect from the other members; and (c) there is confidence that the first two 
conditions will be fulfilled, that is there are long-term expectations that the core values 
of the community will be honoured, and that the organisational fimctioning of the body 
is good enough. When these thiee conditions are matched, change can not only occur 
in the community, but this change will be compatible with its functioning and with its 
core values.
There is a strong relationship between, on the one hand, the legitimacy and the 
adaptability of the institutions and, on the other hand, the possibility of peacefirl change
"^Ryszard Legutko, ‘Cosmopolitans and coimnunitarians: a commentary’, in Cliris Brown (ed.), 
Political Restructuring in Europe. Ethical Perspectives (LondoniRoutledge, 1994), p. 233.
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of the community. Conflict that is highly institutionalised does not disorganise the 
community. On the contrary, conflict in this case is often an organising factor. Frictions 
can occur from either an absence of conformity to the main patterns of the body or 
flom overconformity to the system and its values because this overconformity can 
restrict the capacity of the system for latency and adaptation. Karl Deutsch made an 
opposition between communities of conflict and communities of interests.'^  ^ Clearly 
both patterns exist and usually they coexist in the same social body. Conflict is an 
inherent feature of every community, its resolution is a crucial test for the capacities of 
the community to change without jeopardising its fiindamental values.
Security and community, common features and possible  applications
The two concepts studied in this chapter, are closely linked by the most obvious of
their common elements: the centrality of shared core values. In both notions, core 
values serve as the organising principles under girding their mere existence and as the 
main focuses of their care.
A sense of community implies a minimum consensus on the topic of core values. 
Security is the protection of core values against external threats. The importance of 
security is therefore more obvious than ever: the loss of its core values means the end 
of a given community and either its assimilation by another or its radical, coerced 
transformation into a new one. The two notions are interdependent, A community 
cannot survive without an effort to ensure its security.'^* Security has no sense if there 
is no community of values to protect.
The process of conflict resolution within a community, demonstrates that security 
can be ensured by various methods. The institutionalisation of some processes of 
conflict resolution greatly improves the capacity of the system for latency and 
adaptation. Security can be guaranteed by peaceful processes, and violent conflicts can 
be prevented in this way. Sharing some common values and an agreed institutional 
resolution system can limit drastically the violent nature of any eventual conflict. Thus,
"’^ Deutsch, The Analysis o f  International Relations, op. cit., pp. 214-215.
'’®The reference to the security of a community (as opposed to the security of a state) is deliberate. 
“The security of states dominates our understanding of what security can be, and who it can be for, 
not because conflict between states is inevitable, Imt because other forms of political community 
have been rendered ahnost untMnkable.” In R. B. J. Walker, ‘Security, Sovereignty, and the 
Challenge of World Politics’, no, 15,1990, p. 6.
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a commiinity can live with its members sharing long-teim expectations of peaceful 
change. Security is not necessarily a violent process, as discords can also be restrained 
by a system that makes violent antagonisms impossible.
Part One
The Essential Conditions for the Emergence of 
a Pluralistic Security Community
22
2. Compatibility of major values relevant to 
political decision making: is a democratic or a 
liberal peace possible?
Karl Deutsch considers the compatibility of major values as one of the essential 
conditions for the emergence of both a pluralistic and an amalgamated security 
community. He assumes that: ^
111 regard to values, we found in all our cases a compatibility of the main values held 
by the politically relevant strata of all participating units. Sometimes this was 
supplemented by a tacit agieement to deprive of political significance any 
incompatible values that might remain.
This condition has an obvious link with the concepts of security and community 
examined previously. Security involves the protection of the core values of a 
community from violent threats. There is, therefore, the necessity to have a broad 
agreement on the subject of major values among the members of the community. 
Deutsch defines main values as “those which seem to be of major importance in the 
domestic policies of the units concerned.”  ^This definition is compatible with the one 
given in the previous chapter, this “major importance” being measured by the 
possibility of these values to induce the ultimate sacrifice for their defence.
Examples of major values, cited by Deutsch in the empirical part of his study,^ are: 
“basic political ideology (...) covered for the most part by the terms ‘constitutionalism’ 
and ‘democracy’”; “modified free enterprise” or the “rule of law”. It is worth noting 
that religion has, in most successful cases of integiation, been excluded fi'om the 
politically relevant values."  ^This constant pattern of exclusion of the most controversial 
issues is a very important characteristic of the integrative process. Points that are too
^Karl W. Deutsch et alii. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light o f  Historical Experience (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 
1957), p. 46.
~Md., p. 123. 
% id., pp. 124-129. 
“Ibid, p. 125.
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sensitive to be resolved have to become dead issues to allow the continuation of 
integration.
Tt is quite obvious that this first condition is both essential and veiy difficult to 
interpret. Most research has so far concentrated on the issue of what is widely called 
‘democratic peace’ (i.e. the hypothesis that democracies do not fight against each 
other), but it seems indispensable not to limit tliis first condition to democracy to make 
it more instrumental.
The assumptions and the logic of the ‘democratic peace'
The Kantian project
The hypothesis of a democratic peace is not novel. This idea has been advanced by 
many philosophers from the eighteenth century onward. Immanuel Kant in 1795 wrote 
liis famous treaty On Perpeitml Peace in which he argues that perpetual peace is 
possible if three conditions are fid filled: (1) the civil constitution in each state is 
republican; (2) the law of nations is based upon a federation of fiee states; (3) the 
cosmopolitan or world law is limited to conditions of universal hospitality.^ This 
treatise raised many hopes about the possible achievement of a democratic peace based 
on these very conditions.
Kant, following Rousseau, considered war as an immense waste of time and wealth. 
In the words of Rousseau:^
Think of the waste of men, of money, of strength in eveiy form; think of the 
exhaustion in wliich any state is plunged by the most successful war; compare these 
ravages with the profit which results: and we shall find that we commonly lose 
where we suppose ourselves to gain.
^Immanuel Kant, On Perpetual Peace (1795), section 2, For an analysis of Kant’s positions see 
Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs’, Part I, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
vol. 12, no. 3, 1983 pp. 205-235; Thomas Donaldson, ‘Kant’s Global Rationalism’, in Terry Nardin 
and David R. Mapcl (cds.). Traditions o f  International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), pp. 136-158 and Andrew Hmrell, ‘Kant and tlie Kantian Paradigm in International 
Relations’, Review o f  International Studies, vol. 16, 1990.
^Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Saint-Pierre’s Project for Peace’, in Stanley Hoffmann and David Fidler 
(eds.), Rousseau on International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 78.
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The perpetual peace was according to Kant the outcome mainly of constitutional 
constraints. Citizens that pay the price of a war in blood and treasure do not easily 
accept to fight. As long as the checks and balances of a republic function correctly 
there is little chance for an unjust war to happen, although “peace among men living 
side by side is not the natural state. Kant claims that:^
If the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide tliat war should be 
declared (...) nothing is more natural that they should be very cautious in 
commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.
Peace is not viewed as a natural but as an artificial state induced by liberalism and 
republicanism. On Perpetual Peace is an attempt to “construct a framework of ideas 
within which the generally acknowledged rights and duties of states vis-à-vis their own 
citizens can be shown to require, logically, acknowledgements of certain equally 
important rights and duties toward each other (and each other’s citizens).”  ^Perpetual 
peace seems to result and to be guaranteed by the recognition for all people of a “‘a 
public law of men in general’ (...) thanks to which no individual would any longer be in 
the state of nature, or, as Hannah Arendt was to say, deprived of ‘the right to have 
rights’.” ®^
Defining democracy is of course a veiy difficult task and most authors define 
democracy with reference to free speech, the mle of law, and regular competitive 
elections of the officials empowered to declare war.^  ^Kant considers that the ancient 
democracies did not have a republican constitution because all of the power was held
Kant, op. cit., section 2,
^Kant, op. cit., quoted from Hans Reiss (ed), Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970), p, 100.
^W. B. Gallic, Philosophers o f  Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 
13-14.
^®Pierre Hassner, ‘Beyond the three traditions: tlie philosophy of war and peace in historical 
perspective’, International Affairs, vol. 70, no. 4, 1994, p. 747.
“ See Doyle, op. cit., pp. 206-207, Jolin M. Owen, ‘How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace’, 
International Security, vol. 19, no. 2, 1994, p. 89. Bruce Russett, in Grasping the Democratic 
Peace (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 14 argues that: “Democracy (...) is 
usually identified with a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of citizens, a govermnent 
brought to power in contested elections, and an executive either popularly elected or responsible to 
an elected lei^slature, often also with requirements for civil liberties such as free speech.” See also 
Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1971), Tatu Vaiüiaven, The Process o f  Democratization: A Comparative Study o f  147 States, 1980- 
1988 (New York: Crane Russak, 1990), and Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsly, The Real World 
Order, Zones o f  Peace/Zones o f  Turmoil (Chatham, N.J: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1993).
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by the demos and no checks and balances were available. This distinction is important 
as the causal logic of the democratic peace usually derives from the definition of 
democracy itself.
Causal logic and evaluation of the dem ocratic peace
The main reasons why democracies are loath to fight each other are of two sorts. The
democratic peace can be explained by structural reasons namely the institutional 
constraints within democracies. The division of power and the various checks and 
balances of constitutional democracies are meant to prevent unjust wars from 
happening. The second explanation can be called normative as it bases its assertion 
on the norms supposedly shared by all democracies, these shared norms are meant to 
be applied at the interstate level and thus produce the kind of peace that reigns in the 
internal affairs of democracies. “The culture, perceptions and practices that permit 
compromise and peaceful solution of conflicts without the threat of violence within 
countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other democratic 
countries.D em ocratic norms are the reason for this behaviour; “when it comes to 
democratic norms, nation-states not only can know each other better, but they can 
know each other as nation-states that tend to solve their internal and external 
problems by peaceful means
The democratic peace has been considered as “the closest thing we have to an 
empirical law in the study of international relations.”^^  Thanks to ‘cognitive evolution’, 
peaceful ideas originating in one nation are diffused to others. The partisans of the 
democratic peace claim that no democracy has ever waged war against another
’^See Alain Lagarde, Tntrodiiction’, in Kant, Projet de paix perpétuelle (Paris: Hatier, 1988), p. 34.
’^This interesting distinction was made by Owen, op. cit., p. 90. See also Christopher Layne, ‘Kant or 
Cant: the Myth of the Democratic Peace’, International Security, vol. 19, no. 2, 1994, pp. 6-10.
Tliis explanation is favored by Kant (cf. supra).
’^Bruce Russett, op. cit., p. 31, emphasis in original.
^%manuel Adler, Imagined (Security) Communities (Paper prepared for delivery at the 1994 Amiual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association), p. 22, emphasis in original.
^ J^ack Levy, ‘Domestic Politics and War’, in Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb, The Origins and 
Prevention o f  Major Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 88.
^®See Emanuel Adler, Beverly Crawford and Jack Donnelly, ‘Defining and Conceptualizing Progress 
in International Relations’, in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (cds.). Progress in Postwar 
International Relations Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 14 f f
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democracy/^ “In fact, democracies seldom even engage one another with threats of 
military violence, and when disputes do arise, they hardly ever result in military 
hostilities.” ®^ Thus, the hope of creating a genuine zone of peace in the world;
The political relations among the counties in the zones of i^eace and democracy will 
not be influenced by relative military power. Nor will those nations be divided into 
com}3eting military blocs seeking to balance each other's ixrwer. There probably will 
be plenty of national and other conflict, but the decisive special characteristic of tliis 
conflict is that no one will believe that it can lead to war.^’
Of course, the fact that such a war has not yet happenned does not guarantee that it 
will not happen in the future. Tt seems nevertheless very unlikely that these statistical 
studies can either confirm or infirm the theory.
The critique of the democratic peace theory
The opponents of the democratic peace theory argue that (1) this theory is inherently 
ambiguous because of the difficulty in defining the two central notions of war and 
democracy; (2) democracies have been too few and too remote fiom one another so 
that no real risk of war between them ever existed; (3) democracy is not evidently the 
causal mechanism that accounts for the absence of war between democratic states, 
many other possible explanations can be proposed.
The ambiguity of the definitions
It is veiy tempting for partisans of the democratic peace to define democracy and war 
in a way that will validate their claims. As any statistical test (which can be objective),
’^ Doyle, op. cit.; Russett, op. cit.; Melvin Small and David Singer, ‘The War Proneness of Democratic 
Regimes’, The Jerusalem Journal o f  International Relations, no. 1, 1976, pp. 50-67; Erich Weede, 
‘Some Simple Calculations on Democracy and War Involvement’, Journal o f  Peace Research , vol. 
29, no. 4, 1992, pp. 377-383; William J. Dixon, ‘Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of 
International Conflicts’, American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 1, 1994, pp. 14-32. It is 
beyond tlie scope of this study to evaluate the statistical evidence produced by either the proponents 
or the opponents of the democratic peace tlieory. A rapid overview of modern liistory docs not 
produce any clear example of war between democracies.
’^’Dixon, op. cit., p. 14.
Singer and Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 3. The existence of conflict is not denied by the authors: “Conflict 
among the nations of the zone of peace will have two sources: money (jobs) and symbols. That is, it 
will be conflict based on either opposing financial interests or on issues that are of psychological or 
emotional importance. But tlie key fact is that none of this conflict will affect the fimdaniental 
interests and feelings of any of the parties to the conflict.” Ibid., p. 25.
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prerequisites a definition of the concepts (which is subjective) no test can really be 
conclusive. Therefore, it is not really possible to test the theory from a purely scientific 
point of view. All the tests conducted so far are valid to the extent that their definitions 
are acceptable.
Political realism considers “war as a feature of all historical times and of all 
civilisations.”^^  The habitual definition of war is the one given by Bruce Russett:
War here means large-scale institutionally organized lethal violence, and to define 
“large-scale” we shall use the threshold commonly used in tlie social scientific 
literature of war; one thousand battle fatalities.
The definition of war as an armed conflict that produces over 1000 deaths^ excludes 
de facto  many low intensity conflicts and has therefore only a finite validity. War today 
is more complex and more difficult to circumscribe than before 1945 when most armed 
conflicts were preceded by declarations of war. Democracies are suspected of trying to 
avoid the embarrassment of an out and out war by resorting “to precisely those forms 
of non-attributable violence excluded fi-om the Maoz definition.”^^
Most studies excluded civil wars from their scope because of the need to distinguish 
between domestic violence and interstate conflicts. This distinction removes from 
consideration the American Civil War, an otheiivise cmcial test for the democratic 
peace theory. Because of the same reason, the Boer war is also excluded.
The definition of democracy is even more ambiguous and difficult to assess. There 
are inherent difficulties in the definition of a democracy. The abolition of slavery, 
female suffiage are but two of the sine-qua-non conditions of modern democracy but 
these were clearly not the conditions prevailing in the nineteenth century. Tn short, the 
definition of democracy has varied over the years and it still varies a lot across states as
^^Raymond Aron, Paix el guerre entre les nations (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1984), p. 157. 
^  Russett, op. cit., p. 12.
"'’As in Small and Singer, op. cit..
^^Raymond Cohen, ‘Pacific unions: a reappraisal of the theory that democracies do not go to war with 
each other’, Review o f  International Studies, vol. 20, 1994, p. 218. Cohen refers to a definition 
proposed by Zeev Maoz and Bnice Russett, ‘Normative and Stnjctural Causes of Democratic Peace, 
1946-1986’, American Political Science Review, vol. 87, 1993. This definition is based on the 
concept of “Militarized Interstate Dispute”, defined as (p. 628) “a set of interactions between or 
among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of 
force (...) these acts must be explicit, overt, nonaccidental and government sanctioned.”
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the political systems labelled as democratic have often as many similarities as 
dissimilarities.
It is only through some very ambiguous definitions of either democracy or war that 
the military occupation of the Ruhr by the French in 1923 or even the First World War 
is not considered as an armed conflict between democracies. Michael Doyle, for 
instance, considers that Germany at the brink of the First World War was a democracy 
for its internal affairs but not for its external relations.^^ This distinction may be 
considered as correct or not, but, in any case, shows the difficulty to explain some 
wars.
Neither war nor democracy can have a clear and universally accepted definition. As 
long as these definitions remain so imperfect, the democratic peace hypothesis remains 
utterly fragile as a rejection of the definitions of the terms means also the rejection of 
the theory itself.
Is the dem ocratic peace statistically proven?
There is no doubt that especially in the pre-1945 period democracies were very few in 
number and very far away fi-om one another. War cannot be considered as a real option 
in that case and it is not surprising therefore that no war occurred during this period 
between democratic states. As John Mearsheimer notes:
Democracies have been few in number over the past two centuries, and thus there 
have not been many cases where two democracies were in a position to figjit each 
other.
Most opponents of the democratic peace theory claim that “random chance predicts 
the absence of war between democracies better than liberal theories of international 
relations.” ®^ Statistical studies conclude that “a test of the relationship between dyads 
at war and liberal dyads over time indicates that this relationship is very weak.” ®^
^^oyle, op. cit., pp. 216-217.
’^ J^ohn Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International 
Security, vol. 15, no. 1, 1990, pp. 50-51.
^^David E. Spiro, ‘The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace’, International Security!, vol. 19, no. 2, 
1994, p. 51.
^%id., p. 68.
and Singer, op. cit., pp. 50-69. 
^^Doyle, op. cit., p. 232.
“^For a discussion of different opinions concerning the relationship between democracy and security 
community see Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, Security Communities (Paper presented at 
the 1994 Annual Meeting of tire American Political Science Association), pp. 25-27.
^^Layne, op. cit., pp. 44-45.
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Democratic peace is explained by the fact that democracies “have rarely been 
neighbors.” ®^
On a more abstract level, it. seems difficult to reconcile two findings of many 
partisans of the democratic peace theory, namely that at the same time democracies 
loath to fight each other but do not equally loath to fight against: non-democracies.
Michael Doyle is steadier than other analysts when he claims that:^^
Where liberal internationalism among liberal states has been deficient is in 
preserving its basic preconditions under changing international ciraimstances and 
particularly in supporting the liberal character of its constituent states. Tt has failed
on occasion, as it did in regard to Germany in the 1920s, to provide international |
Ieconomic support for liberal regimes whose market foundations were in crisis. j
IBesides, decisional constraints are not a privilege of democracies. Every type of |
regime has some decisional constraints although, it could be argued that democracies |
Ihave more constraints than other regimes. The relationship between democracy and 
war remains highly problematic as no completely satisfying theoiy can be found to 
explain it.^ ^
Alternative causal m echanism s
One of the main claims of the opponents of the democratic peace theoiy is that there is 
no convincing reason why democracy should be the explanation of tlie fact that there 
has been no war between a certain number of democratic states.
Christopher T,ayne, for instance, considers, after a series of case studies of crises 
between democratic states that did not result in a war, that realism explains better why 
there has been no war. He claims that:
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From a realist perspective, democratic peace theory has mistakenly reversed the 
linkage between international systemic constraints and domestic political 
institutions. (...) States that enjoy a high degree of security, like Britain and the 
United States at the begiiming of the twentieth century, can afford the more 
minimalist state political structures of classical Anglo-American liberalism, because 
there is no inuninent external tlireat that necessitates a jxiwerful governmental 
apparatus to mobilize resources for national security purposes. (...) Tlie greater the 
external tlireat a state faces (or believes it does), the more ‘autocratic’ its foreign 
policymaking process will be, and the more centralized its political structures will 
be.
In short., according to this view, it is peace and security that produces démocratisation 
and not démocratisation that produces peace and security.
A more sympathetic view to the democratic peace theory still claims that it is not 
democracy as such that explains the fact that democracies do not wage wars against 
each other, but rather asserts that republican regimes usually ally with other regimes of 
the same kind. Thus.
Regimes that agree on the conditions of ‘universal hospitality’ are likely to define 
their interests in a similar manner, and to ally to fight for the same causes. This is 
not as Kant suggested, due to the liberal nature of the conditions of universal 
hospitality, but rather to power and interests, subjectively conceived.^'’
Some Other alternative hypotheses are advanced to explain the democratic peace. 
One of them is that “many democracies are peaceful toward each other because they 
are bound by common ties in a network of institutions, including transnational ones 
(e.g. the European Com m unity).A nother alternative explanation proposed by the 
same authors claims that “many democracies have common interests in presenting a 
unified alliance fiont, as in NATO, against a common enemy (perhaps enhanced by an 
active policy of US hegemony as a peace-keeper within the alliance).” ’^’
'^’Spiro, op. cit., p. 81.
^^Bmce Russett and William Aiitholis, ‘Do Democracies Figiit Each Other? Evidence from the 
PeloiX)iinesian War’, Journal o f  Peace Research, vol. 29, no. 4, 1992, p. 416, Similar analyses that 
finally validate the liberal peace hypothesis while keeping a realist framework are advanced by 
Georg Sorensen, ‘Kant and Processes of Democratization; Consequences for Neorealist Thought’, 
Journal o f  Peace Research, vol. 29, no. 4, 1992, pp. 397-414,
‘^Russett and Antholis, op. cit., p. 416. It must be borne in mind tiiat the two authors are partisans of 
the democratic peace theory and do not accept the validity of these views.
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The variety of these views shows that there is not for the time being any clear 
explanation of the absence of war between democracies. An explanation resting solely 
on democracy is still debatable and not entirely convincing.
Which major vaiues can make war unattractive and 
improbabie?
The process of establishing a pluralistic security community requires “an increasing 
unattractiveness and improbability of war among the political units of the emerging 
pluralistic security community, as perceived by their governments, elites, and 
(eventually) populations.”^^  This requirement is met if the members of the pluralistic 
security community share some common peaceful values.
In the words of Seyom Brown:
Realistic strategies for durable peace, whether between two historically antagonistic 
nalioiis, among a set of countries in a region pervaded by warprone instabilities, or 
for the world as a whole, need to address the systemic causes of war and to provide 
the involved conmiunities with options for fundamental, even radical, restructuring 
of their relationships.
Moreover, the nature of any pacifying influence still seems inexplicable. Besides, the 
acknowledgement of the existence of a pacifier begs the question of its emergence. 
Such pioneers as Lewis Richardson, although confirming the importance and the reality 
of a pacifying influence, could not clearly demonstrate what this in fluence involved:
The existence of a j^acifler is here proved, but its nature is not entirely clear. It may 
well be the habit o f obedience to a common government. But there are several other 
social features which have positive correlations with common government.^^
War and enemy; the implications of som e very common w ords
The assumption that war is the central feature of the international setting is not 
intellectually innocent. Such an assumption has as a premise, the fact that at the core of
^^Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis o f  International Relations (Englewood Cliffs. N.J: Prentice Hall, 
1988), p. 281.
Seyom Brown, The Causes and Prevention o f  War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p. 239.
^^ewis F. Ricliardson, Statistics o f  Deadly Quarrels (Pittsburgh: Boxwood /  Chicago: Quadrangle, 
1960), p. 295.
j
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the notion of politics Mes a distinction between friend and enemy. If politics can only 
offer this binary choice, then it is obvious that the whole notion of politics is 
conflictual. This theory of the inherent conflictual character of politics was first 
developed by the German philosopher Carl Schmitt who claimed that the concept of 
politics was solely based on the antithesis between fi-iend and enemy."^ ® According to 
Schmitt, politics were only possible against someone or something. The enemy is 
considered as the indispensable stimulus for any political intercourse. Politics cannot 
exist without enemies and a friend-enemy relationship cannot exist without conflict. 
Conflict and, consequently, international war are inherent parts of politics.
This position is highly problematic and very reductionist. The whole complex issue 
of politics is reduced to a binary choice and no other alternative option is available. 
Tins vision does not encapture the complexity and the variety of either politics or 
international relations. Pierre Hassner proposes a sharply different distinction:'^^
It is the pairing ‘them and ns’ (...) that constitutes human exi>erience. But what is 
contained in this ‘us’, is it the nation, is it the land or any other portion, any other 
union? I do not know it. We all have selective solidarities, because as Rousseau said, 
the friend of mankind is the fiiend of nolxxty. (...) There is a plurality of loyalties 
and at the same time the need for an identity that surplants the others.
This distinction between ‘them and us’ contains a great number of different 
distinctions: ‘them’ can be the enemies but also the contestants and, broadly speaking, 
in a political relationship all participants are at the same time enemies and partners, 
they are conflicting and collaborating:
the “Enemy”, is always the “Other”, but not all “Others” can be defined as 
“Enemies”, however important they are from the viewpoint of “our” identity.'’^
This debate concerning ‘them and us’ opens a whole new multitude of possibilities. 
Politics are not necessarily conflictual, and war although central, is not always the main
’’^ Carl Schmitt, D erB egriff des Politischen (Berlin: 1932).
"’’Pierre Hassner, ‘Le XXe siècle, la guerre et la paix’, La Pensée politique, 1994, p. 49. The 
difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was well expressed by Goethe’s Herr Biedermaim: „Nichts 
Besseres weifi Ich mir an Sonn- und Feiertagen /  Als ein Gesprach von Krieg und Kriegsgeschrei /  
weiin hinten, welt, in der Türkel, die Vôlker aufeinandersclilagen.“
■’’^ Interview of Pierre Hassner by the author, December 14,1994.
"’^ Vilho Harle, ‘On the Concepts of tlie “Other” and the “Enemy”’, History o f  European Ideas, vol. 
19, nos. 1-3,1994, p. 29.
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feature of international relations. Politics and a broader social process can be 
conflictual at some times and collaborative at other moments. Competition is always 
under girding the whole social life but it does not inevitably reach the stage of 
becoming a violent conflict. The vision of international politics as an inherently 
conflictual relationship is not flawless;
Such a i3crcei5tion owes a lot to a philosophical-ixilitical vision that dates (...) to 
before the classical era of western diplomacy, the diplomacy of the interstate system 
consecrated by the treaty of West|)halia in 1648, or even to the times of the Greek 
city-state when, well before the invention of the territorial state, the idea of the 
inevitability of war between neighbouring, and therefore rival, political units, was 
sketched for the first time."’"’
The traditional conception of the relationship between war and peace considers that: 
“Peace has hitherto appeared to be a more or less lasting suspension of violent modes 
of rivalry between political units. iI
This conception of the dialectic between war and peace is no longer valid in large 
parts of the world as for example in Europe where war is not a political option in most 
of the continent. To take into account this extraordinaty change, a radical revision of 
the conventional wisdom is needed. Raymond Aron noticed tliis change that makes 
war far more unattractive today than some decades ago:'*®
Wlio in Europe who is sane would dream of reviving the romanticism of fresh and 
joyous war? Who can forget the mincer of Verdun, the mud of the Flanders and the 
flower of European youth mowed down by macliine gun, let alone the unspeakable 
horrors of the Second World War, the death camps, genocide and the area 
bombings?
A few lines later he explains what alteration of the core values of a society permitted 
this change:'*^
"’’Dario Ballistella, ‘Fin de la guerre froide, fin de l ’état de guerre?’, Politique étrangère, no. 3, 1993, 
p. 748.
"’^ Aron, op. cit., p. 158.
"’^ y n io n d  Aron, Clausewitz Philosopher o f  War (London: Routledge, 1983), p. 400.
"’^ Ibid., p. 400.
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T experience none of Clausewitz’s passions - the cult of the fatherland incarnated in 
the sovereign, the exaltation of the martial virtues or the intoxication brought on by 
victoiy.
The em ergence of peaceful values
External threats do not provide a satisfactory answer for the development of security 
communities. “Although external threats might be quite prominent in the production of 
many past, present, and future security communities, we see no theoretical reason why 
an external threat is a necessary condition. In fact, it is the recognition of shared 
identities that frequently creates the desire, the very expectation that it. is possible to 
develop a security community. ”"** Peace is based on common values and shared 
identities. What is apparently needed is some regional awareness, in the words of 
Andrew Hurrell: “Regional awareness, the shared perception of belonging to a 
particular community can rest on internal factors, often defined in terms of common 
culture, history, religious traditions,”'*®
But, every internal factor is not essential. More than tlie process of démocratisation 
itself, it is some basic prerequisites of modern democracy that can be credited with the 
growing unattractiveness of war.®® There is no longer much prestige in the uniform and 
the conquest of new lands looks pointless.®* The liberal philosophers of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries have predicted this trend. Grotius and Locke defined the state 
of nature in exactly the opposite way from the Hobbesian state of war and insisted on 
the coexistence of co-operation and conflict. Montesquieu predicted with great 
accuracy a shift away from the ‘hot’ passions of his times towards the ‘cold’ passions
Adler and Barnett, op. cit., p. 45. This argument is clearly developed by Adler: “such factors as the 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons and economic interdependence may explain states’ reluctance to |
go to war, but only community bonds and the common identity that becomes established among i
democratic states can explain dependable expectations of peaceful change.” In Emanuel Adler,
‘Europe’s New Security Order: A  Pluralistic Security Community’, in Beverly Crawford (ed.). The
Future o f  European Security (Berkeley, CA: IAS, UC Berkeley, 1992), p. 290. :
"’’’Andrew Hurrell, ‘Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics’, Review o f  |
International Sudies, forthcoming October 1995. ;
^^or a discussion of the role of démocratisation in Latin America see Andrew Hurrell, An Emerging |
Security Community in South America? (Paper presented at the 90th American Political Science I
Association Annual Meeting, 1994), p. 15.
’^Tliis point was stressed at length by Pierre Hassner in his interview.
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of merchant spirit and of individualism.®  ^These informal and only conceptual changes 
make a lot of difference in the way societies and states are organised.
Individualism in particular can account for an important role as it constitutes the veiy 
basis of our ‘modern liberty’. In his very accurate analysis, de la liberté des anciens 
comparée à celle des modernes, Benjamin Constant claimed that freedom in the 
modern world means first and foremost individual, private fieedom. This private 
freedom cannot be enhanced by military conquest, and military values seem completely 
irrelevant.®  ^This kind of freedom is not a zero sum game and the law that according to 
Thucidides dooms an imperialist power to either a boundless expansion or a quick 
disappearance is no longer prevailing. The main demand addressed to the modern 
government is not to acquire new lands but to create the necessaty conditions for the 
production of wealth and the preservation of the basic rights of the individual.®'* “The 
motivation of individuals in the mass and in government, and the influence and skill of 
leaders, weigh far more heavily in the balance than differences in the form of 
authority.”®® International politics are profoundly affected by these social changes:
^^Montesquieu believes that “the natural effect of trade is to bring peace.” In the first cliapter of the 
tenth book of De I 'esprit des lois (1748) named ‘on the subject of trade’, he claims that “everywhere 
mores are mild, there is trade; and everywhere there is trade, mores are mild.” This view is also 
shared by Adam Smith in The Wealth o f  Nations (1776). These views arc based on the basic 
assumption tliat trade and, broadly speaWng, the pusuit of welfare are able to control men’s 
passions. This view is expressed also by Albert O. Hirschmami, The Passions and the Interests: 
Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
1977). A  different view was expressed by Dupuy. He believes tliat the spirit of trade can fail to 
control the passions of men. This spirit is a passion that can go out of control. See Jean-Pierre 
Dupuy, Le sacrifice el Venvie: le libéralisme aux prises avec la justice sociale (Paris: Calmann- 
Lévy, 1992).
^^Individualism is a very complex notion having many different definitions: “«Utilitarian 
individualism» proposes the vision of a society of equal atoms directed by tlie pursuit of their 
interest, «romantic individualism», the one of inconunensurable individuals of wliich none can be 
replaced; «market individualism» utters of a man free of passions entering in a new moral 
community shaped by the ‘doux coimiierce’, as well as a way (that of economics) to analyse human 
comportment.” In Pierre Birnbaum and Jean Leca (eds.). Sur l ‘individualisme: théories et méthodes 
(Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1991), p. 12. For a discussion of 
file influence of individualism on liberalism, see Suzaime D. Jacobitti, ‘Individualism and Political 
Community: Arendt and Tocqueville on the Current Debate in Liberalism’, Notnos: Yearbook o f  the 
American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, vol. 35, 1993.
'^’This is a specific trend of contemporary democracies: “While there have been many democracies 
through history, most of the countries of the zones of peace are a particular kind of democracy that 
never existed before a few decades ago -modern, mass-high-wealth democracies, where the ordinaiy 
people are materially extremely well off by historical standards.” In Singer and Widavsky, op. cit., 
p. 14.
^^Klaus Knorr, The War Potential o f  Nations (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 96.
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The triple process of state modernisation - on the political level a state is no longer 
composed by subjects but by citizens; on the economic level a state is no longer 
autarkic but interdependent; on a symbolic level a state is no longer only meant to 
protect the corporal security but also tlie economic and even the social welfare of its 
members - implies necessarily a rift with the postulate of the necessary autonomy of 
international politics with respect to tlie internal political order.
This modernisation of the state ereates the necessary conditions for the emergence of 
an homogeneous international system. Such a system is composed of states “of the 
same type, and following the same conception of politics.”®^ The homogeneity of the 
international state is certainly a guarantee for a more peaceful interstate framework. An 
heterogeneous international system is an important premise of the prevailing realist 
view concerning international relations.
The thesis developed above is quite similar to the liberal peace theoiy advanced by 
John Owen;®*
Liberals believe that individuals everywhere are hindamentaUy the same, and are 
best off pursuing self-preservation and material well-being. Freedom is required for 
these pursuits, and iseace is required for freedom; coercion and violence are counter­
productive.
The mechanism of the liberal peace is now more obvious. “Liberalism gives rise to an 
ideology that distinguishes states primarily according to regime type: in assessing a 
state, liberalism first asks whether it is a liberal democracy or not.”®®
Given these premises, the definitional problem of the concept of democracy is now 
much easier to solve. In case of an interstate dispute, a regime can be considered as 
liberal if it is perceived so by the other part(s) of the dispute. This perception is 
necessarily subjective, but it is nevertheless the best way to solve this apparently 
insoluble problem.®® Two fellow liberal states have little chance to go to war against
’^’Battistella, op. cit., p. 755,
^^Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations, op. cit., p. 108. 
^®Owen, op. cit., p. 89.
^®Ibld., p. 95.
®Ibid., p. 90.
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one another as they share the same values and consider wars of conquest as useless. 
Tliis is true regardless of any formal arrangements existing between the two.®*
The compatibility of major values relevant to political decision making is one 
important step in the integrative process that leads to the creation of a security 
community. It is certainly a sine qua non condition for the emergence of a pluralistic 
security community as a community pre-requires a certain homogeneity and a number 
of common core values. But more than abstract notions of basic political ideology like 
democracy and constitutionalism, it is rather individualism and the spirit of trade that 
make war pointless and peace always preferable.
’^Lewis Richardson demonstrated, for instance, that common citizenship has not assined peace. See 
Richardson, op. cit., pp. 184 ir.
3. Mutual responsiveness: the concrete translation of the sense of community
The second essential condition for the emergence of a pluralistic security community, 
according to Kaii Deutsch, is: *
The capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each 
other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately and without resort to 
violence. In the case of a pluralistic security community, such capabilities for 
ix)litical responsiveness required in each participating state a great many established 
political habits, and of functioning political institutions, favoring mutual 
communication and consultation. To be effective, such habits and institutions had to 
insure that messages fiom other member governments or units would not merely be 
received, but would be understood, and that they would be given real weiglit in the 
process of decision making.
This second condition is the most concrete consequence of the achievement of 
integration. Because of the existence of a sense of community, the member units of a 
security community are able to respond to the demands formulated by their fellow 
units without using violence and without even threatening its use. A well organised 
(formal or informal) framework for co-operation, mutual understanding and help is 
needed to fulfil this condition.
A sense of community is “much more than simply attachment to any number of 
similar or identical values.” It is rather “a matter of perpetual attention, 
communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness (...) a dynamic process - a 
process of social learning.”  ^Describing mutual responsiveness as a learning process is 
very accurate. Without a notion of concrete solidarity and of mutual help there is no 
real chance of ever attaining integration. This solidarity is achieved through a process 
of learning and a constant effort to retain the attainments of the learning process.
’Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Commmiiy and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light o f  Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
1957), pp. 66-67.
% id., p. 129.
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Thus, mutual responsiveness involves (i) the capacity of the member units to 
understand the problems of their fellow members; (ii) the possibility to find responses 
to these needs thiough a bargaining process that satisfies (up to a certain point) every 
one and (iii) the implementation of these solutions and a feedback process concerning 
the new demands generated by these settlements. The first and the third conditions are 
so closely linked and so interdependent that they can be considered as one and only 
condition.
Mutual responsiveness as a process of learning and 
understanding
Mutual responsiveness implies first of all that the demands of the participating units of 
the pluralistic security community will be received and understood.
Wliile political units in tliis category might be able to do much without each other’s 
aid, and might have no need to tremble at one another’s threats, they might have 
acquired the political habits, practices, and institutions necessary to perceive one 
another's sensitive spots or “vital interests”, and to make prompt and adequate 
responses to each other’s critical needs}
Tn this early definition of the concept of mutual responsiveness, Deutsch insists on the 
perception of the essential needs of the participating units. This capacity, in turn, 
requires the establishment of many communication processes that are efficient enough 
to allow the understanding of the various demands formulated.
Understanding, learning and conflict resolution
The process of understanding that leads naturally to mutual responsiveness (that is to 
the peaceful and adequate resolution of possible conflicts), is an essential feature of 
regional integration as such. Tn the words of Ernst Haas:
^Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community a t the International Level: Problems o f  Definition and 
Measurement (Princeton, N.J: 1953), p. 10, emphasis added.
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The study of regional integration is concerned with ex|Maining how and why states 
cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix 
their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new 
techniques for resolving conflict between tliemselves/
Conflict resolution requires (be existence of an efficient process of interchange that 
facilitâtes mutual understanding. It is therefore an essential feature of every security 
community and of eveiy integrated region to have an efficient communication process 
that allows its units to understand the demands of their fellow members. This condition 
of integration is very close to the first characteristic of ‘complex interdependence’. 
This characteristic, according to Keohane and Nye, implies that:
Multiple channels connect societies, including: infonnal ties between governmental 
elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among 
nongovernmental elites (face to face and through telecommunications); and 
transnational organizations (such as multinational banks or corporations). These 
channels can be summarized as interstate, transgovemmental, and transnational 
relations. Interstate relations are the normal channels assumed by realists. 
Transgovemmental applies when we relax the realist assumption that states act 
coherently as units; transnational applies when we relax the assumption tliat states 
are tlie only imits.^
The coexistence of interstate, transnational and intergovernmental communication 
channels is necessary as the complexity of the needs and the demands of a member unit 
of a security community is great and the use of only one of these channels is not 
sufficient. To receive and to understand the needs and messages of another unit is, 
therefore, a very diflScult task. This makes the realisation of mutual responsiveness 
very difficult.
The coexistence of many different conceptions about the necessity of a considered 
action makes the realisation of a common and well accepted policy action difficult. It 
seems proper to the process of mutual responsiveness that the conflicts that inevitably 
arise are understood and resolved. The process of understanding is also a mutual 
operation. The unit that formulates the demand expects the other units to understand it
fe n s t  B. Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration; Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of 
Pretheorizing’, International Organization, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, p. 610.
^Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1989), pp. 24-25, emphasis in original.
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and, at the same time, the units that receive the demand expect the unit that expressed 
it to understand their possible objections and to consequently modify its claim.
This process of understanding is essential for the evolution from the power- 
orientated paradigm towards a non-violent international system. When a message is 
considered to be understood there is little chance that the issue will evolve into a 
violent conflict if the demand is sensible, or if it can be made more reasonable afler 
negotiations.
Through the process o f  learning, initially power-orientated governmental pursuits 
evolve into welfare-orientated action. (...) When actors realize that their interest 
would best be aciiieved by adopting new approaches, and if  these approaches involve 
commitment to larger organizations, then and only then does “learning” contribute 
to integration.^
The process of ‘learning’ described by Ernst Haas is quite similar to the notion of 
understanding that was used previously. Learning being generally used “as the 
adoption by policymakers of new interpretations of reality, as they are created and 
introduced to the political system by individuals and institutions.”  ^ These notions of 
learning and understanding lie at the core of the social communication model 
developed by Deutsch.
^rnst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford; 
Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. 47-48, emphasis in original.
^Emanuel Adler, ‘Cognitive Evolution: A  Dynamic Approach for the StiKfy of International Relations 
and their Progress’, in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds ), Progress in Postwar 
International Relations (HtssN York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 52.
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The Deutschian model represents a process of integration based on a wide airay of
inter-societal transactions that are of mutual benefit to the people involved. The !process is based on learning - learning that such transactions provide benefits, that I
such benefits outweigli the costs involved, and that there are positive payoffs to
continue such interactions and even expand them. As such interactions occur, and j
Ïexpand, the peoples involved become more and more interdependent, and thus raise |
the costs of stopping such interactions. Also, as interactions occur and increase, j
Ii^eoples develop greater restxinsiveness to one another, the expectation that wants i
!and needs will be responded to positively. At some point this produces the ‘we- |
feeling’, trust and mutual consideration that Deutsch called community. J
Responsiveness and community arise out of a continuing and growing set of social j
transactions by which people learn they can benefit, and through which they come to j
respect and trust others, and expect such respect and trust in return,  ^ j
The difficulty in analysing the process leading ultimately to the understanding of the j
needs of the other fellow members of the security community, lies in the fact that this IIprocess is at the same time a result of integration and a condition for the realisation of i
the integrative procedure. This makes it almost impossible to distinguish cause and 1
effect of integration. Is mutual responsiveness a condition fo r  or a result o f the |
Iemergence of a security community?^ The problem is actually broader and concerns the j
Iwhole issue of integration: |
[Tutegration] can be seen as a state of affairs or as a process. As a state of affairs ■icertain criteria must be met for integration to have occurred (...) The criteria are I
usually specified by the observer or participant, since there is no generally accepted |
‘essentialist’ definition of integration. Wlien integration is conceived as a process, Î
units are seen to move between conditions of complete isolation and complete
integration. (...) Thus, integration involves movement towards (or disintegiation j
away from) collective action based upon consensual values for the achievement of 
common goals in wliich the parties have long-term expectations of mutually
compatible and acceptable behaviour.^® I
^Harvey Starr, ‘Democracy and War: Choice, Learning and Security Coimnimities’, Journal o f  Peace 
Research, vol. 29, no. 2, 1992, pp. 210-211, emphasis in original.
®Ernst Haas acknowledged this problem: “Do variables explaining the initiation of a union also 
explain its maintenance, as we seem to have assumed?”, but did not propose any explanation or. 
solution. See Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of 
Pietheorizing’, op. cit., p. 622.
®^A. J. R. Groom and Alexis Heraclides, ‘Integration and Disintegration’ in Margot Light and A. J. R. 
Groom (eds ). International Relations: A Handbook o f  Current Theory (London: Frances Pinter, 
1985), p. 174.
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A partial solution of tliis problem can be found through the consideration of 
integration as a continuous process, Integration is a process that does not start ex -  
n ih ilo , but from certain preconditions that exist in the given area and a process that has 
no clear and universally agreed end. The fact that the process has no agreed end 
implies that it is to considered as a perpetual process. Having no clear goal to reach, 
the process is a self-perpetuating one. Achievements can be reached and progress 
made, but the effort has to be continuous as no stage reached can be considered as 
completely satisfactory. This does not mean that an ever more integrated area has to 
perpetually expand its scope and its centralisation. It rather means that the quality of 
the communication and mutual responsiveness inside the community has to always be a 
prime care of the participating units. The achievements of integration can never be 
taken for granted. Consequently, the realisation of integration can be measured 
through the quality of mutual responsiveness existing in the community. Mutual 
responsiveness evolving fi om the learning process implies the obsolescence of violent 
conflict and is therefore a most crucial condition and a very important test for 
integration.
A cybernetic approach of the problem
How is mutual responsiveness to be understood? The insistence of Karl Deutsch on the 
process of mutual responsiveness is highly influenced by the assumptions that 
eventually founded his cybernetic approach. This approach in the words of Deutsch 
himself involves:
the systematic study of conmuiiiication and control in organizations of all kinds (...) 
Essentially it represents a shift in the center of interest from drives to steering, and 
from instincts to systems of decisions, regulation, and control, including the 
noncyclical aspects of such systems (...) In other words, the viewpoint of cybernetics 
suggests that all organizations are alike in certain fundamental characteristics and 
that eveiy organization is held together by communication (...) It is communication, 
that is, the ability to transmit messages and to react to them, that makes 
organizations...
"The theory of cybernetics, developed by Deutsch, is indeed more recent than his theory of 
integration. Neverllieless, the important assumptions of Deutsch concerning the nature imd the 
characteristics of organizations are already present.
*^Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves o f  Government: Models o f  Political Communication and Control 
(New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 76-77.
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Deutsch believes that “cybernetics, understood in terms of communication and control, 
offers a general perspective on all politics. (...) Because cybernetics indicates that it is 
steering that stands as the most fundamental process, the study of it in institutions, 
societies, and individuals ought to increase our grasp of problems in all these fields.”^^
“At the heart, of Deutsch's ‘pluralistic,’ ‘cybernetic,’ or ‘transactionalist’ approach 
was the assumption that commumcalion is the cement of social groups in general and 
political communitites in particular.” '^^  This process of communication implies the 
capacity of the participating units to emit and to receive stimuli. This is a veiy 
important pre-condition as it means that there must be established ways of 
communication and many channels that can allow the emission and the reception of all 
these messages. After the reception of a stimulus, it is important to be able to analyse 
it. The analysis of received messages is all the more easier if there are past experiences 
that can be useful in decision making. The whole notion of experience is very 
important as it has been already demonstrated by Herbert Simon. The importance of 
experience demonstrates the centrality of the existence of a great many established 
channels that allow a continuous flow of messages between the members of a security 
community. It now clearly appears that time is veiy important, (despite the undenating 
of this argument by Karl Deutsch) as the greater the past experience and the 
regularity and the performance of the communication process the more efficient, the 
course of mutual responsiveness will be.^^
^^Robert J. Lieber, Theory and World Politics (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1973), pp. 70- 
71, emphasis in original.
^%mannel Adler and Michael N, Barnett, Security Communities (Paper presented at the 1994 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association), p, 6, emphasis in original.
^^Herbert Simon, Administf'otion Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1958). Simon argued that the 
whole notion of ‘bounded rationality’ is based on the usage of past experience by the organisations 
and their members.
'®Karl Deutsch argues that: “Integration is a matter of fact not of time. If people on both sides do not 
fear war and do not prepare for it, it matters little how long it took them to reach this stage. But 
once integration has been reached, the length of time over wliich it persists may contribute to its 
consolidation.”; 'm Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, op. cit., p. 6. Thus, according 
to Dentsch’s view, integration is rather a state of affairs and only partially a process. The process 
(and the time required for its acliievement) is not considered as impoitant, but the inqxirtance of 
time is not denied altogetlier. The fact that it is difficult to evaluate the importance of time seems to 
have discouraged Deutsch from studying it.
^^Lewis Richardson noted that the longer groups have been united be common government, the less a 
war between them is probable. See Lewis Richardson, Statistics o f Deadly Quarrels (Pittsburgh: 
The Boxwood Press /  Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960), pp. 190 ff. This argument seems valid for 
formal or infonnal relationships. Tlie longer a successful system of co-operation, the greater the
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Cybernetics is the science of communication, control, interactions and learning. The 
success of the integrative course depends heavily on the ability of the members of the 
community to learn from their errors and to avoid new failures. Integration of a 
community may be seen as its “ability to receive and transmit information on wide 
ranges of different topics with relatively little delay or loss of relevant detail.” ®^ The 
success of integration, in turn, depends heavily on the ability of the system to 
efficiently utilise the feedback (especially the negative one) that it receives. “Without 
feedback, any social unit will drift - ultimately to catastrophe.”^^  It is this feedback 
function that allows a community to correct the course of its action and to make 
adjustments of all kinds. Usually, most researchers put a lot of emphasis on the positive 
feedback of the transactions occurring within a community.
When these transactions are highly visible, easy to identify and differentiate, jieople 
may form images of tlie conmiimity or of the group involved in tlie transactions. If 
these transactions were rewarded, the image of a community may be strongly 
j[30sitive. Liking tiiis kind of community, people may say: We belong together. In 
their favorable reaction to a community, they might then also say, T can see myself 
as a member of tliis community; I will call it “we” if I siDeak of a group. I will call it 
“home” if I speak of territory."®
However true this analysis may be, it is important to bear in mind that the crucial test 
for the coherence and the success of the integrative process is a crisis and its tackling. 
In that respect the efficiency and the accuracy of the negative feedback is crucial. If the 
feedback is efficient enough, it is highly improbable that military security will be ever at 
Stake in the relations between the members of the community. The efficiency of the 
process depends on the efficiency of its adaptive learning, i.e. the capacity of the
chances of its maintenance. The importance of time was also acknowledged by Kant. He believed 
that: “Passions and vices, discord and war are indeed the stuff out of which culture and history are 
made; but it is also these things wliich, in the long run, are opening the road to morality, to concord 
and to peace.” In Pierre Hassner, ‘Beyond the three traditions: the philosophy of war and peace in 
historical perspective’, International Affairs, vol. 70, no, 4, 1994, p. 746.
 ^^ Deutsch, The Nerves o f  Government, op. cit., p. 150.
 ^W illiam  C. Olson and A. J. R. Groom, International Relations then and now: Origins and trends in 
interpretation (London; Routledge, 1991), p. 162. “By feedback - or, as it is often called a servo­
mechanism - is meant a communication network that produces action in response to an input of 
information, and includes the results o f  its own action in the new information by which it modifies 
its subsequent behoxnor. ” In Deutsch, ibid., p. 88.
^°Karl W. Deutsch, ‘Commimication Theory and Political Integration’, in Plnlip E. Jacob and James 
V. Toscano (eds.). The Integration o f  Political Communities (Pliiladelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 
1964), p. 54.
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system “to recognize and control or master an increasing variety of challenging 
situations. In this case, the two other characteristics of complex interdependence are 
discernible as well:
2, The agenda of interstate relationships consists of multiple issues that are not 
arranged in a clear or consistent liierarchy. Tliis absence o f  hierarchy among issues 
means, among other things, that military security does not consistently dominate the 
agenda. (...) 3, Military force is not used by governments toward other govermnents 
within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails."^
Mutual responsiveness in a cybernetic framework can, thanks to a system of 
communication and learning guarantee ‘dependable expectations of peacefrjl change’.
Mutual responsiveness: fragile or seif-perpetuating?
The fact that mutual responsiveness needs the constant attention of the members of the 
community can be interpreted as the proof that a security community is not anything 
specific. Case by case dealings, according to this view, explain the various 
acliievements better than the existence of a more abstract sense of community. The life 
at the community level is thus seen as a mere particular case of normal inter-state 
relations.
This view, albeit attractive, misses the point. The frailty of mutual responsiveness 
does not mean its non-existence. Tn a well established security community, the 
multiplicity of the channels of communication and the complexity of the relationships 
at stake can easily explain why there is being in the community that goes well beyond 
the being of its members.
This vision is fully compatible with the basic assumptions of cybernetics.
^^Manfred Kochen, ‘Can the Global System Learn to Control Conflict?’, in Richard L. Merritt and 
Bruce M. Russett (eds.). From National Development to Global Community: Essays in Honor o f  
Karl W Deutsch (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 393. See also Karl W. Deutsch, ‘On 
the learning capacity of large political systems’, in Manfred Kochen (ed ), Information fo r Action 
(New York: Academic Press, 1975).
^^Keoliane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, op. cit., p. 25, emphasis in original.
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The view point of cybernetics suggests that all organizations are alike in certain 
fiindameiital characteristics and tliat every organization is held together by 
communication. (...) [Communications engineering] transmits messages that 
contain quantities of information (...) communication, tliat is, tlie ability to transmit 
messages and to react to them (...) makes organizations (...) of living cells in the 
body (...) pieces of machineiy in an electric calculator (...) [and] social groups.
Finally, cybernetics suggests that steering or governing is one of the most (...)
significant processes in the world.^  ^ |
The lives of the individual members of the organisation are important and certainly j
Ihave a great degree of autonomy. Nevertheless, the life of the organisation is not i
simply the sum of the lives of its members. The community has a life and a power of its i
own. The momentum for its existence and the modalities of the transactions inside the
community are only up to a certain point determined by the members. Mutual i
.responsiveness is the translation of this proper existence of the community. This |
existence shows the presence of a sense of community despite the egoism of the jImember units. |
ÎMutual responsiveness In an Interdependent world. Complexity and i
reality
In an excellent work, Andrei Markovits and Warren Oliver claim that the work of Karl |
Deutsch is very similar to that of the sociologist Emile Durkheim. “Deutsch like I
Durkheim, has been preoccupied with a fimdamental analysis of modernization and I
systemic development, both as a process and as a c o n d i t i o n . T h e  authors believe !ithat Deutsch and Durkheim agree on a series of questions and especially on the |
question of legitimacy.
^^Deulsch, The Nerves o f  Government, op. cit., p. 77.
'^’Andrei S. Markovits and Warren W. Oliver HI, ‘The Political Sociology of Integration and Social 
Development: a Comparative Analysis of Emile Durklieim and Karl W. Deutsch’, in Merritt and 
Russett (eds.), op. cit., p. 167.
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a societ}  ^ without moral tenets and legitimate non-coercive channels of 
comnuuiication is bound to stagnate and eventually disintegiate from information 
overload due to lack of legitimation rather than technological deficiencies. Tlie 
constraints of time and human capacities necessitate the existence in eveiy society of 
what could be best labeled the ‘non-contractual elements of contract’. People do not 
keep promises, abide by rules, and follow other patterns of peaceful and co-operative 
interaction because the enforcers of the law require them to do so; rather, they do so 
because of the legitimacy of certain ‘unwritten rules’, that is, because of the 
existence of the conscience collective}^
Tins notion of conscience collective (collective consciousness or collective conscience) 
was introduced by Durkheim in order to analyse and to understand the social 
phenomenon. This notion goes well beyond the compatibility of major values studied 
previously. The social bond requires a communication framework that can transmit 
analyse and efficiently respond to the needs of the members of society.
The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same 
society forms a determinate system wliich has its own life; one may call it the 
collective or common conscience. No doubt it has not as a source an unique organ; 
it is, by definition, spread in the whole of society; but it does, nevertheless have 
specific characteristics that make itself a distinct reality."'^
Society has an existence and a conscience of its own. This assumption is clearly 
incompatible with a social system (national or international) characterised by anarchy 
and the egoism of the units. The existence of a complex social system means that, 
thanks to the interdependent relationships of its members, the system has its proper 
existence.
Tliis assumption makes mutual responsiveness all the more important as it is both the 
nonnal consequence of the actuality of a sense of community and a crucial condition 
for the continuing presence of the social bond.
^ I^bid., p. 171, emphasis in original.
^®Emile Durkheim, De la division du travail social (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), p. 
46, emphasis in original. Karl Deutsch also refered to the notion of consciousness: “Consciousness 
may be defined, as a first approximation and for the purposes of this discussion, as a collection of 
internal feedbacks of secondary messages. Secondary messages are messages about changes in the 
state of parts of the system, that is, about primary messages. Primary messages are those that move 
through the system in consequence of its interaction with the outside world.” In Deutsch, The 
Nerves o f  Government, op. cit., p. 98, emphasis in original.
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The process of mutual responsiveness is closely linked to the notion of 
interdependence. Tt is because the interests and the needs of the community are so 
completely intermingled that a practice of mutual responsiveness exists in the 
considered area. Oran Young defines interdependence:^^
...in terms of the extent to which events occurring in any given part or within any 
given component unit of a world system affect (either physically or perceptually) 
events taking place in each of the other parts or comjionent units of the system. By 
definition, therefore, the greater the extensiveness and weight of the impact of 
events occurring in any given part of a system for each of the other part s, the higher 
the level of interdependence in the system.
Mutual responsiveness is an absolute necessity if there is to be a situation of 
interdependence (as opposed to pure dependence) in the considered area. Tn a situation 
of interdependence, the acts of a unit have great consequences in the lives of the other 
units. These consequences have to be either positive or (if negative) they have to be 
compensated in some way so that no single unit feels forlorn and left aside.
“International community is indicated by high volumes of international transactions 
over multiple ranges of social, economic, cultural and political concerns.”^^  For this 
community to be durable, its members must perceive themselves as benefiting fi'om the 
existence of the community. If this condition is roughly ftdfilled, then a process of 
mutual responsiveness that is real (albeit complex) exists.
Bargaining a s  a p rocess of mutual responsiveness
At first glance, bargaining is the antithesis of mutual responsiveness. Tn a bargaining 
process, there is apparently an exchange between the members of the process that has 
nothing to do with altniism. Self-interest and egoism are meant to be the main 
preoccupation during the negotiations. In the process of bargaining the parties are not 
only motivated by the desire to agree. But if agreement is reached, this means that the 
forces for agreement, proved stronger than forces for disagreement. The outcome can 
often be predicted “on some basis of some ‘obvious’ focus for agreement, some strong
^^Oran R. Young, Tnterdepeiidencies in World Politics’, in Ray Magliroori and Bennett Ramberg, 
Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations’ Third Debate (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 
1982), pp. 57-58. For a critique of the notion of interdependence see Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Myth of 
National Interdependence’, in ibid., pp. 81-96.
^®Donald J. Puchala, ‘International Transactions and Regional Integration’, International 
Organization, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, p. 743.
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suggestion contained in the situation itself, without much regard to the merits of the 
case.”^  in a world of complex interdependence, the process of bargaining conducing 
to decision making, is far more complex. For instance, Ernst Haas distinguished three 
patterns of compromise: (1) accommodation on the basis of the minimum common 
denominator, typical of classic diplomatic negotiations; (2) accommodation by splitting 
the difference, prevalent in the negotiations of international economic organisations; 
and (3) accommodation on the basis of upgrading the interests of the parties. This 
latter mode was considered as the most effective since co-operation in one area was 
leading to co-operation in another,
The existence of a security community makes a difference since: (a) thanks to the 
existence of a complex, interdependent world, the notions of national interest and of 
self-interest are even more blurred and difficult to circumscribe than otherwise and (b) 
the process of learning completely transforms the traditional way of negotiating. There 
is no obvious explanation of this phenomenon. It is very surprising that sovereign units 
basing their attitude on self-interest would have an attitude based on anything else. 
Still, mutual responsiveness is a reality.
Some scholars link interj^ersonal trust and responsiveness, as a hypothesis, with 
progressively rewarding exiDeriences derived from the activities of common markets.
Thus; progressively rewarding experiences learning -> trust. Others seek to press 
simple stimuhis-resjxmse theory into service in suggesting that the intensity and the 
frequency of the regional interaction pattern will explain a given integrative 
outcome. Still otliers assume a more cognitive style of social learning for explaining 
the kinds of increasing resjxinsiveness in which we are interested and therefore 
prefer the lessons of formal decision and coalition theory to discover how and when 
actors redefine their utilities in bargaining with each other. This approach, of 
course, differs sharply from the study of emotive forces, affect, and the manipulation 
of symbols as agents of social learning.®'
^^Thomas C. Schelling, The Stratep/ o f  Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 68. In 
particular, Schelling cites ‘splitting the difference’ as an example of reciuring willingmess to find a 
compromise.
®®Emst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 111.
®'Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing’, op. 
cit., p. 643.
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In lliis text, Ernst Haas quite dearly assesses all the problems that social scientists have 
in explaining the mutual responsiveness phenomenon. But, whatever the view point, 
the fact is that trust and the continuing existence of mutually rewarding experiences 
allows a substantial transformation of normal inter-state relations. These relations are 
no longer viewed as a zero sum game, but as a mutually enriching and rewarding 
experience. “Tnist may develop through a number of mechanisms. One path is around 
political and economic agreements, and key symbolic and meaningful events. It is 
therefore logical that states would try to satisfy each other’s needs and demands as that 
is no way contrary to their long-term interests. Mutual responsiveness is rational as 
long as it is truly mutual and there is not one side that benefits more than normally of 
the relationship.
Of course, there must be some overall balance over time among important 
distributive outcomes so that actors who lose or gain relatively little in one situation 
will be able to gain relatively more on some other issue. In other words, significant 
tangible or symbolic benefits must be perceived as available now or in the future in 
order for national ixilitical actors (or mass public) to alter goals, values, strategies, 
identifications, and behaviors, so that they can participate in and supiiorl an ongoing 
collective decisionmaking process of any significant scope, decisiveness, etc.®®
Mutual responsiveness is a novel concept that has not been sufficiently studied so far. 
Difficult, to define and to understand, its utility is very hard to appraise. The complexity 
of the world and, in particular of certain regional subsettings, makes things even more 
difficult for the analyst. This difficulty was very well expressed by Donald Puchala:
®®Adler and Barnett, op. cit., p. 47.
®®Leon N. Lindberg, ‘Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate 
Measurement’, International Organization, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, p. 660.
®‘'Donald J. Puchala, ‘Integration Theory and the Study of International Relations’, in Merritt and 
Russett (eds.). From National Development to Global Community, op. cit., pp. 159-160, emphasis 
in original.
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Beyond defining [the plixralistic security community], and listing characteristics of 
intraconmiunity relations, [Deutsch] says little about origins, development 
processes, or causal relationships, We can assume that the process of international 
conmiunity formation (i.e. integration) resembles the assimilatory process in 
nationalism, as discussed above. Communications and transactions have an 
assimilatory process of some kind. But, even if these assumptions are valid, the 
formulation remains limited in its analytic utility by concerns raised earlier. What 
also needs to be discovered is whetlier the learning that prompts attiludinal change 
during community formation follows from explicit teaching. (...) Analyzing 
Deutsch’s tliinking on the pluralistic security community underlines that we 
presently have no theoiy of international pluralism.
Mutual responsiveness develops, thanks to a process of social learning that makes 
mutually rewarding experiences more and more common and finally succeeds in 
building a community based on trust, that is a community in which the maintenance of 
peace in the long term, is highly credible. This situation of long term peace 
expectations makes international co-operation easier and the messages received are 
“not merely (...) received, but (...) understood, and (...) given real weight in the 
process of decision making.
^Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, op. cil,, p. 67.
4. Mutual Predictability of Behaviour: the 
guarantee of long-term expectations of peaceful 
change
This third essential condition for the success of a pluralistic security community, is 
considered by Deutsch to be of less importance than the previous two conditions. He 
claims that this condition can be viewed as flowing from the two previous conditions.
A third essential condition for a pluralistic security community may be mutual 
predictability of behavior; this appears closely related to the foregoing. But the 
member states of a pluralistic security community have to make joint decisions only 
about a more limited range of subject matters, and retain each a far wider range of 
problems for autonomous decision-making within their own borders. Consequently 
the range and extent of the mutual predictability of behavior required from members 
of a pluralistic security community is considerably less than would be essential for 
the successful operation of an amalgamated one.'
Karl Deutsch clearly considers this final provision as a normal consequence of the two,
previously defined, conditions. He seems, more specifically, to consider this condition
as an aftermath of mutual responsiveness. In conditions of mutual responsiveness,
when the messages and the demands of the member units are not merely received but
understood and given real weight in the decision-making process, it is only normal that
the behaviour of the member units would be very easily predicted.
The kind of sense of community that is relevant for integration, and therefore for our 
study, turned out to be rather a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of ‘we- 
feeling’, tmst, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self- 
images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of beliavior, and of 
cooperative action in accordance with it - in short, a matter of a jierpetual dynamic 
process of mutual attention, conmiunication, perception of needs, and 
responsiveness in the process of decision-making. ‘Peaceful change’ could not be 
assured without this kind of relationship.®
'Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 




Mutual Predictability o f  Behaviour 55
This term of ‘peaceful change’ is crucial to the whole study. Firstly, it is an essential 
part of the definition of the concepts of integration and of secuiity community. A 
security community is considered to be an integrated area characterised by a sense of 
community, that is long-term expectations of peaceful change.
By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by 
institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.®
Secondly, it is this notion of peacefiil change that lies at the core of the whole issue 
of mutual predictability of behaviour. Tn a. really integrated area, it is to be expected 
that all member units have long term expectations of peaceful change, and that they 
can predict with accuracy similar expectations on the part of their fellow units. The 
commitment to peaceful change has to be highly credible and a. huge effort to build and 
to maintain this credibility is essential to the success of the pluralistic security 
community.
The concept of ‘security conununity’ implies stability of expectations of continuing 
peaceful adjustments. To be stable, however, such expectations must be geared not 
only to the current load of mutual mteraction and potential conflicts among the 
participants, but also to any increase in the volume of such interaction and i>ossible 
friction among them as can be foreseen. '^
Deutsch considers that mutual predictability of behaviour is more easily obtained in a 
pluralistic security community as the necessary scope and range of the common action 
is not as broad as in the case of an amalgamated one. Tliis does not, however, imply 
that, reaching mutual predictability is easy and quick. Tt is a matter of constant, 
attention. Reconciliation after a long period of enmity and conflict is difficult and takes 
time. It is therefore important to understand the mechanisms leading to a build-up of 
trust and confidence. These mechanisms allow the building of expectations that are 
based on credible commitments to peacefiil change by the member units. Expectations
Ibid., p. 5.
''Karl W. Deutsch, Political Coitimunity at the International Level: Problems o f  Definition and 
Mea.'fumweHr (Princeton N.J: 1953), p. 15.
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can be (for the time being) defined as: “an image of the future bounded by what is 
physically, humanly, and socially possible.”^
The requirement of credibility implies the existence of an important degree of 
confidence and trust among the member units. This credibility can be analysed through 
both a sociological and an economic approach.
A sociological analysis of mutual predictability of behaviour
The necessity of mutual predictability of behaviour is beyond any possible doubt. 
Despite the difficulties associated with the analysis of integration, there is no doubt that 
integration cannot be maintained if the members of the community are not credibly 
committed to peaceful behaviour towards the fellow members of the community. This 
process of community formation is still a very important problem for political 
scientists:
The general theoretical questions associated with the process of community 
formation—die process through which inter-unit Ixmds develop to give stmcture and 
stability to larger social collectivities—are among the most persistent and 
rudimentary problems o f political analysis.®
The importance of mutual predictability of behaviour is certainly the least controversial
issue in the realm of community formation and maintenance. But, the building of
confidence that is implied by this notion is veiy difficult to understand.
Parsons, system s theory and mutual predictability of behaviour
Talcott Parsons is the sociologist who studied systems theory with most constancy and 
insight. The centrality of systems is explained by his basic assumption: “since the 
relationships between actors and their situation have a recurrent character or system, 
all action occurs in systems.”^
^Emanuel Adler, ‘Cognitive Evolution: A  Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations 
and their Progress’, in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.), Progress in Postwar 
International Relations QA&w York: Colmnbia University Press, 1991), p. 53.
®Roger W. Cobb and Charles Elder, International Community: A Regional and Global Study (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 4.
 ^James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories o f  International Relations: A 
Comprehensive Survey (New York: Harper and Row, 1990), p. 143,
Mutual Predictability o f  Behaviour 57
Maintenance of the system is based on the development of mutual acceptance of the 
system that creates an equilibrium and a momentum for its continuing existence. There 
is a plurality of subsystems of which the most important are: (1) the personality system, 
(2) the social system , and (3) the cultural system. These subsystems are integrated into 
a larger system that Parsons calls the “action system”.* Social intercourse occurs in a 
general net^vork of social systems and subsystems. A change in one of these 
subsystems influences the course of the others subsystems and the ‘action system’ as a 
whole.^
The system theoiy developed by Parsons has the steadfast concern of analysing the 
patterns of social maintenance (latency or pattern maintenance in his words). Parsons 
does not, however, completely rule out the possibility of change. On the contrary, one 
of his main objectives is to understand how change can occur without jeopardising the 
existence of the system as a whole. The importance of equilibrium should not be 
considered as a purely ‘conservative’ feature. Parsons makes an important distinction 
between ‘stable’ and ‘moving equilibrium’. Equilibrium, in Parsons view, is not 
necessai’iiy synonymous with...^^
...static self-mamtenaace or a stable equilibrium. It may be an ordered process of 
change—a process following a determinate pattern rather than random variability 
relative to tlie staiting point. Tliis is called a moving equilibrium and it is well 
exemplified in growth.
'*See Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Schils (eds.). Toward a General Theory o f  Action (New York: 
Harper Row).
Parsons defines a social system as “a system of interaction of a plurality of actors, in which the action 
is oriented by mles which are complexes of complementary expectations concerning roles and 
sanctions. As a system, it has determinate internal organization and determinate patterns of
structural change. Tt has, fiirthermore, as a system, a variety of mechanisms of adaptation to
changes in the extenial environment. These mechanisms fimction to create one of the important 
properties of the system, namely, a tendency to maintain boundaries. A total social system which, 
for practical purposes, may be treated as self-sufficient—which, in other words, contains within 
approximately the boundaries defined by membership all the functional mechanisms required for its 
maintenance as a system - is here called a society." Ibid., pp. 195-196, emphasis in original.
'°The four functional prerequisites for the maintenance of the social system are according to Parsons: 
(I) adaptation to the environment and to the changes in it; (2) goal attainment (3) integration of the 
different ftinctions and subsystems into a cohesive whole, and (4) pattern maintenance (or latency), 
that is the ability of a system to ensure the reproduction of its own basic patterns, values, and 
norms, Each of these ftinctions is best served by a particular subsystem: pattern maintenance by the 
subsystem of families and households, adaptation by the economy and the social system, goal 
attainment by the polity and integration by the subsystem of culture. See ibid. and Talcott Parsons, 
‘All Outline of the Social System’, in Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Schils, Kaspar Naegele, and Jesse 
R. Pitts (eds.). Theories o f  Society (New York: The Free Press, 1961).
"Parsons, ‘An Outline of the Social System’, op. cit., p. 107.
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The problem of maintaining the equilibrium of a system (i.e. managing its inner 
tensions), while permitting progress and change is probably the most important 
problem in any social system.
The importance of mutual predictability of behaviour is underlined by the fact that it 
is important for the mere existence of the system itself that people and, broadly 
speaking, all members of the given system develop ‘complementary expectations 
concerning roles and sanctions.’ The fimction of mutual predictability of behaviour is 
to allow the formation of reliable expectations about the future behaviour of the other 
members of the system. The stability of these expectations is of great importance for 
the latency of the social system as such. Besides, these expectations should be able to 
change over time and to adapt to the changing circumstances of the social subsystems 
and of the action system as a whole. These expectations should be able to evolve (up 
to a certain point) and stable enough to allow change within the maintenance of the 
main patterns of the system.
Karl Deutsch was very profoundly influenced by the interchange model of Talcott 
Parsons. The main concerns present in his study of international integration are also 
present in systems theory, especially the analysis of the four main functions of every 
system.
When a system is ftmctioning to maintain its own fundamental patterns by adapting 
itself to various changes in enviromnent and pursuing one or several goals, problems 
arise concerning the integration and coordination of the various messages and the 
allocation of facilities or ftinctions inside the system. Tliis is the integration (I) 
function which requires that something be done to prevent the different operations 
of the system from interfering with each other in a frustrating or destructive way.
The maintenance of compatibility and the shift from mutual inhibition to mutual 
facilitation of the fundamental efforts are all tasks of an integrative system.'®
Mutual predictability of behaviour is precisely the condition that makes mutual
facilitation possible. Mutual inhibition is the result of enmity and lack of transparency.
'®See Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves o f  Government: Models o f  Political Communication and Control 
(New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 116-118.
'®Karl W. Deutsch, ‘Integration and the Social System: Implications of Functional Analysis’; in Philip
E. .Tacob and James V. Toscano (eds.). The Integration o f  Political Communities (New York: J. B. 
Lippincott, 1964), p. 183, emphasis in original.
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The building of confidence between the members of a security community makes them 
less reluctant towards co-operative solutions and creates an important momentum for 
integration/"^
The creation of new relations between men and s ta te s
The importance of mutual predictability of behaviour lies, first and foremost, in the fact
that it radically transforms interpersonal and interstate relations. The fact that a kind of 
peaceful relationship can, in an integrated area, be rationally, easily and reliably 
predicted, marks a gieat contrast with the alleged state of social or international 
anarchy. “Deutsch suggests that the fundamentally social character of international 
politics can transform the identities, interests and behaviors of states.”'^
One of the major regionalist claims is that micro-regional economic organizations 
are a means of going beyond national sovereignty in political institutions and of 
creating "new relations between men and states." In Jean Monnet’s view the 
ultimate causes of violent conflict lie in human nature, but it is possible, through 
creating new regional institutions, to limit the conflict-laden consequences of the 
division of mankind into sovereign national states.'®
Tn a realist framework, the state of anarchy is self-perpetuating, because of the 
continuous danger that the members of a social system (the states in the case of the 
international system) will betray their fellow members with whom they were co­
operating. The existence of genuine mutual predictability of behaviour has as a 
consequence the existence of a reliable and persistent state of international co­
operation. “At the international level, community formation has transformed the very 
character of the states system—states have become integrated to the point that 
peaceful change becomes taken for granted.”^^
'‘'This explains tlie growing importance of confidence building measures in international relations. 
For a study of confidence building see Jonathan Alford (ed.), ‘The Future of Arms Control, Part 3: 
Confidence Building Measures’, Adelphi Papers, no 149, 1978 and Conference on Security and Co­
operation in Europe, Vienna Document 1990: o f  the negotiations on confidence and security 
building measures convened in accordance with the relevant provisions o f  the concluding 
document o f  the Vienna meeting o f  the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(Vienna; 1990).
'^Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, Security Communities (Paper presented at the 1994 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association), p. 8.
'®Joseph S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1971), p. 14.
Adler and Barnett, op. ch., p. 13.
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The argument [of the regionalist doctrine] is that regional organizations, 
particularly those involving economic integiation, are the best setting for fiinctional 
cooperation that can make states less prone to exercise their sovereign power for 
violent conflict. Along with the cooperation, a sense of community or positive 
feeling may develop between people of different states. Tlie emphasis is not so much 
on diminishing sovereignty but on making it less dangerous by tying up states in a 
tight web of functional relationships.'®
Tills ‘tight web’ is made stronger thanks to the existence of expectations that it will
hold. In other words, integration is a self-fulfilling prophecy, The mere existence of
expectations that integration will continue to exist creates the momentum that allows
its persistence. Integration is not possible without an important amount of attiludinal
integration. Institutional or policy integration cannot be considered as sufficient
because it remains utterly fragile if not completed by attitudinal integration.
Mutual predictability of behaviour lies at the core of the required attitudinal change. 
In the words of Joseph Nye/°
one of the concerns generally associated with the concept of political integration is 
the extent to which a gi oup of people not only interact or share institutions but the 
extent to wliich they develop a sense of common identity and mutual obligation.
This is the sense in which theorists in comparative politics tend to use the word 
“integration.”
This sense of common identity involves the existence of many established political and 
social habits that make behaviour easier to predict. People and states that have a sense 
o f ‘we-feeling’ will, presumably, be less likely to behave in an unexpected way towards 
other members of the security community.
The existence for a long time of a (fonnal or informal) framework for co-operation 
makes the attitudes of members of the security community easier to predict. The 
existence of close interdependence between the economies of the member units, 
creates de faclo a fiinctional linkage between the actions and the policies of each and
'®Ibid, p. 16.
'®For an analysis of the notion of self-fulfilling prophecy from a psychological point of view see 
Russell Cresciraanto, Culture, Consciousness and Beyond (Wasliin^on D.C; University Press of 
America, 1982).
®®Ibid.,p. 44.
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eveiy unit. Autonomous policies are more and more difficult to implement and the 
existence of a great number of centres of power substantially reduces the possibility of 
a sudden change in the course of a member unit. The continuing existence of mutual 
predictability of behaviour makes an abrupt change of policy more and more difficult 
and less and less probable and profitable.
The concept of mutual predictability of behaviour is very closely linked to the, 
previously studied, notion of mutual responsiveness. Mutual responsiveness was based 
upon the existence of an efficient system of feedback allowing “a series of diminishing 
mistakes—a dwindling series of under- and over-corrections converging on the 
goal,”^^  The peimanent correction of the system of communication and control can 
produce a system that is highly reliable and thanks to which behaviour can be easily 
predicted. “By observing directly a person’s past responses under specific conditions, it 
is possible to predict or explain a response if the specified conditions are present. 
The likely outcome of the coexistence of mutual responsiveness with mutual 
predictability of behaviour is ‘stable peace’
an economic or ftmctional web of interde|>endence can create new relations which 
affect the way in wliich states handle conflict situations (...) tluough creation of 
widespread sense of common identity or community among populations in a region 
wliich makes recourse to violence seem illegitimate to leaders and important 
segments of the population.
A proper characteristic of pluralistic security community is the development among 
member units of “capabilities of mutual communication and accommodation such that 
they can rely on peaceful change and adjustment in problems or disputes.” "^^
®'Deutsch, The Nerves o f  Government, op. cit., p. 89,
®®Henry Teime, ‘The Learning of Integrative Habits’, in Jacob and Toscano (eds.). The Integration o f  
Political Communities, op. cit., p. 231.
®®Nye, Peace in Parts, op. cit., p. 110. The concept of stable peace was developed by Ken Boulding in 
Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).
®'"Karl W. Deutsch, The Impact of Communications upon International Relations Ttieory’, in Abdul 
A. Said (ed), Theory o f  International Relations: the Crisis o f  Relevance (Englewood Cliffs, N.J; 
Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 92.
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A model of rational expectations: mutual predictability of 
behaviour as a question of credibility
The importance of mutual predictability of behaviour is all the more obvious in 
macroeconomics. In the 1970s, the rational expectation school challenged the 
traditional vision of expectations.^^ This new vision has been of great consequence for 
economic analysis as well as for policy-making. The theory of rational expectations in 
macroeconomics can be of great interest to political science as well. It can, in 
particular, allow the shaping of a theory of the credibility of commitment to peaceful 
change, and the formation of some elements of a broader theory of security community 
formation, maintenance and disintegration.
Rational expectations in m acroeconom ics: a brief overview
The theory of rational expectations is based on the assumption of the optimum usage
of all available information.
Sensible people will iise all the available information relating to the process 
determining a variable when forming their forecast or expectation of that variable.®®
This Aindamental assumption has a number of consequences. These consequences are
that; (1) the errors of rational expectations are on average zero; (2) the errors of
rational expectations exhibit no pattern; (3) rational expectations are the most accurate
expectations.
The fact that errors of rational expectations are on average zero means that 
expectations are correct on average. People can (and indeed do) make mistakes, but 
over a longer period of time, their expectations are correct.
Tliis is quite consistent with large or even very large errors in any individual period.
The size of the ex}3ectational error depends upon the size of the unpredictable 
component of the process itself.®®
®^Members of this school are, in particular, the following economists: Jolm Kareken, Thomas 
Muench, Thomas Sargent, Neil Wallace and Robert Lucas. See Preston J. Miller (ed.), The Rational 
Expectations Revolution: Readings from the Front Line (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994). 
Also see Ronan Frydinan and Edmund Phelps (eds.), Individual Forecasting and Aggragate 
Outcomes: Rational Expectations Examined (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); 
Thomas J. Sargent, Rational Expectations and Inflation (New York: Harper and Row, 1986) and 
Steven M. Sheffiin, Rational Expectations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
®®C. L. F. Attfield, D. Demery and N. W. Duck Rational Expectations in Macroeconomics: An 
Introduction to Theory and Evidence (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 18.
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It is of no use to expect people to permanently make mistakes (and especially the same 
mistakes). Their expectations are self-correcting through a feedback process.
The fact that the errors of rational expectations exhibit no pattern means that the 
errors that people make cannot be predicted. It is not possible to presume that people 
will make a particular type of mistake. This also entails that there is no possibility to 
systematically deceive people. People do not make predictable mistakes (the mistakes 
made are perfectly random) and it is not possible to make much of any successful case 
of deception. On the contrary, once the credibility of someone is ruined it has to be 
built anew and this is a time-consuming process and a process that is not easy to 
acliieve.
Finally, the fact that rational expectations are the most accurate expectations means 
that this kind of expectations are based on all available information and on a good 
knowledge of the process.
Forecasts of a variable 7  made using all the available information on the true 
process detenuining 7 are bound to be at least as accurate as, and usually more 
accurate than, forecasts of 7  made on some other basis.®®
This characteristic encaptures the two previous characteristics. As rational
expectations are the most accurate expectations, the expectational error in any period
is a random element that on average equals zero (i.e. on average the expectations are
correct).
Rational expectations theory revolutionised economic theory because a lot of 
emphasis is put on the importance of constant policies based on rules rather than 
discretion and on credibility rather than surprise and deception.
Tlie rational expectations approach directs attention away from particular isolated 
actions and toward choices among feasible rules of the game, or re]?eated strategies 
for choosing policy variables,®^
®®Ibid.,p. 22.
®®Ibid., p. 24, emphasis in original.
®^Thomas J. Sargent, ‘Rational Expectations and the Reconstruction of Macroeconomics’, in Miller 
(ed,). The Rational Expectations'^ Revolution, op. cit., p. 37,
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The importance of the credibility of the commitment to peaceful change, and of the 
amount of confidence existing among the members of a security community is vital for 
the understanding of international pluralism.
A model of integration and disintegration based  on expectations and 
credibility
The concept of rational expectations is of great interest to political science as it can be 
used to underline the importance of attitudes and predictions of attitudes by the 
members of a given integrated area.
The emergence of mutual predictability of behaviour is the result, of an increasingly 
rewarding experience. The verification of past predictions creates a sense of confidence 
and increases the predictability of the behaviour of other member units. Attitudes 
become mechanistic and the mles governing interstate action are more and more 
visible. In particular, the rule which serves as the basis of pluralistic security 
communities (that is the resolution of disputes without resort to large scale interstate 
violence) is considered, in security communities, as a rule that cannot be disowned. 
The sense of confidence is very strong and that, paradoxically, is what makes the 
security community fragile.
A breach of trust in a. security community is bound to be considered of great 
importance. Once the credibility capital accumulated after years of effort has been 
ruined, it is considerably difficult to build it anew. This frailty of any success resulting 
from deception directly challenges a realist assumption. Machiavelli urged The Prince 
to make the most of any possibility to extend its power at the expense of his 
neighbours, if necessary by using deception.^^ Rational expectations theory prompts a 
less absolute approach to the same problem. If the political philosophy of Machiavelli 
is still valid on the whole, there are cases in which it cannot be applied in an absolute 
and irresponsible way. “While peaceful change might be explained through the 
language of power politics and the calculation of expected material benefits to be
®®Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (1514). Machiavelli claims that “a prince, and especially a new 
prince, cannot observe all those things which give men a reputation for virtue, because in order to 
maintain his state he is often forced to act in defiance of good faith, of charity, of kindness, of 
religion. And so he should have a flexible disposition, varying as fortune and circumstances dictate. 
As I said above, he should not deviate from what is good, if tliat is possible, but he should know 
how to do evil, if  that is necessary.” Quoted from Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (London: 
Penguin Books, 1995), p. 56.
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derived from a course of action, Deutsch relies on social knowledge, learning, and the 
existence of norms that emerge from both interstate practices and, more fundamentally, 
transnational forces.”^^  In an integrated area, where the condition of mutual 
predictability of behaviour is actual, the reasoning is far more complex. If a state 
deceives its partners, it can hope to gain a considerable amount of profit in the short 
term. In the longer term, the state which breaches the trust of its partners cannot 
expect to co-operate with them in the same way after the deception. In actuality, the 
normal reaction of its partners would be to be far more cautious and to ask for 
compensation and insurance whenever they co-operate with it. Deception has a price 
which is measured by the difficulty of re-establishing trust among the partners once the 
damage is done. Before breaching the trust of its partners a state should take into 
consideration the impossibility of continuing to collaborate in a ‘business as usuaV way 
after such a deception,
According to Karl Deutsch, the failure of a political system can have six possible 
causes: (1) the loss of power, (2) the loss of intakes of channels of information, (3) the 
loss of steering capacity or co-ordination, (4) the loss of depth of memory, (5) the loss 
of capacity for partial inner rearrangement and (6) the loss of capacity for 
comprehensive or fundamental rearrangement of inner structure.^^ All of these reasons 
have in common that they challenge the mutual predictability of behaviour condition. 
This challenge is made in two different ways: (a) thiough the doubts arising concerning
Adler atidBanielt, op. cit., p. 11.
^^hese questions of trust and confidence are of great importance in the literature on decision-making 
and its rationality. The classic model of decision-making assumes that policymakers try to 
maximise tlie expected utility of an action given the probability of its success. Consequently, they 
must bear in mind that they have to make complex calculations about the possibility of acliieving a 
goal without suffering excessively from any jwssible drawback. The rationality of the process cannot 
be taken for granted, however, important rational elements exist insofar as the goal priorities of 
individuals are set forth explicitly and the means for attaining the goals are also clear. Once again it 
is ‘bounded rationality’ that seems the more appropriate model. For an analysis of decision-making 
see Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (eds.). Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
(New York: The Free Press, 1963); Marshall Dimock, A Philosophy o f  Administration (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1958); J. David Singer, ‘Inter-Nation Influence: A  Formal Model’, American 
Political Science Review, vol. 62, June 1963; Sidney Verba, ‘Assumptions of Rationality and 
Nonrationality in Models of the International System’, in James N. Rosenau (ed ), International 
Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969); Herbert Simon, Administration 
Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1958) and Graham T. Allison, Essence o f  Decision: Explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little Brown, 1971).
^^Deiitsch, The Nerves o f  Government, op. cit., pp. 221-222.
Mutual Predictability o f  Behaviour 66
the system as such, and (b) through the doubts arising concerning the will and capacity 
of a member.
In the first case, the doubts concerning the capacity of a system to provide the basic 
functions that are considered to be its duties creates a sense of distrust and lack of 
confidence in the fixture of the system as well as in its capacity to fiilfil its role as a 
forum for inter-member relations. In this case, mutual predictability of behaviour is 
impossible because the environment that allowed it to be built-up has changed and it is 
not able to cope with the requirements of the action system.
In the second case, fundamental changes in the policies and actions of a member unit 
cast heavy clouds over its commitment to the common system of values. Disintegration 
results from the fact that a member unit of the security community is considered as 
unreliable by the other members. Once the rational expectations concerning the 
behaviour of the given unit are not verified, the behaviour anticipated is radically 
different. Any verbal commitment to peacefiil change by the member is viewed with 
circumspection and even any action that is in accordance with this commitment is 
considered as insufficient.
Once ruined, confidence is difficult to rebuild. This means equally that a member 
should not expect that a breach of trust will easily be forgotten and co-operation with 
go on as usual. A failure is all the more difficult to overcome as confidence is based on 
pattern maintenance. Once the pattern of confidence is damaged, it is higlily difficult 
for the system to survive, as confidence is the fimdamental basis of its structure.
The problem is almost the same in economic pohcy making;
The standard fiamework for economic policy design consists of a model to predict 
how people will behave under alternative policies and a criterion to compare die 
outcomes of alternative policies. Given a model, the policy design problem is to use 
the model to choose the best policy under the criterion.
V. Chari, ‘Time Consistency and Optimal Policy Design’, in Miller (ed.), The Rational 
Expectations Revolution, op. cit., p. 41.
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Although this process seems straiglitforward, in practice solving the design problem 
is far from simple. The main difficulty is developing models that accurately predict 
private behavior under alternative policies. In most situations, people’s current 
decisions depend on their expectations o f future policies, and forecasting how these 
expectations will change in response to current policy changes is a difficult task.
There is no known model allowing a reliable prediction of the changes in future
expectations. Therefore, the soundest strategy is to follow a constant policy, that is a
policy that is easy to understand and to predict and one that is difficult to abandon.
If commitment to peaceful change is considered reliable and strong, the reality of the 
security community is firm. This commitment is all the more difficult to abandon as it 
was built thanks to considerable effort and time. All tliis effort would easily be 
jeopardised if this commitment is called into question.
The importance of rationality in the integrative process is compatible with both the 
importance of learning and the pursuit of self-interest. Firstly, learning and mutual 
predictability of behaviour are mutually reinforcing.
Rationality involves some statement about what means would maximize the chances 
of achieving a goal at a minimum “cost.” (...) The simple proposition underlying 
any system of rational calculation of payoffs is that changes in reward patterns will 
significantly alter human behavior—that habits can be changed or new habits will 
be sought if older habits are not rewarded or are punished. This is a directive fr om 
the reinforcement principle of stimulus-response learning theory.^^
Mutual predictability of behaviour is based on a self-coiTecting process which
obviously requires the existence of important facilities for communication and a
feedback process based on learning.
Secondly, the pursuit of self-interest is equally a normal aftermath of the rationality 
of the integrative behaviour of a member of a security community. “Cooperation, 
alliances, and mergers between political communities—instances of political 
integration—can be explained as the result of rational calculation of payoffs or 
r e w a r d s . T h e  importance of self-interest is underlined by Karl Deutsch himself.
’’Henry Teune, ‘The Learning of Integrative Habits’, in Jacob and Toscano (eds.). The Integration o f  
Political Communities, op. cit., pp. 261-262.
^%id.
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Integration does have a price, one wliich must be met by government and is, in part, 
set by those who are governed, In fact it is the capabilities and peifonnances of 
government tliat provide the key to integration and cohesion in societies. By their 
veiy nature, governments have the means to establish and maintain certain 
standards of well-being for then jxopulations wliich are basic conditions for 
integration.
By insisting on the existence of a price of integration, Karl Deutsch shows the 
importance of rational calculation and of the pursuit of self-interest in the integrative 
process. No country enters into a security community if it does not expect to profit 
from it. The difference with the state of international anarchy lies in the fact that in a 
security community, the main (if not the unique) way to benefit from the state of 
integration is thiough co-operation. It is in this respect that mutual predictability of 
behaviour is of great relevance. Without it, co-operation is utterly fragile, with it co­
operation becomes an automatic process.
^Kari W. Deutsch, ‘The Price of Integration’, in Jacob and Toscano (eds.). The Integration o f  
Political Communities, op. cit., p. 143.
5. Security Community: an important 
contribution to an embryonic theory of 
internationai piuralism
The three essential conditions for the emergence of a pluralistic security community 
(examined previously) are so fiir the main contributions to a theory yet to be built. The 
coexistence of states at the international level from a security perspective has been 
mainly studied tluough the concept of balance of power and of its consequences.^ 
National integration has also been a quite influential concept but one that is only 
considered applicable in a very limited number of cases.^ The peaceful coexistence of 
states in an international framework has been considered a precarious success and 
international anarchy still remains the basic reference point of international relations.^
International pluralism is, however, a reality and one that is very much present at 
some particular historical periods or in certain regional sub-settings such as Western 
Europe today. This kind of pluralism implies the coexistence of tolerance'* for the other 
at the individual, national and interstate level.
Pluralism stresses a moving equilibrium composed of a balance of demands and 
decisions. The problem is how can it be sustained wliile individual preferences 
change.’
For a thorough study of tlie notion of balance of power see Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and 
International Relations (New York; Random House, 1962); Edward V. Gulick, Europe’s Classical 
Balance o f  Power (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1955); Paul Seabury (ed.), Balance o f  Power 
(San Francisco: Chandler, 1965). For a critique of the theory see Ernst B. Haas, ‘The Balance of 
Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?’, World Politics, vol. 5, July 1953; Ernst B. Haas, 
‘The Balance of Power as a Guide to Policy-Making’, Journal o f  Politics, vol. 15, August 1953 and 
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (Hem Knopf 1967).
^See the extensive literature on nationalism, in particular Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social 
Communication (Cambridge, MA; The MTT Press, 1953); Karl W, Deutsch, Tides Among Nations 
(New York: The Free Press, 1979); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Commtmities, Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread o f  Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983) and Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and 
Nationalism since / 7SP (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1990).
’See Helen Milner, ‘The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory: a critique’, Review 
o f  International Studies, no. 17, 1991.
^Tolerance certainly involves permitting without protest or interference but it imdoubtedly remains an 
‘essentially contested concept’.
’David Apter, ‘Structuralism, Pluralism and Problems of Post-Industrial Society’, paper presented for 
a round table of the International Political Science Association on Political Integration (Jeiusalem: 
1974), p. 9.
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The most important contribution to a theory of international pluralism, made by 
Deutsch, is the concept of pluralistic security community. Thanks to this concept, the 
peaceful coexistence of states at the international level can be (at least partially) 
explained and is no longer a mere anomaly in a framework relying on the assumption 
of international anarchy.
[A pluralistic security conimuiiity] is a community of nations that have produced 
something close to an “informal government to ensure peaceful change without 
subordinating all the differences in values, culture, and the like that make the 
separate units distinctively free and independent.” As such, a pluralistic security 
community is something truly new imder the smi.^
Tins concept is veiy important and a lot of work need to be done in this field.
Analyzing Deutsch’s tliinking on the pluralistic security conmiiinity underlines that 
we presently have no theory of international plmalism.^
Integration: an imperfect description of a complex process
Integration is a word that has been mainly used as an economic concept.* The term of 
political integration is much less common and far more controversial and difficult to 
define. The difficulty with the concept of integration (considered as an economic as 
well as a political concept) lies, first and foremost, in the fact that integration is 
simultaneously both a process and a situation:^
Integi atiou can be considered from two p>oints of view: the first point of view insists 
on the static aspect of the phenomenon, whereas the second insists on the idea of 
process.
Emanuel Adler, ‘Seasons of Peace: Progress in Postwar International Security’, in Emanuel Adler 
and Beverly Crawford (eds.). Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991), p. 138. Adler quotes Lynn H. Miller, Global Order: Values and Power in 
International Politics (Boulder, Co: Wcslview, 1985), p. 85.
^Donald J. Puchala, ‘Integration Theory and the Study of International Relations’, in Richard L. 
Merritt and Bruce M. Russetl, From National Development to Global Community: Essays in Honor 
o f  Karl W. Deutsch (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), p. 160.
^See Bela Balassa, The ’Theory o f  Economic Integration (Homewood, IlkRichard D. Irwin, 1961) and 
Alfred Tovias, ‘A Smvey of the Theoiy of Economic Integration’, in Hans .1, Michelmann and 
Panayotis Soldatos (eds.), European Integration: Theories and Approaches (Lanham: University 
Press of America, 1994).
Panayotis Soldatos, Vers une sociologie de l'intégration communautaire européenne: Essai de 
théorie générale systématique (Louvain: Vander, 1973), p, 15, emphasis in original.
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The notion of integration remains extremely difficult to encapture. Obviously, there 
is a point of integration beyond which it can be considered as not worth it to pursue 
the process. This point can be defined in a way similar to the Pareto optimum in 
economics. The optimum point of integration is the level of integration beyond which it
is impossible to go without damaging the welfare of, at least, one member unit of the
security community. The notion of welfare introduced at this point should not be 
considered as a strictly economic term. It can be viewed through a variety of indicators 
(economic, political, social and military).*** To determine the concrete situation of this 
point remains almost impossible. Nevertheless, the intellectual and conceptual value of 
this point of equilibrium is beyond any possible doubt.
Besides, there is a certain degree of achievement of the process that can be measured 
through the usage of a series of indicators.** Thus, what has been named the 
integrative process, is at the same time a state of affairs, indicating a certain degree of 
integration achieved and a continuing process that leads towards a distinct point of 
integration. Panayotis Soldatos thinks it is possible to reconcile the two aspects of the 
phenomenon; *^
The integrative process could find its simplified grapMc representation in a 
cumulative curve if, on one of the axes is represented, at the end of each stage of the 
process, not the degree of integration of each accomplished stage but the total o f all 
the previous stages including the last one. In the framework of this giaphic, the 
notion of integration as a process can coexist with the notion of integration as a
situation; eveiy point of the cumulative curve representing the process is an
encouragement to use the notion of integration as a situation; it represents the state 
of integi atiou at a given moment.
This double countenance of the notion of integration renders the notion far more
difficult to study. Distinguishing the situation from the process is not easy. Still, this
dual aspect of the concept facilitates understanding and analysis of the situation of the
international system. “In sum, the evolution of political communities is path-dependent
'^Welfare implies the coexistence of well-being and security and is also certainly an ‘essentially 
contested concept’.
’’For an example of a number of possible indicators of international integration, see Karl W. Deutsch, 
Political Community at the International Level: Problems o f  Definition and Measurement 
(Princeton N..I: 1953), appendix, pp. 70-71.
’“Soldatos, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
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and not foreordained. Each choice and step in the direction of cormnunity expands the 
set of vested interests and issues that will affect the next round of choice and 
evolution, and thus increases the chances for pluralistic security communities to 
become established—until they themselves make room for the next round of 
transformations and the new kinds of institutionalization.”*^
TIÛS first distinction between the static and the dynamic aspect of integi ation should 
be completed by a distinction between external and internal integration. External 
integration being “the creation of a new unique fi*amework or the incorporation of new 
parts in a unit”; internal integration being “the growth of the degree of integration of 
an already existing whole.”*'*
These distinctions are all the more important in the European context where diversity 
and unity coexist. In the words of Edgar Morin: *^
The difficulty of thinking Europe, is first of all the difficulty of thinking the singular 
in the plural and the plural in the singular: tlie unitas multiplex. (...) Thus, to 
conceptualise how European unity lies in disunion and heterogeneity, we should use 
two principles of intelligence capable of explaining such complex phenomena: the 
dialogic principle and the recursion pnnciple. The dialogic principle means that 
two Of more different logics are linked in a unit in a complex manner 
(complementaiy, competitive and antagonistic) without this duality being lost in this 
unity, (...) The principle of recursion means that we must consider the generative or 
regenerative processes as an uninterrupted productive circle in which, every 
moment, component or instance of the process is at once product and producer of 
the other moments, components or instances.
This complex unitas multiplex lies at the core of the whole integrative process.*^
’’Emanuel. Adler, Imagined (Security) Communities (Paper prepared for delivery at the 1994 Annual 
Meeting of tlie American Political Science Association), p. 31, about the patli-dependent character 
of the process see the previous chapter on credibility and mutual predictability of behaviour.
’“’ibid., p. 17. This conceptual distinction lies at the heart of the ‘deepening versus enlargement’ 
debate in the European Union.
’’Edgar Morin, Penser l'Europe (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), p. 24, emphasis in original. This same idea 
of complexity was expressed by Pascal: “Evetything being caused and a cause, helped and helping, 
mediate and immediate and all of tliem being peipetuated by a natural and insensible link that links 
the most remote and the most different, 1 think it impossible either to know the parts without 
knowing the whole, or to know the whole without individually knowing the parts.” In Pascal, 
Pen.vée.v (Paris; Gamier-Flammarion, 1976), p. 69.
’‘’This tension existing between unity and diversity is thoroughly examined in Pierre Hassner, ‘Vers 
un universalisme pluriel’. Esprit, December 1992.
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Integration is therefore a phenomenon that is at once a process and an achievement, 
a union of diversities, The difficulty of the analysis of the phenomenon lies mainly in 
the difficulty of understanding and explaining the coexistence of pluralism and unity. 
Thus, in the Deutschian framework, independent nation-states form a pluralistic 
security community thanks to the fulfilment of three conditions: (1) compatibility of 
major values; (2) mutual responsiveness and (3) mutual predictability of behaviour.*^ 
Deutsch described integration as aiming “at the creation of a wide range of general 
inirpose capabilities, often exceeding by an order of magnitude or more the capabilities 
of the components states.”** States continue to exist while having so much in common 
that their continuing independence seems either doubtful or useless.
International pluralism is a reality while lacking a coherent theoretical framework.*** 
Pluralistic security community theory and these thiee conditions/achievements are an 
accurate but incomplete description of international pluralism. The prodigy seems too 
complex to be understood. New conditions could be added. Referring to the process of 
European integration, Panayotis Soldatos believes that the following conditions are the 
essential reasons for the process: (1) The need for enhancement, of common security; 
(2) the hope of achieving greater economic prosperity; (3) the will to promote some 
shared values; and (4) the will to promote supra-nationalism.^** Since many other 
conditions can come to mind, the problem is that no set of conditions can flilly and 
accurately describe international integration.
Our list of conditions and “integiatlve” characteristics, far from favouring the 
tendency to adopt a monoconceptual interpretation, puts a lot of emphasis on the 
plurality and the interaction of “integrative” variables.^’
’^Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis o f  International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 
1988), p. 281.
‘®Karl W. Deutsch, ‘Between Sovereignty and Integration: Conclusion’, Government and Opposition, 
vol. 9, no. 2, 1974, p. 113, emphasis in original.
’^For a critique of the theoretical framework of international pluralism see Oran R, Young, ‘Professor 
Russetl, Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor’, World Politics, no. 21, 1969, For the nececity to 
extend the theoretical basis o f the theory see Stuart A. Scheingold, ‘Domestic and International 
Consequences of Regional lixtQgmtXQiT, International Organization, vol. 24, no. 4,1970.
’^’Soldatos, op. cit., pp. 107 ff.
’’’Ibid., p. 253.
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Many attempts at definition have been made but none of them can be considered as 
complete or definitive.
Tn studies of international regional integration scholars have defined integration in 
terms of the process of sliifting loyalties from a national setting to a larger entity, the 
ability to ensure peaceful change over time, the establishment and maintenance of 
community, tlie ability of a system to maintain itself, and the collective capacity to 
make decisions. Writers primarily concerned with national integration have defined 
integration as a system cohesion, adaptation to stiuctures, a bridging of the elite- 
mass gap, the establishment of common norms and commitment to patterns of 
political behavior.^^
Even support for political integration is a complex phenomenon. Deutsch believes that 
support for political integration follows a high level of transactions and social 
communication.
When these transactions are higlily visible, easy to identify and differentiate, people 
may form images of the community or group involved in the transactions. Tf these 
transactions were rewarded, the image of the commimify may be strongly positive.^’
The mechanism of political support can find a possible description in the following
matrix: '^*
Table 5. /: Political Support and International Integration
Systemic Interaction Identitive Interaction
Utilitaricm Response Expectations of future gain as Belief in a common interest
result of past satisfaction
^^Fred M. Hayward, ‘Continuities and Discontinuities between Studies of National and International 
Political Integration: Some Implications for Future Research Efforts’, International Organization, 
vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, pp. 919-920. Hayward refers, respectively, to the works of Erast Haas, Karl 
Deutsch, Amilai Etzioni in Political Unification: A Comparative Study o f  Leaders and Forces 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965) and Claude Ake in A Theory o f  Political 
Integi'ation (Homewood, 111: Dorsey Press, 1967).
Werner J. Feld, ‘Sociological Theories of European Integration’, in Michelmann and Soldatos 
(eds.), op. cit., p. 46,
‘^‘Adapted from Leon L. Liiidberg, ‘Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon 
Requiring Multivariate Measurement ’, v o l .  24, no. 4, 1970, p. 693. For 
a more complete account of these dimensions see Leon L. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, 
Europe’s Would-Be Polity; Patterns o f  Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J: Prentice Hall, 1970).
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Affective Response Belief in legitimacy, as basis of Sense of mutual political
willingness to comply with identification
authoritative outputs of system
Security community theory vis-à-vis some other theories of 
international integration
Security community theory is just a theory of regional integration, and it is, in 
actuality, a theory that could be considered to be minimalist. The only concrete 
achievement of the construction of a pluralistic security community is considered to be 
the impossibility of war among the member states of the community. Besides the 
whole theory is based on the use of data series concerning communication. This theoiy 
can be labelled “communicative interactionism”?^ It is clearly based upon a 
sociological perspective as “society is seen as being in a process of evolution and 
progress; what is to be determined are the uniformities governing this process and the 
meaning of integration.”^^
concept of security coininunity refers, solely, to a region in which war is no longer considered as 
a possible way of resolving inter-state disputes, a group “in which there is real assurance that the 
members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in 
some other way.” In Karl W. Deutsch el al.. Political Communily and the North Atlantic Area: 
International Organization in the Light o f  Historical Experience (Princeton N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1957), p. 5. “In (...) pliualistic security communities the participating states 
remain sovereign; but they maintain a liigh level of mutual transactions and develop capabilities of 
mutual communication and accommodation such that they can rely on peaceful change and 
adjustment in problems or disputes.” In Karl W. Deutsch, ‘The Impact of Communications upon 
International Relations Theory’, in Abdul A. Said (ed.), Theory o f  international Relations: the 
Crisis o f  Relevance (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 92. “The absence of (...) 
advance preparations for large-scale violence between any two territories or groups of people 
prevents any immediate outbreak of effective war between them, and it serves for tliis reason as the 
test for the existence or non-existence of a security community among the groups concerned. The 
attainment of a security conummity thus can be tested operationally in terms of the alienee of 
presence of significant organized preparations for war or large-scale violence among its members, 
and integiation for us is the creation of tliose practices and macliinery— tlie habits and 
institutions—wliich actually result in the establishment of a security community.” In Deutsch, 
Political Community at the International Level, op. cit., pp. 2-3,
^^avid Mutimer, ‘Theories of Political Integration’, in Michelmann and Soldatos (eds.), op. cit., p. 
34.
Werner J. Feld, ‘Sociological Theories of European Integration’, in Michelmami and Soldatos 
(eds.), op. cit., p. 43.
Towards a Theory o f  International Pluralism 76
For Deutsch, the dynamic of integration is found in the learning of individuals in 
social groups — groups he classes as communities, societies and cultures. The social 
groups are defined primarily with reference to interaction, and although clearly 
simple interaction is insufficient to create meaningful social groups. Thus, to form a 
social gi'oup, the collection of interacting individuals must partake in stable 
structures of communication (...) Learning, in turn, is driven by this communicative 
interaction (...) Such increased capacity to communicate builds and strengthens 
community, a process of building which is Deutsch’s concept of integration.^®
The importance of communicative interaction and learning explains the main method
(i.e. quantitative analysis) used by Deutsch for the empirical verification of his thesis.^ **
Deutsch views international political integration or community foimation as a 
process leading towards an integrated political community. This community must 
possess (1) a certain number of structural components; (2) a political process that 
allows non-violent coexistence at the international level; (3) a high degree of 
interaction among its members permitting the formation of a sense of common destiny, 
in the words of William Fisher:^ **
The sociocausal paradigm contends that a process of social assimilation leads to or 
cause a process of political development to occur. In the paradi^i social 
assimilation is conceptualized as a learning process during which peoples, in 
resiionse to mutually rewarding transactions, adopt habits that tliey perceive as 
conducive to firrther rewarding transactions. (...) It should be noted that this 
paradigm is based on tlie hypotliesis that social assimilation caused political 
development and therefore that social assimilation must exist before political 
development can start.
The paradigm came under heavy criticism during the sixties, on the grounds that the 
linkage between the empirical data and its hypotheses is not well established.
2®Ibid., pp. 34-35.
’’^ See Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy Macridis and Richard L. Merritt, France, Germany and 
the Western Alliance: A Study o f  Elites Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New 
York; Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967) and Karl W. Deutsch, ‘Efforts d’intégiation dans le complexe 
de la politique européenne’, in Dusan Sidjanski (éd.), Méthodes quantitatives e t intégration 
européenne (Geneva: Institut d’Etudes Européennes, 1970),
‘^’William E. Fisher, ‘An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration’, 
International Organization, vol. 23, no. 2, 1969, pp. 257-258, empliasis in original.
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the paradigm posits the existence of a direct causal relation between two types of 
variables —social assimilation which can be described as a psychological variable 
relating to the attitudes of mass publics and political development which can be 
described as a variable relating to the behavior of selected elite populations. Never 
does the paradigm, however, theoretically state how the attitudes of mass 
populations are translated into elite behaviors, (...) Political development is very 
much a process involving the interactions of various political elites. Yet the 
paradigm fails to specify the variables which probably determine elite hehaxnors 
regarding integration.®’
These thoiightfiil critiques do not invalidate the whole of the security community 
theory, but rather call for the creation and development of complementary theories and 
the invention of new tests and methods allowmg the empirical control of the 
assumptions of the th eo ry . Th i s  empirical control is difficult. Very often, the 
acknowledgement of the existence of security communities is followed by the avowal 
that it is not possible to explain this achievement.
The fact that not only war, but the use of its threat has become totally inconceivable 
in the mutual relations of Western countries, brings the idea of peace llirougli 
interdependence and democracy back into fashion. Ceitainly an extremely important 
development has taken place in the West, a development whose source is as 
debatable as that of the nineteenth-century revolution mentioned by Aron (industrial 
society? democracy? capitalism? individualism? economic and demograpliic 
evolution?), but whose reality is not; relations between liberal develoiied countries 
can no longer be understood in the light of the definition of international relations 
as a state of nature, characterized by the possibility of resorting to force. Neither the 
constraints nor the priorities of the modern state can be thought througli 
satisfactorily on the basis of its classical attributes such as sovereignty and 
territoriality; even less, on the basis of the extreme case, on that of war.®®
®‘ibid., pp, 288-290, emphasis in original. For a critique along similar lines see Ronald Inglehart, ‘An 
End to European I n t e g r a t i o n ? Political Science Review, vol. 61, no. 1, 1967.
®’’An innovative approach of the national security problem that borrows a lot of ideas from Security 
Community theoiy, can be found in Barry Buzan, People, States and Fern'. The National Security 
Problem in International Relations (Brighton: Harvester Hill, 1983). Buzan refers (p. 106) to 
Security Complexes “defined as a group of states whose primaiy security concerns link together 
sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart fiom one 
another,”
®®Pierre Hassner, ‘Beyond the tliree traditions: the philosophy of war and peace in Mstorical 
perspective’. International Affairs, vol. 70, no. 4, 1994, pp. 750-751.
Towards a Theory o f  International Pluralism 78
Regional integration has been explained by a number of different theories that have 
been unable to explain in an easy and comprehensive way the whole of the integrative 
process. Their common use cannot explain the whole process either but some of the 
weaknesses of these theories can be better exposed in this way. '^*
Table 5.2: Main Theories o f International Integration







Creation of a constitutional Federal state




progressively reduce the 
power of the nation states
Spillover of integrative 
demand from technical to 
political tasks
Need to co-ordinate state 
action (in a world of 
sovereign states) in order to 
achieve desired outcomes in 
specific issue areas
Compatibility of major 
values and learning through 
communication and mutually 
rewarding transactions




Sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures 
in a given area of 
international relations
Security community
®'’The small presentation of the various theories of international integration that follows, is not meant 
to be comprehensive or complete. It only aims at putting security community tlieory into 
perspective. The reader should refer to the literature indicated in the footnotes for further details.
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Federalism is excessively based on a legalistic approach and political will.^  ^
Functionalism^® and neofunctionalism over-rely on the notion of spillover and fail to 
consider the problem of self-encapsulation.^^ Security community theoiy cannot 
distinguish cause and effect and over-relies on quantitative data of attitudes to 
determine the level of integration.^* Ultimately, as argued by Adler and Barnett: it is 
“unclear how changes at the socio-psychological level, like learning and socialization 
processes, [are] transformed into state interests and policies.” *^* Regime theoiy 
developed in the 1970s as a response to the apparent failure of political integration 
theory fails to link the demand for international services with the supply in functional 
organisations.'***
®'^ For an analysis of the federalist approach see Dusan Sidjanski, Dimensions européennes de la 
science politique: Questions méthodologiques et programme de recherches (Paris: Librairie 
générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1963); Cari J. Friedrich, Trends o f  Federalism in^heoty and 
Practice (New York: Praeger, 1968); Hemi Brugmans, La pensée politique du fédéralisme 
(Leyden: 1969) and P. Hay, Federalism and Supranational Organizations (London: 1966).
®^ For a classic study of fimctionalism see David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1966). See also Johan K. De Vree, Political Integration: The Formation o f  
Theory and Its Problems (The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 1972) and A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor 
(eds ). Theory and Practice in International Relations: Functionalism (New York: Crane, Russak).
®’Tlie notion of ‘self-encapsulation’ highlights the fact that a successful international organisation 
does not necessarily Amher integration. If the level of integration attained is considered as 
sufficient and if the cost of fiirther integration is viewed as too heavy then, even a successive 
international organisation does not identify with progressive integration. The spillover process is 
not an overwhelming cosmic force driving mexorably towards Airther integration. See Ernst B. 
Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing’, 
International Organization, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, pp. 611-615. For an example of self-encapsulation 
in Europe see Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and James L. Deghand, ‘European Teclmological Collaboration: 
The Experience of the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO)’, Journal o f  
Common Market Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, 1968. For a neoflmctionalist treatment of Eurojiean 
integration see Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics o f  European Economic Integration 
(Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1963) and Charles Pentland, International Theory and 
European Integration (London; Faber and Faber, 1973).
^^''Communications theory suggests~it does not assert or prove—Xh&X an intensive pattern of 
communication between national units will result in a closer ‘community’ among the units if  loads 
and capabilities remain in balance.” Tn Ernst B. Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration’, op. cit., 
p. 626, emphasis added. For a critique of the Deutschian model see also Fisher, op. cit., and 
Inglehart, op. cit.. Another critique of Deutsch’s work argues that he has developed a theoiy not so 
much of political integration but more of "social or moral community” which, "ignores too much 
that is |X)litically relevant.” Tn Leon N. Lindberg, ‘Tlie European Community as a Political System’, 
Journal o f  Common Market Studies, vol. 5, no. 4, 1967, p. 345.
®%manuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, Security Commtmities (Paper presented at the.1994 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association), p. 37.
'’’’See Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Demand for International Regimes’, in Stephen D. Krasner (edj. 
International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). For another critique of this theoiy 
see Susan Strange, ‘Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis’, in ibid. Regime theory 
does not reject the assumption of international anarchy, it rather considers that ‘‘under certain 
restrictive conditions involving the failure of individual action to secure Pareto-optimal outcomes, 
international regimes may have a significant impact even in an anarchic world.” In Stephen D. 
Krasner, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables’, in ibid., p.
Towards a Theory o f  International Pluralism 80
Whatever the relevance of one or another of these theories, regional political 
integration can not be expected to be theorised, thoroughly, in the future. A ‘neither 
fish nor fowl’ approach is undoubtedly valid even though it is not always very helpful 
for understanding the international setting.'** Similarly, the still inadequate theory of 
international pluralism cannot be expected to be developed to a plainly satisfactory 
level. Still, some elements permitting a theorisation of the reality of international 
pluralism do exist, and this is particularly the case of pluralistic security community 
theory.
This very much debatable theorisation is all the more usefiil if it allows the 
operationalisation of the concepts developed. This is a task of the utmost importance 
for the validity and the utility of the theory. If an operationalisation is possible, the 
theory can be considered as having a practical importance. This operationalisation is 
possible through the construction of a series of indicators and tests allowing the 
appraisal of the level of integration achieved.
2. For an analysis of regime theory and its application to the Cold War antagonism see John S. 
Diiflleld, ‘Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: the contributions of regional security regimes’. 
Review o f  International Studies, vol. 20, 1994. For an analysis of European Political Co-operation 
through the framework of regime theory see Hcinz-Jürgcn Axt, ‘Koopcration unler Konkurrenten; 
Das Regime als Theorie der aufienpolitischen Zusanmienarbeit der EG-Staateii’, Zeitschrift Jur 
Politik, 40 Jg, no. 3, 1993. For an overview of coalition and alliance theory see Vincent Leraieux 
with Namatic Traoré and Nathalie Bolduc, ‘Coalitions, alignements et alliances interétatiques’. 
Revue Etudes Internationales, vol. 25, no. 2, 1994; Francis A, Beer (ed.). Alliances: Latent War 
Communities in the Contemporary World (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970); George
F. Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits o f  Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1962) and Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen and Steven Rosen (eds.), Alliance in 
International Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970).
'’’For such an analysis of European integration see Donand J. Puchala, ‘Of blind men, elephants and 
international integration’, in Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds.). Perspectives on World 
Politics  (J^ondon: Routledge, 1991),
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6. Testing Compatibility of Major Values: a 
content analysis of the communiqués of the 
European Council
Compatibility of major values is a necessary condition for the existence of a pluralistic 
security community, since such a community is characterised by the existence of a high 
level of integration leading to the establishment of long-term expectations of peaceful 
change. This liigh level of integration is notably indicated by the existence of common 
beliefs and values.
The importance of compatibility of major values for European integration has been 
widely noticed before. After the Second World War, the time was ripe for a reappraisal 
of inter-European relations and some shared beliefs made the beginnings of European 
integiation much easier.
Given this level of destruction, it is not suiprising that many continental Europeans 
were prepared to envisage radical solutions, even solutions which encompassed the 
doing away of tlie ‘state’, that 19th century epitome of grandeur. Most interestingly, 
even some resistance groups were tliinking along tliese lines, calling in Geneva in 
1944 not only for a Federal Union, which ‘alone could ensure the preservation of 
libeity and civilisation on the Continent of Europe’, but for a goverimient directly 
responsible to the European people, with ‘an army placed under the orders of this 
government and excluding all other national armies’.’
The whole process of European integration was made possible by the agreement of the 
participant states concerning a certain number of major values. This agreement was 
forceftilly expressed in the preamble of the Statute establishing the Council of Europe. 
The high contracting parties reaffirmed their “devotion to the spiritual and moral 
values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of 
individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis 
of all genuine democracy.” Besides, the Council of Europe also showed its support for 
human rights by passing a Convention on Human Rights.^ Major values are clearly
’Trevor C. Salmon, A European Defence Identity (London: British Atlantic, 1983), p. 3.
®^ Ses Arthur H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977) 
this book includes the text of the Convention signed on 4 November 1950 and the protocols.
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articulated through this Convention. “In Articles 2 to 14 inclusive of the Convention 
and the subsequent First and Fourth Protocols, a number of rights and freedoms are 
laid down: for example, freedom to life protected by law; freedom from torture and 
slavery; the right to a fair trial; the right to private and family life; the freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion and expression; the freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association; the right to marry and found a family.”*
As in the case of the Council of Europe, common values lie clearly at the core of the 
objectives of the European Union. Thus, the Treaty on European Union states (article 
J.l) that the goals of the EU are to safeguard common values, interests and the 
independence of the Union; strengthen security; promote international co-operation; 
and enhance democracy.
The aim of this section is to examine the degree of compatibility of major values 
prevailing among the member states of the European Union, as well as the coherence 
and the usage of these values.
Testing compatibility of major values: some methodoiogical 
considerations
The study of compatibility of major values has to take into consideration the existence 
of some inherent problems with any analysis of values.
Images of larger political units—Europe, Atlantic union, world government—are 
often laden with positive values. “Separatism” or “parocliialism” seems 
unimpressive by comparison. But we must note the great, emotional charge that 
“independence” has for Americans, as it has for many other [leoples. We do not 
celebrate “integi ation day” or the ratification day of the American Constitution; we 
celebrate Independence Day on the fourth of July. (...) In many countries, we find 
such value-laden words as “liberation,” “freedom” and “independence”. To a large 
extent, we find a similar value charge in favor of a shift, sometimes to a larger, 
sometimes to a smaller political unit. What seems to make the difference is the 
association, in experience or expectation, of the proposed larger or smaller iiolitical 
unit with other values and valued services.'*
®Clive Archer, Organizing Western Europe (London: Edward Arnold, 1990), p. 47.
''Karl W. Deutsch, Tides Among Nations (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 284-285.
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It is therefore important to make the difference between the values that are considered 
positive and the values that are negatively laden. The values that are deliberately 
omitted must also be taken into account. One of the most obvious ways of establishing 
the level of compatibility of major values is to make a content analysis. This method is 
proposed by Karl Deutsch himself;^
Tlie compatibility o f  major politically relevant values and value patterns may then 
be a crucial condition for political integration. Wliere such major values are 
incompatible, common institutions and frequent contacts are likely to produce not 
integration but bitter and protracted conflict. A testing of the compatibility of major 
values by survey methods, content analysis and/or historical description or literary 
methods may, therefore, be of cracial importance for the realism of our analysis.
Content analysis is therefore a highly relevant method for the evaluation of the degree 
of compatibility of major values. The existence of compatibility of major values should 
logically be accounted for in public documents. It is, therefore, rational to seek to 
study this notion through content analysis.
Content analysts: m ethods and rules
Content analysis is today a highly sophisticated method for the study of texts and 
documents of all kind. This paper is going to use some of the methods used in content 
analysis, especially methods relevant to the study of values.®
The documents examined are the final communiqués of the European Council during 
the years 1989-1994. The choice of these documents is justified by the fact that these 
communiqués are the expression of the highest political body of the European Union. ^  
It is only logical to expect that the main policy making centre of the EU would state 
with authority and confidence the values and beliefs, the Union stands for. This 
hypothesis is verified by the subsequent empirical analysis. The documents used are,
®Ibid., pp. 270-271, emphasis in original.
^ o r  the tlieory of content analysis, see Laurence Bardin, L'analyse de contenu (Paris; Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1993), especially pp. 125-206; O. R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the 
Social Sciences and Humanities (Addison Wesley, 1969); Robert P. Weber, Basic Content Analysis 
(London: Sage, 1985); Klaus Klippendorf, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology 
(J-,ondon: Sage, 1980); R. Gliillione, J.-L. Beauvois, C. Chabrol and A. Trognon, Manuel d ’analyse 
de contenu (Paris: Colin, 1980) and K. E. Rosengren (td.). Advances in Content Analysis (London: 
Sage, 1981).
^For reasons of convenience, the term European Union is used instead of the term European 
Coinnnmity although before the entiy into force of the Treaty on European Union there is entity 
called European Union.
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accordingly, abundant with relevant information for the study of values. Another 
reason for using these documents is that they are the product of a lengthy, intensive 
process of negotiation and re-negotiation. In them can be found genuinely agreed and 
shared values that result from a procedure that gives them particular importance. Since 
eveiy single word of these documents was included after serious consideration, a 
content analysis of them is all the more relevant.
One of the most important rules of content analysis affirms that the documents used 
must be used exhaustively.* This study respects this rule: all the documents since 1989 
are used. The relevant part of the documents is the conclusion of the presidency.** The 
choice of 1989 as the starting point for the study is made because of the historical 
signi ficance of this year. 1989 is the beginning of a new era in European politics. This 
new era is characterised by the importance of some shared values and the expression of 
the i mportance of values in politics is more emphatic because of this fact. This makes 
the documents pertinent. A great many of references to common values are to be found 
in them.
The documents are very homogeneous: they come from the same political authority 
and are of roughly the same importance both politically and materially (their length is 
usually similar, especially in the case of regular meetings of the Council). This 
homogeneity makes possible the use of the document as a point of reference in the 
whole study, in particular for the statistics of the content a nalysis. The unit of the study 
is the theme or subject, i.e. the use of a certain subject or theme by the European 
Council. The use of the notion of theme is very common in content analysis. A theme 
is a recording unit o f complex meaning, its length can be variable and its reality is not 
linguistic but psychological. An assertion, but also a simple allusion can constitute a 
theme, a theme can also be developed in several different assertions. But in a similar
Bardin, op. cit., p. 127.
^The special meeting of the European Council in Brussels on the 15th of July of 1994 (Bulletin o f  the 
FMropean Communities 7/8-1994, p. 7) is therefore excluded of the study because of the absence of 
conclusions of the presidency (this European Council had as its only purpose the appointment of 
Jacques Santer as the new R  esident of the European Commission), The corpus used in this study is, 
therefore, composed by 16 documents (in parentheses the relevant issue of the Bulletin o f  the 
FMropean Communities): The European Councils of Madrid (6-1989), Strasbourg (12-1989), 
Dublin (4-1990), Dublin (6-1990), Rome (10-1990), Rome (12-1990), Luxembourg (6-1991), 
Maastricht (12-1991), Lisbon (6-1992), Birmingham (10-1992), Edinburgh (12-1992), Copenhagen 
(6-1993), Brussels (10-1993), Brussels (12-1993), Corfu (6-1994) and Essen (12-1994).
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way, a single assertion can refer to many themes. A subject will be counted only once 
per numbered paragraph of the communiqué. This is made to avoid counting the 
repetitions of the same theme in the same paragraph as different items. The use of the 
theme as the recording unit is very common for the study of values and beliefs through 
content analysis.***
One hypothesis of the study is that the European Council expresses judgements on 
values either concerning the European Union (i.e. the values and the beliefs of the 
European Union) or concerning non-member states (i.e. values and beliefs that the 
European Council would like to see other states adopt or reject). This distinction 
explains the structure of the section in one part examining the ‘internal values’ (values 
mentioned with respect to the internal organisation of the European Union) and 
another part examining the ‘external values’ (values that the EU supports or rejects 
vis-à-vis questions of foreign policy). The comparison of the results of the two parts 
should be veiy interesting for an analysis of the degree of coherence of the major 
values that prevail in Europe today.
This paper seeks to demonstrate that the commonality of the beliefs in democracy 
and the rule of law, and more fundamentally, the belief in the centrality of the 
individual and of individual freedoms has a pacifying influence in the European Union. 
The compatibility of these values is a guarantee against the resurgence of territorial 
disputes and European wars.
A final, very important, problem for the realisation of this study, lies with the 
definition of the word values. Values are certainly standards or principles considered 
precious or important in life. This dictionaiy definition shows the subjectivity of the 
term. A value remains ultimately an essentially contested concept. There is little hope 
of achieving a good and workable definition of it. All words chosen are chosen in an 
utterly subjective way. An effort is made hereafter to take into account all words 
depicting a tenet or belief that serves as a focal point in the European Council 
communiqués. However, the subjective character of the operation is not denied.
10Bardin, op. cit., p. 137.
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The use of values by the European Council for the portrayal of 
the European Union
The main them es used  by the European Council
A content analysis of the documents of the European Council over this period shows 
the importance of four main themes: democracy, rights and freedoms, racism and anti­
semitism and the nation-state.
Table 6.1: Values significant to the European Union 
Subject___________ Key W ords Key Verbs Items
Democracy
Rights and Freedoms










free movement of persons 
freedom
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The analysis of the results
Not suiprisingly (especially given the period reviewed), the theme which seems to be 
of the utmost importance in the documents of the European Council is democracy (17 
items in 16 documents and most importantly, this value is stated as being the most 
important in the documents themselves). Democracy is clearly stated as being the main 
characteristic of every European polity. In particular, democracy is considered as the 
main feature needed for accession to the European Union; “any European States 
whose systems of government are founded on the principle of democracy may apply to 
become members of the Union.”**
The wording seems unambiguous, but some important limitations remain, The 
European Council often seeks to remind member states of the importance of complying 
with the “democratic requirement”. References to elections, democratic institutions, 
and to the democratic traditions of the membei" states show just how important this 
theme can be. The need to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the EU is also very 
often underlined.*^ Broadly speaking, the references to democracy often have as a 
meaning that democracy must be reinforced and the democratic lules obseiwed either 
by the member states or the European institutions.*^ In short, democracy is not 
considered as developed to a satisfactory level, but rather as a matter for perpetual 
attention and care. The frailty of democracy and the dangers of centralisation and 
bureaucratisation are acknowledged, directly or indirectly. If there is agreement on the 
centrality of democracy, its degree of development does not seem satisfying.
Nevertheless, democracy is certainly a value held by both the member states and the 
Union as a whole. There is compatibility of values in this field, since the need for the 
reinforcement of the value implies the commonality of the belief in it.
^^Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 12-1991, p. 8, The same phrase (with exactly the same 
wording) is also xx'&eûisi Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 6-1992, p. 10.
’®The European Council often associates the reinforcement of citizens’ rights and the enhancement of 
democracy: “(The European Council] (...) welcomes the political agreement on tlie detailed 
arrangements concerning the right to vote and to stand for municipal elections, wliich wiU be in 
addition to Union citizens’ existing riglit to vote and to stand in European parliament elections.” In 
Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 12-1994, p. 17.
’®One characteristic reference to the need to respect democracy is the following: “Tlie European 
Council emphasized (...) the need to ensure the proper observance of democratic control in each of 
the Member States.” In Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 12-1989, p. 12.
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Wliat (at first glance) seems to be a surprise, is the importance of the number of 
references to rights and freedoms of the European citizen (32 items in 16 documents). 
References to the freedom of movement of persons (for instance) are very common: 
“The European Council, feeling that free movement of people was a priority for 
1992,...”*'* Wider references to individual rights and to the role of the individual or the 
citizen also abound throughout the text. Since the citizens are asked to support 
European integration, the European Council tries to convince them that they stand to 
benefit from the process: “The Maastricht Treaty will bring direct benefits to individual 
citizens.”*^ The need for the support of the citizens has as a result the admittance by 
the European Council of the fact that the main benefits of integration are for the 
individual:
With a view to enhancing the benefits which our people derive from belonging to a 
Conummity which has as its raison d’être the promotion of their rights, their 
fi eedoms and their welfare, the European Council dealt with a number of themes of 
particular relevance to the individual citizen,...’®
The essentially individualistic nature of European societies and of the European 
polity as a whole is asserted and accepted in the documents analysed. Welfare is 
considered as the main aim of the Union and references to economic values are made 
mainly through mentions of the benefits that European citizens stand to gain. Thus, the 
aim of the EU employment policy is to “create more jobs for our citizens,”*^ The 
allusion to the citizen is used to underline both the democratic aspect of the process 
and its individualistic nature. The rights of the individuals are closely associated with 
welfare and economic values:
As taxpayers, the citizens of Europe rightly ex^iect fraud, wastefulness and 
mismanagement to be combated with the greatest rigour.’®
The rights granted by the EU are considered to be additional to the ones granted by the 
member states. The functioning of the EU itself is a matter of concern for the
'^^Bullelin o f  the European Communities, 6-1989, p. 10. 
^^BuUetin o f  the European Communities, 10-1992, p. 9. 
^^Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 6-1992, p. 8. 
'^‘Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 12-1992, p, 8. 
^^BuUetin o f  the European Communities, 12-1994, p. 16.
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European citizen and references to the benefits of the individuals by the increased 
openness and transparency of the Union are quite common.
The individualistic nature of the Union is also demonstrated in the field of 
immigration and more particularly with respect to the right of asylum. These matters 
are always treated in a very neutral way as mere technical matters and not as political 
ones. The rare mentions to the existence of a right of asylum are also aimed at 
providing a justification for the European policy in this subject; “[The European 
Council] recognized the importance of such measures against the misuse of the right of 
asylum in order to safeguard the principle itself. The rights and freedoms, asserted 
as important in the documents, are first and foremost the rights and freedoms that 
benefit the European citizens.
The need for the satisfaction of the European citizen is even asserted as being an 
essential component for the building of a united Europe. The European Council speaks 
of “the adoption of concrete measures which will enable European citizens to 
recognize in their daily fives that they belong to a single entity.” ”^ European integration 
is not possible without, the support of the individual and common action aims at 
persuading the citizen that he or she stands to benefit fiom being in a single polity. •
The only major values that are consistently and vigorously rejected in the documents 
studied are racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism (10 items in 16 documents). The 
European Council expresses with an unambiguous wording its “deep revulsion” and its 
“concern” as well as the need to combat these phenomena. The opposition to such 
actions and deeds shows the agreement of all European states concerning the belief in 
the need to condemn and fight these phenomena. There is, therefore, a clear case of 
commonality of rejection of some beliefs which can be considered as an instance of 
compatibility of major values.
Finally, there is the occurrence of the mention of the Nation-State in the 
communiqués (10 items). The teims used in that purpose are very neutral. For 
instance, the main verb used for this reason is "to respect’. The importance of national 
identity md the usual attributes of the Nation-State (sovereignty, independence) are
Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 12-1992, p. 23. 
'^^Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 12-1989, p. 10.
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often underlined: ""The Treaty on European Union involves independent and sovereign 
States having freely decided to exercise in common some of their competences.”^^  The 
importance of the Nation-State is not denied and an important degree of agreement 
exists concerning its importance, but the neutrality of many terms used gives the 
impression that the European Council is very cautious. There is nevertheless, an 
agreement concerning the importance of the value of notions such as national identity.
As a conclusion of this part, it can be asserted that the communiqués of the European 
Council show how much modern democracies are based upon individualistic values. 
The pursuit of welfare by the individual citizen is important(as demonstrated in section 
2) because it is a value that makes war unattractive and almost unfeasible. The 
enhancement of the welfare of the citizens is one of the main priorities of every 
European government. To ensure the maintenance of welfare is considered as a duty of 
the government. The link with peace lies in the fact that the pursuit of welfare and of 
more and more individual jfreedoms is incompatible with the pursuit of any adventurous 
and violent action. The insistence on the rights of the citizen is also closely linked to 
the weight of democracy. Democracy is based on the individual citizen and only its 
satisfaction can be considered as a sufficient guarantee for the fiiture of democracy. 
Democracy and individual freedoms are directly related.
The debate on the pertinence or the obsolescence of the nation-state is by no means 
yet finished. This field is still very sensitive and the evolution of the ideas concerning 
the role of the nation-state remains utterly unpredictable. Tliis is clearly demonstrated 
by the caution with which the terms are used in the communiqués. However, the 
degree of compatibility of major values seems well advanced and even if some 
disagreements and uncertainties remain, the existence of a sense of community and the 
importance of shared values is undeniable. The belief in a democracy based on 
individual freedoms and rights is clearly shared by all member states.
^^BuUetin o f  the European Communities, 12-1992, p. 25.
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The use of values with respect to states outside the European 
Union
The result of the content analysis
The communiqués of the European Council show very clearly which major values the 
European Council considers as positive and which are considered as negative.
Table 6,2: Positively-laden values
Values____________________________ ________ Items
Democracy 46
Respect for human rights/individual freedoms 38
Co-operation in peace talks/dialogue 26




Peacehd settlements of conflicts 15
T erritorial integrity 14
Respect for international agreements/international law 14 
Sovereignty 12
Protection of minorities 12
Unity 11
Independence 11








Freedom of circulation of persons 4
Freedom of circulation of ideas/freedom of expression 3 
Openness 2
Freedom of information 1
Beside the positively-laden values, accounted above, the European Council often I
makes references to practices it rejects and condemns. These condemnations I
complement the positively-laden values examined before. Practices rejected are !t
symptomatic of the values that are a sserted as being essential by the European Council |
and the member states. These rejections are mainly re-assertions and reinforcements of |
the major values of the European Council.
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Table 6.3: Practices rejected by the European Council
Practices Examples item s
Violence/war
International tensions/conflicts 
Violations of human rights
Socio-economic problems
Violation of international 
law/agi’eements
Arbitrary arrests and treatment 
Apartheid































Analysis of the results
For the analysis of the above results, it is impossible to separate the positively-laden 
values from the rejected practices, since one cannot be studied without reference to the 
other. Besides, the two tilings are completely intermingled in the documents. For 
instance; “The European Council, concerned at the renewal of tensions in Central 
America and particularly at the recent explosion of violence in El Salvador, considers 
that a peaceful solution in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples of the region 
can only come tlirough dialogue, the safeguarding of human rights, and respect for 
democracy.
Again, the importance of the respect for democracy (46 items) and human rights (38 
items) comes as no surprise. The first important group of positively-laden values have
22Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 12-1989, p. 17.
Testing Compatibility o f  Major Values: the communiqués o f  the European Council 94
to do with what should be (accordmg to the European Council) the desired goal of 
every state. The development of democracy and the respect of human rights and 
individual freedom is the ideal condition for every member of the international 
community. Peace, security prosperity and respect of the rule of law are corollaries of 
this acliievement. Tliis is the reason why all these elements are usually employed in the 
same sentences.
Respect for democracy and human rights is the outstanding issue at stake in the 
communiqués of the European Council. The rejection of the practices of violation of 
human rights is very important (30 items in the 16 documents). What is emblematic in 
that respect, is that the cases of violation of human rights are accounted in detail and 
there are but few references to violations to human rights as such. Most often, the 
European Council refers to specific cases of violation of human rights (arbitrary 
arrests, executions, torture etc.). The pursuit, of a policy aiming at the universal respect 
of human rights is an essential element of European foreign policy:
The Community and its Member States undertake to pursue their policy of 
promoting and safeguarding human riglits and fiindamental freedoms tlirougliout 
the world. This is the legitimate and permanent duty of the world community and of 
all the States acting individually or collectively. They recall that the different ways 
of expressing concern about violations of rights, as well as requests designed to 
secure those rights, cannot be considered as interference in the internal affairs of a 
State, and constitute an important and legitimate part of tlieir dialogue with third 
countries. For their part, the Conununity and its Member States will continue to take 
up violations wherever they occur. '^'
The substance of these values can be labelled reference values Namely, these values 
are the ones that serve as the central nile in the evaluation of all situations abroad. All 
situations not complying with the rule (i.e. with these reference values) are considered 
abnormal. Democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, peace, freedom, the rule of
Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 6-1989, p. 15.
^^Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 6-1991, p. 17.
^For the importance of reference values see two classic value analyses: R. K. Wiiite, Value-Analysis: 
the nature and the use o f  the method  (Glen Gardiner, N.J: Libertarian Press, 1951) and V. 
Tsambert-Jamati, Crises de la société, crises de l ’enseignement (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1970).
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law and prosperity are such major values that are widely adhered by the member states 
of the European Council.
These reference values are clearly reflected in the practices and attitudes rejected by 
the European Council: the clear rejection of war and violence is closely associated with 
the belief in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The rejection of all cases of violations 
of human rights is associated with the belief in human rights and especially individual 
rights. Interestingly enough, most cases of human rights violation concern individual 
rights (one important exception being apartheid). Thus, arbitrary arrests, torture, 
detention of political prisoners, executions, intimidation and persecution (to take but a 
few cases) are clearly contrary to the rights of the individual (freedom of speech and 
belief, habeas corpus etc.).
Some other values mentioned by the European Council seem essentially as being a 
means to achieve the above-mentioned reference values. Such subsidiary values are 
dialogue and co-operation in peace talks, the belief in the peaceful settlement of 
conflicts economic development and co-operation, security, reconciliation, protection 
of minorities, good government, openness and the belief in the market economy. These 
values are auxiliaries for the acliievement of the reference values, but this does not 
mean that they are of minor importance. It only implies that they are means whereas 
the reference values are desired end-results. Thus, the European Council asserts that 
""A just, stable and lasting solution must be found through diplomatic action, regional 
dialogue, economic cooperation and reconciliation based on respect for democracy and 
human rights...Reconciliation is at once a process and a state, that is why it is 
accounted (in this case) as a subsidiary value. The other values (diplomatic action, 
regional dialogue, economic co-operation) are clearly subsidiary and are accounted as 
a means for acliieving the reference values (the word through is used). The end-result 
is distinctly democracy and the respect of human rights.^^
^^Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 6-1989, p. 15,
“^ The European Council seems especially to consider that the experience of European regional 
integration can be an interesting model for other regions of the world: ‘The easing of international 
tensions with the end of the Cold War provides new possibilities and resources for development but 
also favours the emergence of new fonns of cooi^ration, namely at the inter-regional level.” 
Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 6-1992, p. 17.
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It is worth notiiig that there is an important number of references to sovereignty, 
independence or unity. These references are mainly made in cases of decolonisation 
processes or in cases of occupation of the territory of a state, The wording of the 
references to these values is very standardised and sounds, therefore, very repetitious 
The reason for this is that the European Council is very uneasy with the use of such 
terms as sovereignty and independence. The verbs and the common meaning tenns^ 
are almost neutral which shows just how difficult this matter is for the European 
Council.^^
The example of Central and Eastern Europe
The importance of some major values for the EU and for its foreign relations is made 
all the more clear in the references of the European Council to the states of Central and 
Eastern Europe. The support for the transition to democracy is unambiguous: “The 
Community has taken and will take the necessary decisions to strengthen its 
cooperation with peoples aspiring to freedom, democracy and progiess and with States 
which intend their founding principles to be democracy, pluralism and the rule of 
law."^ °
The process of change and the progressive liberalisation of these states is seen as an 
historic chance to construct a Europe based on compatibility of major values:
Tills process of change brings ever closer a Europe which having overcome the 
imnatnral divisions imposed on it by ideology and confrontation, stands united in its 
commitment to democracy, pluralism, the rule of law, full respect for human riglits, 
and the principles of the market economy
The possibility of achieving a lasting peace in a free Europe is also closely associated 
with the success of European integration. The European Council cannot think of a 
peaceful Europe without a successful and dynamic European Union. The EU is
^^The common meaning terms are evaluative terms of the attitude objects, they designate the value 
considered. For more details, see Bardin, op. cit., p. 210 If.
^®Key verbs in that respect are to respect and to support. For instance, “The European Council 
reaffirms tlie Union's support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine.” In Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 6-1994, pp. 15-16. The standardised use of the 
aforementioned verbs and the absence or the neutrality of the common meaning terms greatly 
contrasts with the use of common meaning terms that are positively and negatively-laden for the 
description of other values.
^^Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 12-1989, p. 12.
Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 4-1990, p. 7.
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considered as the polity that is able to ensure peace and stability in the continent, The 
development of the EU is viewed as a necessity not only for itself, but also for the 
needs of Europe as a whole.
A point has now been reached where the continued dynamic development of the 
Community has become an imperative not only because it corresponds to the direct 
interests of the Î 2 Member States but also because it has become a crucial element 
in the progress that is being made in establishing a reliable framework for peace and 
security in Europe.^^
The support for the transition to democracy and to market economy is likewise 
associated with the individual citizen; “The European Council reaffirmed the right of 
individual citizens to participate fully in this process and called on all States to obseive 
this principle without reservation.”'^  ^The importance of individual rights is, once again, 
underlined and the belief in the importance of the support of the individual for the 
success of the founding of a peaceful Europe is beyond any possible doubt.
As in the case of the "internal values’, the "external values’ consider the individual as 
the corner stone of democracy. The references to a market-orientated economy are 
also made to show that the citizen can be prosperous and benefit from progress. The 
enhancement of individual freedoms is seen as the best way of establisliing a 
community of democracies that do not consider war as possible any more. “A political 
consensus is growing around the fundamental relationship between pluralistic 
democracy, respect for human rights and development regarded as an equitable and 
sustainable process focused on the individual.” '^^  The EU clearly states its will to 
extend abroad the relations among its member states that are based on compatibility of 
major values.^  ^ It is seeking to forge new partnerships, based on respect for shared 
values of fieedom, democracy, civil and political rights social well-being, market- 
orientated economies and free enterprise. The belief is that relationships based on such
^^Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 4-1990, p. 8, tliis sentence is repeated in ibid., 6-1990, p. 15.
in the Essen European Council a similar assertion is made: “The European Union is making an
essential contribution to overcoming the legacy of past divisions, and promoting peace, security and 
stability in and around Europe.” Ibid., 12-1994, p. 12.
^^Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 6-1990, p. 13.
^^Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 6-1992, p. 17.
^^See in particular the aims of the CFSP stated in Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 12-1990, p. 
9.
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values are inherently peaceful and this belief is obviously supported by experience from 
inter-European relations since the end of World War TT. Compatibility of major— 
peaceful—values is a guarantee for peace between the member states of the European 
Union.
Seemingly, the degree of compatibility of major values looks unimpressive. The 
agreement is limited to some very "basic’ notions such as democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law. There is no mention, for example, of the existence of common 
interests. This small achievement is, however, sufficient to sustain peaceful relations 
between the member states of the European Union.
7. Testing Mutual Responsiveness: the case of 
European Union Regional Policies and Redistribution
Mutual responsiveness, as already demonstral ed, is a etucial test for the existence of a 
security community. If the demands and needs of the members of a security community 
are “not merely (...) received, but (...) understood, and (...) given real weight in the 
process of decision-making”  ^then the considered area can reasonably be considered as 
integrated. Karl Deutsch i nsists on the importance of communication (that he measures 
mostly tlirough the ratio of foreign to domestic mail) for testing the reality of tliis 
notion but he also proposes some other ways of empirically testing the reality of the 
notion.
Another siiecific aspect of responsiveness we found was the disintegrative effect of 
reacting with excessive delay to the social, economic, or |3olitical reforms that came 
to be expected by the people in the area. Mainly, this is the res^ionsibility o f national 
govermnents witliin their own borders. But, those govermnents sometimes needed 
help from outside, and other countries had a chance to demonstrate international 
responsiveness. (...) The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA), early American assistance to Greece, the Marshall Plan, and NATO are 
the outstanding instances. (...) Witliin Europe, the Coal and Steel Community and 
the projxised atomic energy pool and common market plan seem to be further 
evidence of responsiveness.^
Unilateral transfers and redistribution towards the poorer members of a community 
are therefore clear examples of an increased level of mutual responsiveness. Therefore, 
the study of European regional policy and redistribution is a way of examining the 
degree of mutual responsiveness achieved. In a broader perspective, a liigli level of
^Karl W. Deutsch et al.. Political Commimity and the North Atlantic Area: International 
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redistribution is a prerequisite for successive integration and an unconfusabie indication 
of past achievements. In the words of Loukas Tsoukalis:^
A relatively equitable distribution of the gains and losses, or at least the perception 
of such an equitable distribution, can be a determining factor for the continuation of 
the integration process. (...) Redistribution can (...) be considered as an index of the 
political and social cohesion of a new system; large transfers of funds across 
national frontiers not being a normal feature of international organizations.
Regional policy and redistribution in the European Union progressively gained 
momentum. ‘"The gradual acceptance of the redistributive function of the EC budget 
and hence the link between economic integration and solidarity across national 
frontiers makes the Community very different fiom traditional international 
organizations, and can be interpreted as a sign of the EC slowly acquiring the traits of 
proper political system.”'* The study of the evolution of European regional policies and 
redistribution shows a growing level of integration in Europe. These policies have then 
to be analysed from a more theoretical viewpoint as to properly show the importance 
and magnitude of mutual responsiveness.
r/ie growing importance of European regiona! policy and 
redistribution
The perceived need for a European regional policy has been growing over the years, at 
a pace similar to the one of European integration. For Europe, the existence of a 
regional policy can even be considered as more important than in the cases of the 
member states.
"Loukas Tsoukalis, The Ne^v European Economy: 7he Politics and Economics o f  Integration (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 228-229.
‘^ Ibid, pp. 261-262.
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(...) the frontiers of economic communities often coincide with the frontiers of 
defence coimnunities or with the provision or preseivation of other ‘public goods’ 
such as securit)', justice, common culture, language and heritage. In such cases, 
non-econoniic values may easily outweigh episodic disadvantages for some region of 
an economic nature. The European Community, by contrast, has at present a 
narrower range of policy function with which to assure a satisfactory overall balance 
of advantage for all its Member States. The public good of ‘unity’ may thus require 
a relatively greater amount of attention than would be necessary if the Conununity 
extended its fimctions to wider policy areas. ^
In the European Union, there are enormous income and infrastructure disparities that 
greatly exceed similar disparities in the United States.^ The aim of achieving a common 
market cannot therefore be severed from a necessary convergence of the regional 
economies towards the European average. The realisation of a single European market 
is at risk of becoming unpopular, or even irrelevant to some states. ‘"On the basis of 
PPSs, per capita income levels in Greece and Portugal are less than half those enjoyed 
in Germany and Luxembourg.”  ^ The poorest regions are in danger of being forever 
laggards. In this case some regions could consider their European experience as not 
being a rewarding one. This is clearly a great danger as a fundamental objective of 
European construction has been the establishment of an ‘ever closer union’.^  A 
genuine community is not possible if internal disparities of a large scale persist . There 
is clearly an income distribution problem in Europe and, the existence of a rich centre
"Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa with Michael Emerson, Mervyn King, Jean-Claude Milleron, Jean 
Paelinck, Lucas Papademos, Alfredo Pastor and Fritz Scharpf, Efficiency, Stability and Equity: A 
Strategy for the Evolution o f  the Economic System o f  the European Community, A Report (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 89. For a broader analysis of regional policy see Horst Siebert, 
Regional Economic Growth: Theory and Policy  (Scranton: International Textbook, 1968); John 
Friedman and William Alonso (eds ), Regional Policy: Readings in Theory and Applications 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1975); Harvey Armstrong and Jim Taylor, Regional Policy: The 
Way Forward  (London; Employment Institute, 1987) and Harvey Armstrong and Jim Taylor, 
Regional Economics and Policy  (Oxford: Philip Allen, 1985); Harvey Armstrong, ‘The reform of 
the European Community regional policy’, Journal o f  Common Market Studies, vol. 23, no. 4.
^See Andrea Boltho, ‘European and United States regional differentials: a note’, Oxford Review o f  
Economic Policy, vol. 5, no. 2, 1989.
^Tsoukalis, op. cit., p. 232. PPS stands for Purchasing Power Standards.
'’in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, the six govermnents were “determined to lay the foundations 
of an ever closer union among tlie peoples of Europe” and were “resolved to ensure the economic 
and social progress of their countries by coimnon action to eliminate the barriers that divide 
Europe.”
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as opposed to a poor periphery endangers the rationality and the coherence of the 
European edifice. This is clearly acknowledged by the European Commission;^
111 crude terms, the 10 most prosperous regions, headed by Groningen in the 
Netherlands and Hambourg in Gennany, are three times as rich and invest three 
times as much in thek basic economic fabric as the 10 poorest regions in Greece and 
Portugal. The Community is committed to reducing this gap and to ensuring that no 
one is a second class citizen.
This is the reason why regional policy and in a larger perspective redistribution has 
progressively become one of the most important single items on the European agenda . 
Whereas from 1958 to 1975, no common regional policy existed per .ve, from 1975-on 
some instruments were created allowing the strengthening of the regional dimension. 
Finally, in 1988 the creation of the Structural Funds has constituted an important step 
foiward towards the creation of a genuine regional policy and an increase of the 
effectiveness of the instruments used.*® The creation of the single European market and 
later-on, the beginnings of the process leading to Economic and Monetary Union were 
decisive factors for the implementation of a more comprehensive regional policy.
The original instrwincnts and provisions for the implementation of a regional and 
redistribution policy
The problem of regional heterogeneity was relatively minor in the early years after the 
creation of the Community. With the important exception of the Mezzogiorno all the 
other regions were relatively homogeneous. The problem of the Mezzogiorno was 
acknowledged in an additional protocol to the Treaty of Rome. Regional problems 
were considered as a task that came within the assignments of the Community. The 
preamble is quite clear when stating the aims of the Community;
''Commission of the European Commimities, Helping Europe’s Regions (Brussels and Luxembourg: 
1992), p. 1.
'°Tlie chronological periods chosen are also those chosen in Tsoukalis, op. cit., pp. 232-233. For 
another account of the liistoiy of European regional policy, see John Ryan, ‘The Regional Policies 
of the EuroiDean Coimnission, the United Kingdom and Germany’, Journal o f  Regional Policy, vol. 
13, nos. 3-4, 1993; A. Marques, ‘Community conq^etition policy and economic and social 
cohesion’. Regional Studies, vol. 26, no. 4; John Mawson, Mario Ruis Martins and Jolui T. Gibney, 
‘The Development of the European Coimmmity Regional Policy’, in Michael Keating and Barry 
Jones (eds.), Regions in the European Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) and David 
Keeble, Jolm Offbrd and Sheila Walker, Peripheral Regions in a Community o f  Twelve Member 
States (Luxembourg; Commission of the European Communities, 1988).
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Anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their hannonious 
development by reducing both the differences existing between the various regions 
and the backwardness of the less favoured regions.
And article two of the Treaty goes even further in that respect:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a Common Market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote 
throughout the Community a hannonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising 
of the standard of living and closer relations between the States lielonging to it.
Beyond these direct references to the regional dimension of the Community, “the 
common poHcies have regional effects, but, conversely, the common policies can be an 
instrument of regional policy at the Community level.”** Lti particular, the Common 
Agricultural Policy was meant to reduce income inequalities as regional concentration 
on agriculture and economic backwardness are closely linked.*^
Some other instruments were created for the implementation of tins "regional 
dimension’. Tn particular, the European Investment Bank was used as a source of 
relatively small interest loans and guarantees for the less developed areas of the 
Community. Nevertheless, regional policy stayed throughout this period an awkward 
European matter:
The various derogations, together with the lack of any separate chapter on a 
coimnoii regional policy, suggest that the authors of the Treaty of Rome, wiiile 
recognizing the regional problem and the need to employ special instruments to deal 
with it, had decided to leave the responsibility basically to the hands of national 
authorities.'"
During this period the instruments and, in an even greater extent, the sums employed 
were far too small to allow the implementation of a real European regional policy.
' 'Norbert Vanhove and Leo H. Klaasen, Regional Policy: A European Approach  (Westmead: Saxon 
House, 1980), p. 382,
'"One of the main aims of the CAP is to ensure a “fair standard of living” for people employed in 
agriculture (article 39.1), For the importance of the CAP to questions of welfare in some countries 
see Fiona Butler, ‘Tlie EC's Common Agticultural Policy (CAP)', in Juliet Lodge (ed.). The 
European Community and the Challenge o f  the Future (London: Pinter, 1993),
'"Tsoulcalis, op. cit., p. 236.
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Redistribution was of a very modest scale.*'* Besides, during this period rapid economic 
growth explains why income differences did not become a major political issue. Over 
this period income disparities among the Six were reduced which helped to allay fears 
about the effects of economic integration upon the weaker economies. *^
The. progressive strengthening of the regional dimension
The first enlargement of the EC added to the Community many poor regions and the 
economic and income disparities were considerably increased. “The primary 
responsibility for dealing with the backward regions was [hitherto] left with the 
member states. Community Regional Policy, which hardly existed before 1973, has 
been slowly taking shape since the first enlargement.”*^ Thus, Ireland succeeded into 
adding protocol no 30 to its accession Treaty that, states that: “THE HIGH 
CONTRACTING PARTIES (...) RECALL that the fundamental objectives of the 
European Economic Community include the steady improvement of the living 
standards and working conditions of the peoples of the Member States, and the 
harmonious development of their economies by reducing the differences existing 
between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions.”*^ This 
protocol was considered by the Irish “as a commitment that Community resources 
would be available to assist them, particularly a far-reaching regional policy.”*^ 
Besides, the economic crisis fiom 1973-on and the rapid deterioration of the 
international economic environment created a profound malaise and a great many 
doubts about the efficiency of the European process.
The UK government was, at the time, looking for ways to reduce the financial 
burden arising fiom its accession to the EC and more specifically the UK contribution
‘'’No account of the funife redistributed was found, but there is no doubt that since the only sums 
redistributed came from the Common Agricultural Policy, the European Investment Bank and the 
Miyzzogiomo protocol, redistribution was of a small scale.
‘"See Vanhove and Klaasen, op. cit.,
“TVfarjia-Liisa Kiljmien, ‘Regional Disparities and Policy in the EEC’, in Dudley Seers and 
Constantine Vaitsos, Integration and Unequal Development: the Experience o f  the EEC  (London: 
Macmullan, 1980), p. 213. For an analysis of these times see also Andrea Boltho (ed.), The 
European Economy: Growth and Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) and David Dyker 
(ed ). The European Economy (London: Longman, 1992).
"’Quoted in Trevor C. Salmon, ‘Ireland’ in Carol Twitchett and Kenneth J. Twitched (eds.), Building 
Europe: Britain '.v Partners in the EEC  (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1981), p. 197.
‘% id., p. 197.
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to the CAP. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was created in 1975 
for this purpose.*^ This shows how closely redistribution and regional policy are linked. 
At the beginning, the ERDF had veiy few financial means and these means were 
distributed on the basis of quota allocations for each member state decided by the 
Council of Ministers. This simply meant that every single state (even the most 
developed one) was getting some fiinding for its regional problems. This became 
increasingly unpopular and irrational after the two following enlargements and was 
progressively modified.^® Funds available through the ERDF grew over the years and a 
bias in favour of the poorest states was introduced. The resources allocated to the 
Social Fund and to the Regional Fund reached 7 billion ECU in 1988.^* Still, at this 
time, regional policy was veiy little co-ordinated and no real control of the allocation 
of the funds was possible.
In 1985, the introduction of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes intended for 
the Mediterranean regions of France, Italy and the whole of Greece was an important 
step fotward in the direction of a genuine European regional policy. This programme 
can be considered as the “valuation of the background of a European Union. Each 
Programme would last from three to seven years and a total of 6.6 billion ECUs was to 
be allocated through them. '^* After the 1986 enlargement, the need for a more efficient 
regional policy was even greater than before. The Single European Act laid the 
foundations for a qualitative step forward. In particular. Title V named "Economic and 
Social Cohesion’ was a formal recognition of the importance of redistribution. Articles 
130iz and 130g provided a link between the reduction of regional disparities and
‘^Sce Helen Wallace, ‘Distributional Politics: dividing up the Community cake’, in H. Wallace, W. 
Wallace and C. Webb (eds.). Policy Making in the European Community (Chichester: John Wiley, 
1983).
"“Changes were introduced in the quotas of the member states and a non-quota element was 
introduced.
"‘See S. F. Goodman, The European Community (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 168.
""Tsoukalis, op. cit., p. 240.
""Fritz Fraumeyer and Bernliard Seidel, ‘Regional- mid Sozialpolitik’, in Werner Weinfeld and 
Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), Jahrhuch der Kuropdischen Integration 1984 (Bonn: Institut fur 
Europaische Politik and Europa Union Verlag, 1984), p. 169.
"'‘These funds came from various EC frmds and the EIB as well as from newly created budget 
resources. See Tsoukalis, op. cit., p. 242, for details. The 6.6 billion ECUs frind target was not 
actually reached since most states have been unable to absorb the totality of tlie capital available.
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Specific instruments like the ERDF, the European Social Fund and the EAGGF- 
Guidance Section^  ^(the so-called structural funds) and the EIB.
The aim of new article 130a was to strengthen tliis cohesion and to promote ‘overall 
harmonious development’, in particular by reducing disparities between the various 
regions and the backwardness of least-favoured regions. Member states were to 
conduct their economic ixilicies to this end and the achievement of the Single 
European Market was to take into account the needs of economic and social 
cohesion. The structural funds (...) and the European Investment Bank were also to 
be used to acliieve these objectives (new Aiticle 1306 EEC). The ERDF was to be 
used to adjust regional imbalances within the EC and plans were to be made to 
rationalize the various structural funds so tliat they may more efficiently acliieve 
economic and social cohesion witliin the Communities."''
The ground was ready for the creation of a real European regional policy.
The emei'gence of a real European regional policy
In 1988, during the Brussels meeting of the European Council, a decision was taken to 
double the resources available to the Structural Funds (in real terms) between 1987 
and 1993 .^ *^ This decision, together with the reform of the EC budget and the one of 
the CAP, constituted the so-called Delors package for the successful implementation of 
the internal market programme.^*  ^It was then clear that this was the necessary price to 
pay for the political acceptance of the internal market programme, especially in some 
states. These measures were followed by measures aiming at enhancing the efficiency 
of EC action. The Funds were given five priority objectives:
1. Regions lagging beliind;
2. Declining industrial areas;
3. The long-term unemployed;
""European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, For an account of the reform of the ERDF see
G. J. Croxford, M. Wise and B. S. Chalkley, ‘The reform of tlie European Regional Development 
Fund: a preliminary assessment’, Jo wraa/ o f  Common Market Studies, 26, no. 1, 1987.
""Clive Archer, Organizing Western Europe (London: Edward Arnold, 1990), pp. 109-110.
"^ “By 1993 the budget appropriations for the Funds will increase to ECU 14 billion (European 
currency units), or about 25 percent of the total Community budget.” In Gary Marks, ‘Structural 
Policy in the European Community’, in Alberta M. Sbragia (ed.), Kuro-Politics: Institutions and 
Policymaking in the "New” European Community (Washington D C: The Brookings Institution, 
1992), p. 191.
"^See Andrew Scott, ‘Financing the Commimity: The Delors II package’, in Lodge (ed.), op. cit..
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4. Employment of young people;
295. (a) adjustment of agricultural structures and (b) development of rural areas.
The first objective now concerns Greece, the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, 
Portugal, most of Spain, the Mezzogiorno and the new German Lcinder. Objective one 
was meant to absorb 60% of the Structural Funds by 1993. The regions concerned by 
the second objective are concentrated in central and north-western Europe and a great 
number of them are in the UK. Objectives three and four are the domain of the 
European Social Fund and the funds allocated to objective 5 are significantly smaller.*®
Table 7.1: Hough breakthnvn by priority objective (billion ECXJ, 1988prices)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Objective 1 5.6 6.6 7.4 8.2 9.2
Objective 2 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Objectives 3-4 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
Objective 5a 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
Objective 5b 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Total Objectives 8,7 9.9 11,3 12,6 14.1
Transitional measures 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4
Total Funds 7,2 7.7 9.0 10.S 11.6 12.9 14.5
Source: Eurostat, Europe in Figures (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 1992), p45.
Regional policy is now clearly the second most important expenditure post of the 
European Union budget.** The budget, of course, remains of fairly modest proportions
"^See Commission of the European Coimnunities, op. cit., p. 4 for more details. See also Eurostat, 
Europe in Figures (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Coimmmilies, 
1992), pp. 44-45.
"“See J. Van Ginderachter, ‘La réforme des fonds stmcurels’. Revue du Marché Commun, May 1989.
"‘Eurostat, op. cit., p. 41. In 1993, conmiitments to structural operations reached 21.270 million 
ECUs at 1992 prices compared to 35.340 million ECUs for the CAP and 4.500 million ECUs for 
internal policies.
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(up to 1.2 percent of European Gross Domestic Product), but since it concentrates its 
action in a small number of fields, its impact is not unimportant.*^ The financial 
perspectives show in that respect the growing importance of structural action Over the 
1993-1999 period, structural operations are set to increase by almost 41 percent 
whereas, the budget increases by just over 21 percent .
Table 7,2: Appropriations for commitments (million ECU at 1992 prices)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Slruciural operations 21.277 21.785 23.480 24.990 26.526 28.240 30.000
Total appropriations 69 177 69 944 72.485 75.224 77.989 80 977 84 089
for commitments
□ Total appropriations for commitments
Structural operations
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Source: Bulletin o f the European Communities, 12-1992, p. 32.
The principle of additionality was also reinforced after this reform. This principle 
means that “EC expenditure should represent a net increase in the amounts spent on
""For the financing problems of the European Union, see Goodman, op. cit., pp. 74-84, and Valerio 
Lintner and Sonia Mazev, The European Communitv: Economic and Political Aspects  (London: 
McGraw-Hill, 1991), pp. 72-94.
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development and not on consumption.”** This, of course, implies the necessity to 
exercise some kind of central control:*'*
The principal objective of regional policies should not be to subsidize incomes and 
simply offset inequalities in standards of living, but to help to equalize production 
conditions tlirough investment programmes in such areas as physical infrastructure, 
communications, transixntation and education so that large scale movements of 
labour do not become the major adjustment factor.
The Treaty on European Union has gone a step hnther towards a comprehensive 
regional policy with the creation of the cohesion fund. This fund is worth 15.250 
million ECUs at 1992 prices over seven years.*  ^ It is aimed at helping the transition 
towards a common currency in the poorest members of the Union. The second Delors 
package (i.e. the main budgetary guidelines for 1993-1997) called for a fiirther increase 
in the resources of the Structural Funds winch should represent 33.5 percent of the 
expenditure of the EU budget in 1997. Concerning the less developed countries and 
regions, tliis would represent a doubling of resources in real terms.*^
Rationale for Community regional policy and mutual 
responsiveness: explaining the construction of a policy
The rationale of European regional policy
European regional policy has a threefold rationale: economic, social and political. All 
three elements are very important and very closely linked.
The economic rationale is that it is essential to intervene at a local level to overcome 
possible adverse effects of market integration on disadvantaged regions.
""Tsoukalis, op. cit., p. 246.
"‘Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (Delors Report), Report on Economic 
and Monetary Union in the European Community (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of 
the Eurojiean Communities, 1989), pp. 22-23.
^^Bulleiin o f  the European Communities, 12-1992, p. 29.
"“For more details, see Scott, ‘Financing the Conununity: the Delors II package’, in Lodge (ed.), op. 
cit., (London; Pinter, 1993).
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Tn a peîfect market, eqnilibiinm would be established by the free movement of 
capital and labour, and flexible factor costs. Capital would move to depressed areas 
to take advantage of surplus labour and lower costs. Labour would migrate to 
growing areas in search of employment and higher wages. In practice tliis may not 
happen. Economics of scale may produce higher returns to capital in booming areas; 
wliile outmigration may leave beliind the unskilled and the old in die declining 
regions. (...) Tn any case, labour is less mobile in Europe than in the United States, 
let alone the perfect market model. There are also external social costs to capital and 
labour mobility in the fonn of congestion in expanding areîis and under-utilized 
infrastructure in the declining areas."^
The effects of market integration especially in the European case are very difficult to 
determine. There is no overwhelming evidence to support either that the common 
market helps regional convergence or that it induces regional divergence.*^ Market 
integration can have very different effects depending on the sector concerned. 
“Improvements in the competitiveness of transport and telecommunication services 
should, for example, reduce the locational disadvantage of peripheral regions. On the 
other hand, the liberalization of financial seiMces seems likely to emphasize the 
economies of scale offered by specialized centres.”*** It is cleat that this problem is 
even more delicate seen from the wider perspective of world trade. “If Europe as a 
whole decides to bargain away its protection of the textile and clothing sector in order 
to gain concessions on say, opening up of trade in financial services, the impact will be 
to favour financial centres like London or Paris, at the expense of regions specializing
"Tiesbel Hooglie and TVlicliael Keating, ‘The politics of European Union regional policy’, Journal o f  
European Public Policy, vol. 1, no. 3, 1994, p. 368.
"'’The danger of economic integration in some regions was underlined by Gunnar Myrdal who 
considered that the free movement of capital can lead to ‘polarization’ effects through a process of 
‘cumulative causation’. Tn short, the inflow of capital in regions where its marginal productivity is 
greatest leads to a dynamic process that reinforces the attractiveness of these regions. The free flow 
of labour can have similar effects since it drains the most dynamic workers of the poor regions. The 
costs of development in the dynamic regions (pollution and congestion for instance) can provoke a 
inflow of capital to the iX)or regions but this is unlikely to compensate the initial outflow, See 
Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theoty and Underdeveloped Regions (luondon: Duckworth, 1957). For 
an analysis of the total impact of the single market see Paolo Cecchini with Michael Catinat and 
Alexis .Tacquemin, The European Challenge: 1992 The Benefits o f  the Single European Market 
(Aldershot; Wildwood House, 1988). See also M. Quevit, ‘Tlie regional impact of the internal 
market: a conqiarative analysis of traditional industrial rej^ons and Tagging regions’. Regional
Studies, vol. 26, no. 4 and W. J. Steinle, ‘Regional competitiveness and the Single Market’,
Regional Studies, vol. 26, no. 4.
"'Tadoa-Schioppa et a l, op. cit., p. 94.
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in textiles and clothing.”'*® Still, four important reasons make market integration 
difficult for certain regions; (a) increased competition would harm non-competitive 
films that are higWy concentrated in the peripheral regions; (b) integration would 
necessitate the reconversion of whole regions where stagnating activities are 
concentrated; (c) important external economies would increase the attractiveness of 
certain regions; (d) regions with a high concentration in agriculture can be detrimental 
as these structures are very difficult to change.'**
But, besides the uncertain economic effects of market integration, there are 
important social reasons for European regional policy. The equalisation of 
interregional living standards has been recognised as a major objective in all 
contemporary democracies.'*^ The right of people to remain in their proper 
communities and to preserve their traditions is also a powerfi.il reason for the reduction 
of migration towards booming areas. Any regional policy aims at “maintaining and 
encouraging the social and cultural basis of the life of the regional populations 
including the preservation and best use of natural, cultural and amenity resources 
avaUable.”®
Finally, the political case for European regional policy is based upon the need to 
legitimise the European economic and social order. Tn nation states, there is an 
important redistributive effect of fiscal policy and taxation which is added to the 
regional policies implemented. Tn the European Union, the small scale of fiscal 
integration does not allow such a massive redistribution. It is therefore important for 
the cohesion of the Union to have specific actions in the field of regional policies.'*'*
‘“lain Begg, ‘European Integration and Regional Policy’, Oxford Review o f  Economic Policy, vol. 5, I
no. 2, 1989, p. 98. ' :
“ See Vanhove and Klaasen, op. cit., p. 229. ;
‘"Biis is also the case for the EU as it is assumed that the construction of a single market (economic 1
integration) will ultimately help the convergence of living standards althougli no time schedule is I
set for this convergence. i
‘"Willem Molle with the collaboration of Bas Van Holst and Hans Smit, Regional Disparity and  -i
Economic Development in the European Community (Westmead; Saxon House, 1980), p. 3.
“ See Hooghe and Keating, op. cit., p. 369. See also Tsoukalis, op. cit., pp. 264-265, Tsoukalis claims I
(p. 264) that: “Two basic characteristics of the EC budget, are its small size and the legal |
requirement for zero balance between revenue and expenditure. Thus its role in terms of the i
traditional functions of allocation, stabilization, and redistribution can only be extremely limited.”
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European regional policy as a process of mutual responsiveness
It is often considered, by some part of public opinion in states that are net contributors
of the European budget, that its development is only for the benefit of the poorest 
members of the Union and that the other members do not stand to benefit fi^ om it. The 
notion of juste retour (meaning that states should aim at. a zero balance between their 
contribution and their benefits fiom the European process) in particular "risks 
undermining the capacity of sectoral policies to achieve their specific objectives, and 
thence the utility of developing new policy initiatives, and in an extreme situation risks 
paralysing the Community system as a whole. Over 60 percent of the EU budget is 
now financed by just three states: Germany (30%), France (20%) and the UK (12%). 
The burden clearly seems very unequally shared.'*  ^This can provoke a severe crisis of 
confidence in the utility of the policies.
Besides, the European regional policies have had many important effects that result 
from their mere principles. These principles are: (1) partnership between the regional, 
national and Community level; (2) subsidiarity and (3) additionality to national funds."^ 
The first principle has as a consequence the emergence of European regions as an 
important political and administrative entity."** Subsidiarity and additionality have a 
federalist flavour that helped the perception of the EU as a genuine political entity. 
These developments foster the perception of the EU as the entity that has far-reaching 
powers and responsibilities. Thus, the Union is seen as an essential instance for the 
transmission of demands and the realisation of the ‘mutual responsiveness process’.
These radical changes explain to a large extent the difficulties that some states had 
with the implementation of this policy. It is very difficult to adapt to these changes, 
Besides, there are some other important reasons that make these policies somewhat 
unpopular.
’"Padoa-Schioppa et al., op. cit., p. 90.
‘“Maurice Schumann, ‘Le nerf de l ’Union européenne’. Revue des deux mondes, February 1994.
‘^Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., p. 5. î
‘^See Claude de Granrut, Europe : le temps des Régions (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de la i
Jurisprudence, 1994). Article 109a of the Treaty on European Union establishes also a ‘Conunittee 
of tlie Regions’ with advisory fimctions defined by tlie Treaty. See Sir William Nicoll and Trevor C.
Salmon, Understanding the New European Community (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf,
1994), p. 108. For an analysis of the impact of the Regions upon the distribution of the structural 
fiuids, see Marks, op, cit., pp. 218-221.
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One of them is that net contributors of the EU budget have often the impression that 
tlie money of their contribution is wasted. This feeling comes from the fact that many 
resources were wasted for the development of the Mezzogiorno and no European state 
wants a similar thing to happen in the case of European regional policy. These wasted 
resources have many reasons. The first of these reasons is ‘rent seeking’. This term 
refers to lobbying activities aiming at procuring profits to minorities or even to 
organised crime fi'om licences and government regulation, activities that can be labelled 
"Directly Unproductive Profit seeking.”"® The argument in favour of this kind of 
unilateral transfers states that these transfers are meant to correct initially distorted 
situations and are therefore but measures of justice. Still, the most likely result of these 
activities is price distortion and the increase of the number of monopolies. In this case, 
rich regions directly subsidise poor regions without this subsidies being conducive to 
development. The most rational strategy in this case is to remove directly the market 
distortions.^® Otherwise, there is welfare loss for society (in particular a lot of 
resources are allocated towards political bargaining) and the process is clearly neither 
efficient nor mutual.
The theoTy of collective action and the notion of ‘free rider’ also help to explain the 
reason why rich regions or States are unwilling to pay for poor ones.^* Members of a 
large organisation only receive part of the benefits of collective action while bearing 
the costs. A member is a ‘fiee rider’ when it receives a disproportionate part of the 
benefits while bearing little part or no part, at all of the costs. In this case also, the 
process is not mutual and only one side stands to benefit substantially from it.
These concerns have been increasingly taken into account in the formulation of the 
European regional policy. The existence of wide spread fraud and the necessity to 
control the efficiency of the usage of the funds has been a problem that the EU has 
been trying to tackle. In particular, fraud has been increasingly considered as a penal
‘"Katrin Millock and Sophie Olson, ‘Why Poor Regions Stay Poor’, Journal o f  Regional Policv, vol. 
13 , 110. 1, 1993, p. 62.
“^See Padoa-Scliioppa et a l, op. cit., p. 92.
"'Mancur Oison,. The Logic o f  Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory o f  Groups (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1968).
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offence and community law has developed a new branch in order to limit tliis 
problem.
The comparisons made with regional policies at the national level also clearly show 
that:^*
It has become clear that a successfiil regional ixilicy needs to establish adequate 
networks of the political, social and economic agents concerned on local and 
regional levels as well.
The development of multi-level partnerships involving regional, national and European 
authorities is more widespread than before. The reform of the Stuiotural Funds in 1988 
has had as a consequence the shift of power away irom the national level towards the 
European and the regional ones.^" This reform aims, once again, at enhancing the 
efficiency of the process.
The requirement of efficiency has been equally taken into serious consideration. As 
early as 1984, during the reform of the ERDF and the creation of the Tntegrated 
Meditenanean Programmes, the problem was acknowledged and an effort was made 
to strengthen control.
Strong emphasis has also been placed on the close monitoring of different 
programmes in an attempt to deal with earlier criticism regarding the wastage of 
resources and wide-spread malpractices.""
With the adoption of the Treaty on the European Union, a new step in the direction of 
conditionahty was made.
There is also a new element of conditionality introduced with respect to the 
Cohesion Fund: the countries benefiting from it will need to liave a programme of 
economic convergence approved by FCOFTN in the context of multilateral 
surveillance.""
"^See John A. E. Vervaele, La fraude communautaire et le droit pénal européen des affaires (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1995).
""Ryan, op. cit., p. 465.
"‘Marks, op. cit., pp. 212 ff.
""Tsoukalis, op. cit., pp. 244-245.
""Ibid., p. 247.
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The necessity of a certain kind of balance between the costs and the benefits of 
Kuropean membership has also been acknowledged through the creation of the ERDF, 
This is a very dangerous matter, though.
The efforts of the UK to reduce its own net budgetary contributions opened the 
Pandora’s box by turning net national contributions to the budget for the first time 
into an important, and also exj^losive, political issue, and thus raising alarm in 
Brussels about the negative consequences of a possible entrenchment of the juste 
retour principle,
The necessity of an overall balance between costs and benefits of integration is 
beyond doubt for the process to be popular.
Regional disparities may be a severe barrier to fiiither integration. The EC advances 
by way of the mutual consent of its members. Where large areas remain 
underdeveloped it is difficult to obtain the consent to move further along tire road of 
economic and monetary union. The EC can only advance if eveiyone feels they are 
benefitiiig.^^
But, it must be borne in mind that the necessary balance has to be considered as a 
complex phenomenon. One particular case showing the complexity of the process is 
the case of so-called Tied aid’, ‘Svhere the donor country provides financial aid which 
has to be spent on imported goods firom tliis same c o u n t r y . I n  this case the impact in 
the donor state is minor as the aid is, in reality, more of a subsidy to the firms of the 
aid-donor. This is clearly the case in European regional policies as the various projects 
financed by European Union fimds are exclusively attributed to firms coming from the 
net contributor states.
^ I^bid., p. 263, emphasis in original.
^Tlarvey Armstrong, ‘Coimmmity regional policy’, in Lodge (ed.), op. cit., (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 
135,
J. Marques Mondes, ‘Economic Cohesion in Europe: The Impact of the Delors Plan’, Journal o f  
Common Market Studies, vol. 29, no. 1, 1990, p, 22.
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Tt can be easily seen that in this circumstance the donor countty w ll be unaffected 
110 matter how much it decides to give away. However, it should be noted that tliis 
conclusion is valid only for ‘reasonable’ values, that is, values which leave 
unaffected the growth rates of the propensity to import and the terms of trade. 
Nevertheless, it emphasizes the point that in this case a country can become a 
generous donor without jeopardizing its otvn growth rate,'’'^
To put in a nutshell, the recipient states stand to benefit from the European fimds by 
developing Ibeir infrastructures and their economy, whereas net contributors to the 
European budget also stand to benefit fi om regional action thanks to the social stability 
induced by economic growth in the former states, thanks also to the substantial part of 
fimds that will be returned to firms of the contributor states and, finally, to the overall 
positive effect on economic welfare that development will certainly have.
(...) it must be stressed that the overall judgement over costs and benefits of 
participation in the Conmiunity must be made in a wider context than merely the 
budget. Gains from trade are likely for most countries to be of greater significance.
Wider still are benefits of a purely political character, such as support for democracy 
and otlier political values.®’
Regional policy at the European level can therefore be seen as a process of mutual 
responsiveness. Tt is clear that both contributors and recipients stand to benefit from it. 
“The most straightforward explanation for the growth of the structural Funds is that 
they are a side payment or bribe paid by the wealthier members to the poorer 
peripheral members of the EC in return for their assent to the 1992 package of 
economic liberalization.”'’^  Both sides are responding to the needs and messages of the 
other side. For instance, donor states ask for more efficiency and a better control over 
the usage of the resources, recipients ask for more fimds.
These various strategies of the different actors can be studied through a game- 
theoretical framework. For tliis purpose, actors at the European level can be divided 
into two categories: net contributors and net recipients from European regional
’ibid., p. 22.
‘Padoa-Schioppa el al., op. cit., p. 90. 
’Marks, op. cit., p. 194.
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policies and redistribution.®  ^ These two groups can also be labelled recipients®'^  and 
donors.®  ^ The two actors have two different options which are either co-operation or 
deception. The situation before the implementation of the regional policy and the 
acceptance of some compensation by the recipients is noted x in the donor countries 
and y in the recipients. According to the choices taken different values are attributed to 
the interaction of their strategies. These strategies can be translated into the following 
payoff matrix;
Strategy for recipients
Strategy for donors Deception
Co-operation
Deception Co-operation
x-2, y-2 x+5, y~5 
x~5, y+5 x+10, y+10
in this payoff matrix regional policies are considered as a mixed-sum game.®® Lack of 
mutuality in co-operation or in deception can result into a zero-sum game in which the 
gains of one actor equal the losses of the other. But, mutuality in deception or in co­
operation have either a positive or a negative-sum game as a result.
®^ This characterisation is, obviously, subjective. It also has the drawback to exclude the Conutiission 
ixom the reasoning. Nevertheless, the construction is of some value as it allows to see clearly lire 
process of mutual compensation characterising this kind of political negotiation. Some other 
simplifications arc necessary for the use o f tiie model. Namely, tlie model deals with homogeneous 
actors, whereas in reality, Üie actors considered being independent states, Üiey may have very 
different approaches of the problems and the solutions envisaged. The strategies of the actors are 
considered as producing a fix amount of payoff. This amount is totally subjective. Finally, 
preferences of the actors are considered as constant, whereas in reality they can change over time. 
This is a common assumption to every application of game theory. For a more complete account of 
game theory sec John P. Mayberry, John C. Hcrsanyi, Herbert E. Scarf and Rcinhard Seltcn, Game- 
Theoretic Models o f  Cooperation and Conflict (Boulder, Co; WestAdew Press, 1992); Martin 
Shubik, Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1984) and Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis o f  Conflict (Cambridge, MA; Harvard 
University Press, 1991).
^''Recipients include Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain.
®®Donors include Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, the UK, Italy and 
Belgium. These reasoning is conducted for the European Union of 12 member States, but a similar 
reasoning seems valid for a Union of 15.
®®For a complete analysis of the application of game theory in political science see Peter C. 
Ordeshook, Game theory and political theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
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If both actors choose the strategy of deception (for instance, the donors refijsing to 
provide the assistance and the recipients reilising to implement the liberalisation of 
their economies), the net result is a negative sum game that harms their global welfare. 
Tf one of the actors chooses a strategy of deception whereas the other chooses a 
strategy of co-operation, the result is a zero sum game. What is won by the actor that 
chooses to deceive its partner is lost by the faithfiil and honest actor (this is the case, if 
the donors provide the necessary assistance whereas the recipients do not implement 
any economic reform). Finally, if both actors choose a consistent course of co­
operation, then they both stand to benefit fiom the mutual efforts and this result in a 
positive sum game that shows an increase in their global welfare (both of them benefit 
either fi om the regional assistance or fiom the progress of economic integration and 
from social and political stability).
It is now clear that genuine mutual co-operation results into a positive outcome. In 
the European case, the evolution of regional policy shows that it has been an 
increasingly clear case of mutual responsiveness as the policy has been increasingly 
adapted to the needs and the demands of the actors.
8. Testing Mutual Predictability of Behaviour: 
the case of European Security Integration
Mutual predictability of behaviour is an essential condition for the emergence of a 
pluralistic security community in so far as it helps the building of dependable 
expectations of peacefiil change. Testing the reality of this condition is not easy. Tn 
particular, it is difficult to predict how a relationsliip will evolve. The existence of 
peaceful relations at one point in time cannot automatically mean that these relations |
will remain peaceful in the future. However, it is possible to make reasonable 
predictions for the fiiture thanks to a correct appreciation of the lessons of the past.
This is the method applied by Karl Deutsch himself in his seminal book, despite its 
obvious limitations.^
In particular, in Europe, it. is difficult to predict the peacefiil evolution of the 
continent since the security situation is changing at a very quick pace and there are a 
lot of uncertainties about, basic parameters of European security. Tn the European 
Union, the situation is certainly more stable and, therefore, fiiture evolution is easier to 
predict.
Once the whole of Europe grows together at a governmental level, and a 
nonregulated exchange between associations, political paities, and organizations of 
any kind becomes natural, interdependence and, witli it, constraints for a 
coordination o f behavior develop.^
’“The reason that historical cases have something to leach us about the contemporary problem of 
integration is to reason by analogy. This is what most people do when they try to guide present 
actions by past experience. But intelligent use of experience need not rely completely upon 
parallels. Past examples are suggestive, not conclusive. They point in a general direction, but not 
toward a specific destination.” Karl Deutsch et al.. Political Community and the North Atlantic 
Area: International Organization in the Light o f  Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1957), pp. 10-11. The use of past experience is indeed very difficult. “Wlicn 
resorting to an analog} , l^licy-inakers] tend to seize upon the first tliat comes to mind. They do 
not search more widely. Nor do they pause to analyze the case, test its fitness, or even ask in what 
ways it might be misleading. Seeing a trend running toward the present, they lend to assume that it 
will continue into tire fiiture, not stopping to consider what produced it or why a linear projection 
might prove to be mistaken.” In Ernest R. May, '"Lessons" o f  the Past: The Use and Misuse o f  
History in American Foreign Policy  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. XT. There is an 
imperative of caution if  the lessons of the past are to be of any help.
^Dieter Senghaas, ‘Europe 2000; A Peace Plan’, Alternatives, no. 15, 1990, p. 468, emphasis in 
original.
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Two ways for testing mutual predictability of behaviour are chosen. Firstly, it is 
possible to assess the cohesion of the Union by examining the actuality of a single 
foreign policy actor embodied by the EU. The implicit logic of this argument is that if 
the EU is able to aggregate the needs of the member states and to represent, them 
abroad, it is logical to assert that theii" behaviour is easily predictable and well co­
ordinated. Since the EU is an actor on the international stage, the member states have 
only a limited autonomy of action and their behaviour can hardly be unpredictable. 
Secondly, this paper examines the degree of achievement of European defence co­
operation. In this case, the logic behind the argument is that if states collaborate in 
defence industry and security action, they clearly themselves do not expect they will 
ever use the weapons they construct in common against each other.
The EU as a single foreign policy actor: achievements and 
short-comings
Since the late 1960s, with the development of European Political Co-operation the 
EU  ^ has tried to build a 'European reality’ in the world stage.^ The efforts of the EU 
aiming at providing a certain degree of cohesion in foreign policy thanks to the 
development of common positions and actions developed the image of a united Europe 
abroad and gave more weight to the actions and positions taken than if there was no 
such co-ordination.
The notion of aetorncss: some theoretical considerations
The notion of actorness is quite difficult to circumscribe. Certainly, it involves 
(conscious or unconscious) deeds or non-deeds that show a united fi ont towards non-
^Once again the term European Union is used for reasons of convenience despite the fact lliat, al the 
time, the term used at the time was that of European Communities.
''For a complete analysis of European Political Co-operation see Panayiotis Ifestos, European Political 
Cooperation, Towards a framework o f  supranational diplomacy? (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987); P, 
Kestos and C. Tsaidamdis, To Evropaiko systima asfalias kai i elliniki exoteriki politiki pros to 
2000 [The European Security System and the Greek Foreign Policy towards the year 2000] (Athens; 
Sideris, 1992), pp. 81-87; Sir William NicoU and Trevor C. Salmon, Understanding the New 
European Community (Heniel Hempstead: Harvester Wlieatsheaf, 1994), pp. 185-213 and Simon 
Nuttall, European Political Co-operation (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1992).
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members, international organisations, and international issues/ To show a united fiont 
on one international matter leads to expectations that this will happen again in other 
issues and cases.
Action leads to exi^ectiitions. This action may not necessarily be concrete or directly 
perceivable. Rather, action may be inaction, it may be passive or active, explicit or 
implicit. Blit whatever the nature of the action, its objective is the achievement of 
status and rank internationally. (...) Action itself establishes customary patterns of 
behaviour for the EC that are then expected by the international system.®
In that sense, if the European Union increasingly acts as a single actor, this has as a 
consequence the building of expectations that the HU will continue to act in this way.
A union of states does not become a single foreign policy actor overnight. Actor 
capability is built little by little and there is no fixed amount of it at any time. Actor 
capability has important structural prerequisites that are; (a) a community of interests; 
(b) a decision making process; (c) a system of crisis management; (d) a system for the 
management of interdependence; (e) a system of implementation; (f) external 
communication channels and external representation; and (g) resources and a 
mobilisation system.^ The fulfilment of these condition may greatly depend on the 
issue. “The capacity of being an actor is most appropriately conceived of as a variable 
property which the Community may possess to a greater or lesser extent.”® What 
seems basic for an actor is (a) to be able to show its difference fiom the external 
environment (b) to have a minimum degree of internal cohesion and (c) to possess 
some amount of power. ^
®K. J. Holsti gives one possible definition of action as “the tilings governments do to others in order to 
effect certain orientations, fulfill roles, or acliieve and defend objectives.” In K. J. Holsti, 
/ « t e m a f t o w f l / ( E n g l e w o o d  Cliffs, N. J; Prentice Hall, 1983), p. 144.
®Kathleen M. Spieker, A Community Perspective on the Interaction o f  EC External Relations and 
European Political Cooperation in the Pre-Maastricht Conmiunity: case studies o f  actor behaviour 
manifested through economic sanctions and trade used as political instruments (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of St. Andrews, 1994), p. 48.
^These prerequisites aie proposed by Giumar Sjôsledt in The External Role o f  the European 
(London: Saxon House, 1976).
% id., p. 14.
’’Hedley Bull asserts for instance that tlie European Community needs to develop some measure of 
military capability in order to be considered as a genuine international actor. See Hedley Bull, 
‘Civilian Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal o f  Common Market Studies, vol. 21, 
1982-1983, pp. 149-164.
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In sum, what can be considered as a minimum definition of actorness is the 
coexistence in one political body of an autonomous (or quasi-autonomous in the case 
of a strictly co-ordinated system) decision-making structure that possesses enough 
power to have a significant impact on the international system.
The evolution of the European Union as a single foreign policy actor
At the beginning of European integration, foreign affairs were excluded from the
competence of the Community. “However, its economic weight and influence, the 
rapidly changing and turbulent international agenda and the member states’ recognition 
of the inseparability of external relations from foreign policy and security resulted in 
the mid-1980s in a reappraisal of what international role, if any, the EC should 
pursue.”^^ The EC is a subject of international public law and, therefore, has an 
international legal personality. But, an international personality has been developed 
that goes well beyond this legal approach.
The European Community of the beginnings was meant to be a 'civilian power’. 
But, some competences of the EC have very broad consequences on the external 
relations of the member states.^ ® An 'ever closer union’ cannot go without a 
progressive build-up of a European personality. This build-up was made possible 
thanks to the progressive alignment of the positions of the national states on a number 
of questions.
The foundation of the European Political Co-operation in 1970 created the 
background for the treatment of foreign policy matters, but, once again, defence had 
been excluded.’''
’"in particular, articles 223 and 224 of the Treaty of Rome exclude security related products from the 
measures concerning economic integration and tlie construction of a Single Market.
’’Juliet Lodge, ‘From civilian power to speaking with a common voice; the transition to a CFSP’, in 
Juliet Lodge (ed.), The Kuropean Community and the Challenge o f  the Future (London: Pinter, 
1993), p. 227.
’^See Bull, op. cit..
’ “^...Treaty obligations (association agreements witli third coimtries (Article 238» proved 
unexjxictedly fertile ground for expanding EC conqietences - for example under the Single Act and 
through the European Parliament. Association with Overseas Territories (Article 132) and the 
130wer to conclude international treaties (Article 228), as well as the increasingly important and 
politically sensitive ability to receive and establish diplomatic missions, all augmented the EC’s 
international visibility and presence per seT  Tn Lodge, op. cit., p. 229,
’'’ifestos and Tsardanidis, op. cit., p. 82.
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Since that time, most taboos have been lifted, notably the security taboo since the 
crea tion of the Franco-German brigade and the resurrection of the WFXI, from now-on 
considered as the security arm of the EU. “The civilian-power imagery remained 
important, but it was unclear how it fitted with the increasingly typical security/military 
responsibilities and activities into which the Community was being drawn.” ®^ The 
Treaty on European Union definitely put defence on the agenda of the Union. “Tn spite 
of the cautious approach followed in the Maastricht treaty, it is of more than symbolic 
importance that the idea of a common European defence is no longer anathema at the 
official EC l e v e l . T h e  member states still keep most of the power in the decision 
making process concerning foreign policy. “The willingness of member states to pool 
their national sovereignty has been made conditional upon a mutual recognition of each 
other’s interest.”^^
In the autumn of 1973 the foreign ministers of the then Nine stressed that the Nine 
intended to ‘play an active role in world affairs’, to ‘progressively define common 
]30sitions in the sphere of foreign jwlicy’ and to seek to act ‘as a single entity’, 
bringing out the distinctive character’ of that entity.’^
EPC has aimed at increasing mutual understanding on international issues among the 
member states and at harmonising their views. The Single European Act which 
codified the EPC insisted on; the necessity for partners to inform and consult each 
other in matters of mutual interest; the formulation of international positions after 
consultation of the partners; the positions of the member states should take into 
consideration the positions adopted through EPC; measures that damage the coherence 
of EPC in international relations should be avoided; and finally, in international 
organisations and institutions, the positions of member states that do not participate in
’®Lodge, op. cit., p. 231.
’"Alfred van Staden, ‘After Maastricht: Explaining the Movement towards a Common European 
Defence Policy’, in Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds.), Kuropean Foreign Policy: The KC 
and Changing Perspectives in Europe (London: SAGE, 1994), p. 142. For another account of the 
development of the defence role of the Union in the Maastifcht Treaty see Anand Menon, Anthony 
Forster and William Wallace, ‘A common European defence?’. Survival, vol. 34, no. 3, 1992.
’^Ben Soetendorp, ‘The Evolution of the EC/EU as a Single Foreign Policy Actor’, in Carlsnaes and 
Smith (eds.), op. cit., p. 116.
’'’NicoU and Sahnon, op. cit., p. 186.
’"Ibid., p. 187.
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them should be taken into account by those that do/® In all these cases, it is clear that 
one likely result of the co-operation process has been that the behaviour of the member 
states has been more predictable than ever before. Since the member states were 
constantly in touch, few if any surprises were to be expected from any of them.^  ^ Of 
course, co-ordination was far from perfect. Especially, factors like commercial 
competition, incompatibility of interests and divergence of views concerning the fiiture 
(and the desired end-product) of European integration are still important and reduce 
the possibility of common action and the reliability of states’ expectations for the 
future. Still, the mere fact that a steady pattern of co-operation is now a constant 
feature of the EU is a minimum guarantee against a possible shift in national 
preferences and actions.
Evaluation of the degree of mutual predictability of behaviour
The development of a CFSP and of political union in the Treaty on European Union
has had as an underlying rationale the need for reinforcement of predictability of 
behaviour.
Responding to German unification, political union had the undeclared aim of 
reinforcing the interaction of Germany into the EC, thus constraining the freedom of 
Germany to act alone.
A tight web of relations in the field of foreign affairs has had as a consequence the 
reduction of the number of choices available to member states. National behaviour has 
been more easily predictable in this way. “The CFSP and political union have been 
developed with the aim of assisting the EU in its new tasks that are to absorb the 
united Germany; to develop stability on the continent as a whole and to keep a good 
relationship with the United States in the new strategic environment.” ®^ Common 
action in these fields is considered as more efficient than national one.
""See Heinz-Jürgen Axt, ‘Kooperation unler Konkurrcnlen; Das Regime als Theorie der 
aufienpolitischen Zusammenarheit der EG-Slaaten’, Zeiischrift JUr Poliiik, 40 Jg., no. 3, 1993, p. 
248.
’^The COREU telex system has been A^ ery usefiil in that respect (cf. infra).
^^Soetendorp, op. cit., p. 103.
^^Reinhardt Rummel, ‘Regional Integration in the Global Test’, in Reinliardt Rummel (ed), Toward 
Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the European Community 
(Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 10-17.
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Important problems remain to be solved. Notably, when member states value then 
‘national interest’ more than community solidarity or the will to have common 
positions and actions with the other states, it is very difficult to make them change this 
attitude.Ultimately, national interest can still prevail if there is not a sense of mutual 
interest in common action. The co-operation model remains an inter-governmental 
one. Tn particular, article J.8.2 of the Treaty on European Union states that “The 
Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions.” Qualified majority 
voting is also possible v/here the Council unanimously agreed that these are “matters 
on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified vote” (article J.3.2). Even though 
there is a strong incentive to co-operate, it is not possible to do it without the notion 
that all countries involved stand to benefit (or at least not to lose) from the common 
action. This argument, is acknowledged by the proponents of a European common 
defence who argue that a failure to achieve it will be also a failure for all member 
states:
Our march towards tlie construction of a European defence, albeit long and full of 
obstacles, is an inqserious necessity, from which we will not escajie without a failure 
for each and everyone of our countries.^®
The idea of a common European defence and of the construction of a single foreign 
policy actor is by no means entirely new. “From 1945 to 1954, the debate was about 
transcending sovereign independence in national security, which had failed to contain 
Germany in the past and held little prospect of containing Germany or the Soviet 
Union in the future, and urgently establishing new and durable international or 
supranational security structures.” ®^ These efforts have had as a conclusion the signing 
of the European Defence Community Treaty in 1952 which if ratified “would have 
created a European army integrated at division level with a common uniform, a unified 
command stiucture, a unified armaments production and procurement system, and a
'^’Xhis is particularly the case about tlie imposition by Greece of an embargo against tlie Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the action of the European Commission against Greece is likely 
to fail. The European court is likely to consider (since this is the position of the judge-rapporteur) 
that even though tliis constitutes a breach of tlie common external trade policy, it is for each 
member state to evaluate if tliere is a superior national interest tliat makes the implementation of a 
Community rule impossible.
^"François Leotard, ‘Notre projet de défense européenne’, Revue des deux mondes, December 1994, p. 
52,
^"laii Gambles, ‘European Security Integration in the 1990s’, ChaiHot Papers, no. 3, 1991, p. 3.
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mix of supranational and intergovernmental authorities mirroring the European Coal 
and Steel C o m m u n i t y . T h e  failure of this project showed how difficult the 
construction of a common identity can be, especially in defence matters.^® This 
difficulty was acknowledged by the Treaty on European Union which makes an 
interesting distinction between common defence policy and common defence. Common 
defence “means more than a closer integi ation of the armed forces of the EU’sAVEU’s 
member states for the collective self-defence which would be implied by a narrow 
interpretation of Common Defence, it will cover the whole range of the fimctions of 
armed forces.”^^  Both of these notions go well beyond the traditional notion of alliance 
and “contain aspects of endogenous cooperation and integration resulting from the 
process of developing a political union.”®® What is special about European Security 
Integration is that it happens not. just because of the necessity to fight a common 
external tlireat or to share the burden of defence, but also because of a constant drive 
towards tighter integration and co-operation. The limits of this tendency are difficult to 
assess.
It is beyond any possible doubt that a 'natural tendency’ to co-operate now exists in 
Europe.
The institutionalization of coordination and cooperation with respect to foreign 
jxilicy matters has created a habit of cooperation. As a mle, the member states 
consult each other on all important foreigi policy issues and adherence to this rule 
depends on the members’ goodwill.^’
^Tbid., p. 4.
®^For an account of the failure, of tlie EDC, see Raymond Poidevin, ‘Commimauté de défense et 
communauté ;x)litique: des projets prématurés?’, Cadmos, vol. 14, no. 55, 1991,
’’"John Roper, ‘Defining a common defence polity and common defence’, in Laurence Martin and 
John Roper (eds.). Towards a common defence policy  (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, 
Western European Union, 1995), p. 8, emphasis in original Roper defines the notion of common 
defence policy as “‘a common policy with respect to the use of the armed forces of the member 
states of tlie European Union’ and [tliis Conmion Defence Policyl will aim at developing concepts 
as to how the necessary means for the pursuit of the European Union’s objectives in the field of 
defence can be constituted and employed. (...) Common Defence on the other hand can be defined in 
two ways: a stronger version would be ‘the organisation of the armed forces of the member states in 
common’, and a weaker one ‘tlie organisation of the activities of the armed forces of the member 
states in common,”’ Ibid., pp. 8-9, empliasis in original. This, somewhat uneasy, distinction shows 
how broad the choices are concerning integration in this field.
""Ibid., p. 8.
"'Soetendorp, op. cit., p. 118.
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Tliis tendency remains contingent to the will and the decision of the individual member 
states. Besides, common European action has very few possibilities at hand. T.ike the 
EPC in the case of Yugoslavia, the main weapons available to any common action are; 
public opinion, the withholding of diplomatic recognition and economic sanctions.®  ^
Action in this case is very difficult if the Union is faced with people that do not share 
its logic and its values. One of the main arguments used by the EU during the 
Yugoslav crisis in order to stop the war has been that whoever is considered 
responsible for waging the war will eventually have trouble joining the Union and will 
become an international pariah. This argument is of little effect when faced with the 
determination of the Serbs.®® This problem is inherent to the values of the European 
Union, but has important consequences for any future action. The divergence of 
opinion, interests and action in the treatment of the Yugoslav alTair come from this 
incapacity to formulate a coherent common position and action.
This difficulty of translating into coherent action the common values existing in the 
Union is quite obvious in the output of the CFSP since the entry into force of the 
Treaty on European Union. Since this date, 10 common actions/positions and 15 joint 
actions have been adopted, whereas, during the same period 125 common declarations 
have been made. In sum, the CFSP (like the EPC in its time) has mostly produced a 
declaratory policy and little common action.®'^  Integration remains insufficient for the 
development of real joint action.
Nevertheless, the existence of an automatic process of co-operation reduces the 
possibilities to have a surprise position on any major political subject. There is close 
consultation through COREU®® and a great deal of effort is made to allow the
""Trevor C. Salmon, ‘The Union, tlie CFSP and the European security debate’, in Lodge, op. cit., p. 
257.
""Argument presented by Pierre Hassner, interview with the author in December 1994 and in March 
1995. A more optimistic view of European policy in Yugoslavia is proposed by van Staden: “The 
final decision to organize such a [peacekeeping] force under the auspices of the United Nations does 
not alter the fact that during the Yugoslavian crisis joint diplomacy among EC members had 
become a ix>licy in itself, and that the sending of observers to an explosive situation had brought the 
Conmiunity to the brink of direct military inteivention.” In van Staden, op. cit., p. 142. Tliis view 
underestimates the divergence on views concerning the details of the Yugoslav crisis and the variety 
of different actions taken by member states.
"''Council Report to Reflection Group, April 1995, pp. 31-39, The importance of common declarations 
is also obvious in the communiqués of the European Council in which the ideas and values of the 
Union are expressed (cf. chapter 6),
""Correspondant Européen is the telex system connecting the Foreign Offices of the member states.
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formation of common positions. Consultation and co-operation is now taken for 
granted, even if there is a lack of political will that makes progress difficult,®® 
Predictability of behaviour is stronger than otherwise. Since states develop 
expectations concerning common action and the habit to form common positions, the 
behaviour of national states is easier to predict . The degree of security integration is, 
however, too low and too fragile to assert that the European Union has reached a 
satisfying level concerning mutual predictability of behaviour. There are too many 
uncertainties about the future and the instinctive character of co-operation remains 
utterly frail. “Events since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty suggest that domestic 
support will be a more crucial factor in European integration than it has been so far. 
The analysis also points to the importance of the external environment,”®^ Divergences 
in national policies and too many uncertainties remain concerning the future of the 
many different conditions affecting European security.®®
In particular, there are strong differences in views concerning collaboration in foreign 
policy and (in a broader perspective) the fiiture of European integration among the 
member states. This is an important problem because if a state does not perceive the 
integrative process as rewarding, it then has a motive for pursuing independent 
action.®® Franck Pfetsch considers that there are five behavioural patterns in the EC: 
traditional behaviour of a national independent actor; supportive behaviour (i.e. 
national policy pursued with the support of the other member states); selective joint 
action; co-ordination and harmonisation of policies; and finally, uniform behaviour 
conducted by a supranational or federative organism.'*® These divergences in behaviour
""Views expressed by Hugh Mortimer head of the CFSP unit at the Foreign Office, notes taken by 
Trevor C. Salmon, Hull Conference, 12 May 1995,
"^Nicolaj Petersen, ‘Tlie European Union and Foreign and Security Policy’, in Ole Norgaard, Thomas 
Pedersen and Nicolaj Petersen (eds.), The Kuropean Community in World Politics (London: Pinter, 
1993), p. 27.
""“The sovereignty issue, especially in the sensitive areas of defence and security, remained important 
as did the fear of upsetting the US by implying that it was either not wanted or not needed. Tlie 
plethora of institutions in tlie security and defence field and the pervasive uncertainty surrounding 
the new European enviromiient, an uncertainty which in some minds counseled the cautious view 
tliat institutions and arrangements tliat had served them well should not be tampered with, were 
also problems requiring resolution.” Salmon, op. cit., p. 238.
""For the necessity of considering integration as rewarding see Karl W. Deutsch, Die Schweitz als ein 
paradigmatischer Fall politischer Integration (Bern: Paul Haupt, 1976),
'""Franck Pfetsch, ‘Tensions in Sovereignty: Foreign Policies of EC Members Compared’, in Carlsnaes 
and Smith (eds.), op. cit., p. 125,
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have correspotîding differences concerning the desired end-product of European 
integration/** The inclusion of a defence component in the European integration 
process is an issue at stake. And there are a number of other splits.
There are, for example, unresolved, differences between nuclear and non-nuclear 
states, states that deploy nuclear weapons on their soil and those that do not, large 
versus small and economically strong versus economically weak countries.'’"
These disagreements do not render common action completely impossible. “On the 
whole the EC, in most of the cases examined, acted as a coordinated flexible 
governmental entity over broad issues and general positions. On specific matters, 
national political interests prevailed and differences became clearly visible,”'*® National 
policies are far from being completely predictable and most predictions made about 
future behaviour still contain a great ‘risk premium’ that reduces substantially the 
concrete acliievements of integration.
In Sum, although the progressive strengthening of the image of the Union as a single 
foreign policy actor is now quite important, the many uncertainties and short-comings 
of this effort do not allow to clearly state that there is mutual predictability of 
behaviour in the EU. What can be assumed is that a certain degree of mutual 
predictability of behaviour exists but, the stability of this acliievement and its possible 
fiirthering remain unclear.
Security and Defence co-operation and mutual predictability of 
behaviour
It is necessary to go beyond the analysis of the EU as a single foreign policy actor. A 
real (albeit very limited) mutual predictability of behaviour leading to long-term 
expectations of peacefiil change can be assumed to exist because of this fact. But, since
'"Ibid., pp. 129-130.
'’"Reinhardt Rummel and Peter Schmidt, ‘West Eiuopean Integration and Security Cooperation; 
Converging and Diverging Trends’, in Mathias Jopp, Reinhardt Rummel and Peter Schmidt (eds.). 
Integration and Security in Western F.urope: Inside the European Pillar  (Boulder, Co; Westview 
Press, 1991), p. 22,
'’"ibid., p. 135. For another account of national divergent views, see Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstmp, 
Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer and Ole Waever, The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios 
for the Post-Cold War Era  (London: Pinter, 1990), pp. 134-162.
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the EU remains ultimately a union of sovereign states, it is necessary to examine the 
relations among these states in order to assess the degree of mutual predictability of 
behaviour prevailing in the Union.
An almost paradigmatic case of co-operation in Europe is the Franco*German 
‘special relationship’ that has been the engine of European integration since the sixties.
Another possible way of examining the degree of mutual predictability of behaviour 
existing among the member states is to look at the pattern of co-operation concerning 
defence and in particular weapons co-production.
The Franco-German security relationship as a case of mutual predictability of 
behaviour
The end of the long-standing Franco-German enmity and the establishment of a reliable 
pattern of co-operation is one of the most remarkable achievements of the post-war 
period.'*'* This pattern is very well established and its failure seems difficult (albeit still 
possible).
Sometimes it appears as if  the Franco-German relationsliip is maintained more 
through anxiety over the possible negative consequences that could result from the 
failure of the ‘entente’ than by a convergence of political interests and political- I
cultural rapprochement. The exaggerated symbolism of many Franco-German f
Isummits and the fact that major political moves have been undertaken by the French j
President and the German Chancellor without intensive consultation of the j
ministries concerned, can be regarded more an indication of the remaining I
divergences tlian of the many points of convergence.'’^
The special relationship is considered as the ultimate guarantee for the maintenance of I
Ipeace and of the pursuit of European integration. Tt is therefore not possible to j
1envisage an end to it without important consequences for the fiiture of peace in iiEurope. The rela tionship is maintained despite the dissimilarities of the partners and the j
important points of divergence existing among them.
’ ’For an account of the history of tlie Franco-German relationship see Robert Picht (ed.), Das Biindnis 
im Biindnis. Deutschframôsische Beziehungen im internationalen Spannungsfeld (Berlin: Severin 
und Sielder, 1982); Karl Kaiser and Pierre Lellouche (eds.). Le couple jranco-allemand et la 
défense de I ‘Europe (Paris: IFRI, 1986). Maurice Vaïssc, ‘La réconciliation franco-allemande : le 
dialogue de Gaulle-Adenauer’, Politique étrangère. Winter 1993-1994.
'’^ Peter Schmidt, ‘The special Franco-German security relationship in tlie 1990s’, Chaitlot Papers, no. 
8, 1993, p. 1.
1!
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The main contribution of this partnership is the building of trust among these former 
enemies and the establishment of an engine for the fiirthering of European integration.
Each state stands to benefit from it. Germany uses the relationship to overcome the 
handicap of being a loser of the Second World War and to pursue its policy of further 
European integration. France uses the relationship to keep German power at bay and 
to enhance its role and its strength in Europe. Tn particular, “France, potentially weaker 
than Germany, needs a strong influence over the others to remain an attractive bilateral 
partner.”'*® From a French point of view, the EU is a tool used in order “to give France 
the political and economic base which it otherwise lacks as a medium-sized nation­
state, so as to be able to play a global role commensurate with its assessment of 
itself.”'*^
German unification challenged the equilibrium of the partnership and for some time 
national interest seemed to prevail.'*® The fear of a ‘re-nationalisation’ of German 
policy looks unfounded since Germany is comfortable with its position as a member of 
the Western organisations.'*® But for some time (a time in which took place the German 
unification and the early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by the Federal Republic), 
the French did not consider German behaviour as reliable and predictable.®® in 
particular German unification has been considered as a new beginning for the German 
question. “The postwar division of Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the German Democratic Republic has in some way provided a workable solution to the 
perennial problem of German power.”®* The existence of a strong and united Germany 
has been a radical change to the Cold-War situation. France, in particular, had many 
difficulties to cope with this change. The acceptance of the new situation, finally, re­
established a more normal pattern of collaboration.
’"David P. Calleo, ‘L’Union européenne et la fin de la guerre froide’, Les Cahiers du CERJ, no. 10, 
1994, p. 7.
'’"Dicter Mahncke, ‘Parameters of European Security’, Chaillot Papers, no. 10,1993, p. 16.
'’"See Ingo Kolboom, ‘Frankreich imd das vereinte Deutschland’, EM/vpn-rirc/nv, nos. 15-16, 1991.
'"’Gebhard Schweigler, Grimdlagen der aufienpolitischen Orientierung der Bimdesrepublik 
Deutschland. Rahmenbelidungen, Motive, Einstelhmgen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1985).
""Hans Stark, ‘France-Allemagne : entente et mésententes’. Politique étrangère, Winter 1993-1994.
"’Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price and John Roper, ‘New directions in European seciuity’, in Ken Booth 
(ed.), New Thinking About Strategy and International Security (London; Harper Collins Academic, 
1991), p. 247.
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It is still somewhat of a paradox to see that Germany is on the one hand feared 
because its behaviour is not considered as reliable and, on the other hand, its allies 
demand more and more from it. “[Germany] is both feared for its great potential and 
constantly called upon to develop and demonstrate that potential in response to calls 
for support from all quarters.”®^
The two states also have very different visions concerning the future of European 
integration. France considers that “united Europe must have, vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world, an economic and poHtical personality; the nation-states must form the 
foundation of this whole and retain their own room for manoeuvre. Behind these ideas 
lies France’s double concern to preserve the special status of a gieat power and to use 
the European Community when its own national resources prove inadequate.”®® 
Germany insists on a democratically controlled EU system, a communitarian decision­
making process and openness to the greatest extent in the economic arena.®'*
But, the assumption that, the two states should go foiward together still prevails. The 
main reason for tliis is the desire “to avoid a conceivable re-nationalisation of security 
policy, which is quite often judged as a concern on both sides of the Rhine, because 
this could lead to the re-emergence of old power struggles among the West European 
nation states.”®® Another reason is that (in spite of all their disagreements) both states 
share the common objective of a European Union.
The Franco-German partnership survived the important strains of the first post-Cold 
War years which shows just how stable and capable of reform this relationship can be. 
The partnership is a way of enhancing the predictability of behaviour prevailing in the 
two countries. “Before the War, Germany has never been able of forging a national 
vision that leaves a normal place to the rest of Europe. The long Franco-German 
partnership of the post-war period allows us to hope in a different fiiture.”®® Working
""Alfred Grosser, ‘L’Allemagne élargie dans l ’Europe élargie’. Politique étrangère, no. 4, 1991, p. 
831. See also Caleo, op. cit., p. 25.
""Philippe Moreau-Defarges, ‘L’Allemagne et l ’avenir de l ’unification européenne’. Politique 
étrangère, no. 4, 1991, p. 850,
"%id., pp. 852-853.
""Schimdt, op. cit., pp. 52-53. Tins is a very common objective of regionalism, see Andrew Hurrell, 
‘Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics’, Review o f International Studies, 
forthcoming October 1995.
""Caleo, op. cit., p. 28.
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together involves not working against each other. There exist today long-term 
expectations of peacefiil change between France and Gennany.
The existence of long-term expectations of peacefiil change is particularly obvious in 
the case of the Eurocorps, the former Franco-German brigade. The idea, born in 1987, 
of a Franco-German brigade was novel and ambitious, Merging units of two states 
with two languages at a low military level is sometMng difficult and reminds of 
Monnet’s strategy for integrating Europe through a series of concrete achievements. It 
was hoped that this initiative will be an example for the future and allow the 
constitutions of an embryo of European defence.®  ^But, on the whole the positions of 
the two partners were veiy different;
The French concept is of a purely binational command; this stresses limiting the 
initiative to a strictly Franco-German process, keeping defence firmly within 
national hands and cooperating on a purely state-to-state basis. Against this, the 
German model sees the joint brigade forming the nucleus of a EuroiDean army firmly 
embedded in the Atlantic Alliance, the initiation of a process towards a 
supranational defence framework.""
France is a medium nuclear power and is not a member of NATO’s integrated 
command. Germany has strong links with the United States and NATO and a clear 
ambition for a more integrated federal Europe,®®
The differences are thus that the first function of the brigade was utterly symbolic:
To the French, the joint brigade is primarily a symbol wliich is not expected to lead 
to an amalgamation of the two armies. To the Germans too, the joint brigade is 
being used as a symbol of the continuing vitality of the Bonn-Faris axis as it comes 
under strain over economic and financial issues.®"
Security considerations between the two states did not disappear because of the joint 
brigade. The nuclear issue remains unsettled and the rediscovery of Central and 
Eastern Europe by the United Germany changed considerably the question.
"^Interview of President Mitterrand, Le Monde, 23-6-1987.
""Dominik von Wolff Metternich, ‘The Franco-German Brigade: A  German Perspective’, RÜSI 
journal, vol. 136, Aulunm 1991, p. 45.
"^or the relative positions of the two states see Ifestos and Tsardanidis, op. cit., pp. I l l  ff.
®"Passim
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As it is often the case with the Franco-German axis, the apparently blocked situation 
found a solution through summit diplomacy. An unexpected breakthrough occured 
thanks to the agreement of the two leaders. In the 1992 summit in La Rochelle, the 
creation of a European corps of Franco-German initiative was announced by the 
French President and the German Chancellor. This corps has two main kinds of 
mission: (a) peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian mission in the framework of 
international organisations and (b) participation in the common defence of the 
members of NATO and the WEU.®*
An important efibrt was made to avoid presenting this new corps as a threat to the 
existing defence arrangements. The communique of the summit clearly stated that: 
“National contributions to this corps do not affect existing obligations with respect to 
Other organisations. The European corps will contribute to the strengthening of the 
Atlantic Alliance.” This effort was not very successftjl since the Atlanticists were 
convinced that tliis was part of a plan to undermine NATO and the American presence 
in Europe: “Conscious of his continuing need of German support to ftirther de Gaulle’s 
model of a Europe standing free of the United States, Mitteirand was now prepared to 
compromise on another Gaullist axiom, that of a France’s national military 
autonomy.”®^
These initial problems and limitations have been overcome since that time. The 
American presence in Europe is less controversial than before and, nowadays, most 
doubts concerning the US role in Europe emanate from the US itself. The necessity to 
build a Common European Defence Policy, included in the Maastricht Treaty, makes 
the need to form pan-European armed units more urgent than ever before.®® Besides, 
the choice to make a corps is operationally more convenient, since it is possible to 
integrate the command of the various national units without merging them. The 
ambition under girding the formation of the Eurocorps is certainly very significant.
"‘Stark, op. cit,, p. 995. The final communiqué of the summit states in particular that “The Corf» may 
be used either for common defence of the Allies in accordance with Article 5 of the Wasliington 
Treaty or the Treaty of Brussels. It can be authorised to perform peacekeeping or peacemaking and 
humanitarian missions.”
""Edward Foster, ‘The Franco-Gcrman Corps: A  ‘Theological’ Debate?’, RUSI Journal, vol. 137, 
August 1992, p, 63.
""Helmut Wiilmann, ‘The European Corps—Political Dimension and Military Aims’, RUSI Journal, 
vol. 139, August 1994, p. 28.
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The European Cotps is only a first step. Formed by a French-German initiative, it 
will become the first operational army corps of tlie WEU—witli more than 50.000 
soldiers from four nations (France, Germany, Belgium and Spain) it is one of the 
strongest major formations in Western Europe. The EuroiDean Corps is tlie 
expression of the commitment of the participating nations to jointly reinforce 
European responsibility in the field of security and defence."''
Despite all the difficulties associated with the beginnings of the common brigade, the 
fact that most problems have been surmounted and that further integration has been 
enabled to go ahead is a sign of success. Obviously, patterns of behaviour, even 
between France and Germany, are not well established as yet, but there is a reality of 
predictability of behaviour. Tn particular, expectations of fiirther integration and co­
operation seem to be well established.
Interstate defence co-operation as an indicator of empatliy and mutual 
responsiveness
Another possible way of looking at mutual predictability of behaviour is to examine 
defence co-operation from the point of view of mutual predictability of behaviour. The 
assumptions regarding tliis consideration are that states that collaborate at tWs level, 
share long-term expectations of peaceful change concerning their mutual relations. 
Theii behaviour is quite easily predictable. Such co-operation is an unmistakable sign 
of integration.
The leading thought behind the formation of the alliance and also the trading of tlie 
given abilities is empathy, ‘that means the readiness to understand the feelings of 
tlueat and fear of the other side and to consider tliem in so far as one’s own security 
allows. It demands (...) the momentous insight (...) that the inner security of the 
other side is of existential significance for our own security, since one can only rely 
on stable systems; only they [these tyiie of systems] remain true to the institutions, 
reliable and predictable.’""
Co-operation in defence production is a translation of empathy into a concrete form. 
It is also a way of rendering defence affordable which is one of the main aims of 
European Security Integration. For many years, defence procurement was purely a 
national matter. “Despite high costs, European countries procure most of their
"''Ibid., p. 29.
""Franz H. U. Borkenhagen, ‘Eine neue Sicherheitspolitik-Chance ftir Europa’, Aits Politik und 
Zeitgeschichie, no. 36, 1990, emphasis in original.
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weapons at home.”®® But, “three other possible solutions have received increased 
attention since the mid 1980s, at least among the European NATO members; 
collaborative development and production of advanced weapons, coordinated 
procurement policies and rationalised and restructured defence industrial sectors.”®^ 
The Tornado and the Eurofighter combat aircraft’s are the hallmark projects in this 
respect. But, the development of this effort is not without problems. Tn particular, 
there is an important tension between pan-European market integration and national 
protection. The formation of the Tndependent European Programme Group in NATO 
did not resolve this contradiction.®^ “These contradictory impulses, plus the fact that 
the political oversight, management and sponsorship of these activities is being 
conducted under several (and often competing) auspices, strongly suggests that some 
combination of national and continental policies is most likely to evolve in Europe.”®®
These strategies have very limited effects for the moment since there are just, second 
best solutions compared to the “preferred strategy of subsidised autonomous national 
production and exports, for they involve serious compromises in national decision­
making autonomy that are still anathema to most producers.” ®^ Integration in this field 
remains fragile. It should also be borne in mind that defence co-operation is still a 
function of the situation of the market. When there is sufficient demand to allow the 
production of national military systems, the incentive to co-operate disappears. Even 
when the situation is difficult, national pride and pressures from weapons producers 
result in the multiplication of weapon products. For instance, there will be three 
European combat aircrafts of the next generation: the Eurofighter, the Rafale and the 
Swedish aircraft:, and it is likely that many European states will buy the American 
aircraft of this same generation. In short, there is no such thing as a European single 
market in this field and this is a sign of weakness of European integration.
""Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The European armaments industry at the crossroads’, Survival, vol. 32, no. 1, 
1990, p. 65.
""Keith Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns o f  M ilitaty Production and Trade (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 147.
"^For an analysis of the 1988 report of the group see William Walker and Philip Gummett, 
‘Nationalism, Internationalism and the European Defence Market’, Chaillot Papers, no. 9, 1993,
pp. 10-11.
"®Krause, op. cit., p. 149.
""Passim.
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The most encouraging aspect of European co-operation in the field of weapon 
production is the fact that there is long-term involvement in common projects. The 
decision to collaborate for the production of a weapon system, implies a partnership 
for many years. The development of Eurofighter proper started in 1983 and three of 
the four participants have already the experience of the Tornado programme behind 
them.^* The long-term element is obviously present. The states that produce weapons 
in common do not expect that there will be, at least for the duration of the project, any 
violent conflicts with their fellow partners.
The necessity to reinforce European co-operation in this field is recognised by almost 
all European political leaders.^" Risks and difficulties do exist but the rationale for 
collaborative programmes is unequivocal. “Equipment procured collaboratively may be 
the most cost effective means of meeting a nation’s needs, although the need to 
compromise on specifications has to be weighed carefully against cost savings.” ®^ The 
increased sopMstication of contemporary weapons make research and development 
costs more and more important. It is, therefore, increasingly profitable to share these 
costs and thus decrease the per unit cost of the military system. '^* The link between co­
operation and mutual predictability of behaviour is very important; “Partnerships can 
be very productive, but to work require trust, commitment to a long term relationship, 
and compatible corporate cultures.” ®^ These conditions are quite restrictive but, once a 
partnership is efficient mutual predictability of behaviour is real. The objective 
difficulties for fiilfilling these requirements in the field of defence joint action place 
severe limits to the amount of mutual predictability of behaviour achieved.
Of course, these limits of co-operation do not mean that European states fear their 
fellow member states. But, still, mutual predictability of behaviour is limited and 
expectations of peaceful change are fi'ailer than otherwise. The proposal to create a
"'Ned Frith, ‘The European Fighter Aircraft—Potential and Prospects’, RUSI journal, vol. 137, April î|
1992.
""See the position of Jacques Chirac vis-à-vis a European aerospace policy in Le Monde, June 13th 
1995. For the British support to European defence co-operation, see The Economist, March 11th 
1995.
""Sir John Bourn, ‘Securing Value for Money in Defence Procurement’, RUSI Whitehall Paper Series 
1994, p. 49.
"'*Ron Smith, ‘Defence Procurement: A  European Identity?’, RUSI journal, vol. 137, Febniary 1992, 
p. 44.
""Ron Smith, ‘The Economic Driver’, RUSI journal, vol. 138, Jime 1993, p. 28,
J
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single defence market by abolishing the relevant article 223 of the Treaty of Rome can 
(if it succeeds) prove a decisive contribution to the establishment of a more reliable and 
predictable system in defence procurement/® This could be an important help in the 
establishment, of genuine mutual predictability of behaviour among the members of the 
European Union.
Such an arrangement will be far more efficient than ad hoc co-operation. “European 
co-development; has generally taken the form of ad hoc intergovernmental 
arrangements negotiated on a project-by-project b a s i s . W h a t  is needed is real 
internationalisation, i.e. “not (...) cooperative arrangements that simply preserve 
national capabilities and traditions; there must be an element of real inlegmUon, 
involving industrial specialisation, competition, and the collective identification of 
operational requirements.”^^  Co-operation is usually a rather costly substitute for real 
market integration.^® This radical approach can completely change the present situation 
characterised by the existence of huge differences in the attitudes of the member 
states.^® Such radical change requires the radical transformation of political co­
operation; “a truly open defence equipment market would require sufficient political
1integration to enable defence equipment to be treated like any other tradeable j
commodity.” *^ Joint ventures in defence industry are beginning to produce something j
close to a Eurocompany, but the way to go is still very strenuous. j
""For the background concerning the proposal of establishing a single market for arm procurement in 
the European Union see The Economist, March 11th 1995 and April 8tli 1995. For the idea of 
founding a European Armament Agency, see Jean Fournet, ‘The European Answer’, RUSI journal, 
vol. 138, June 1993.
""Moravcsik, op. cit., p. 66.
Walker and Giunmet, op. cit., p. 4, emphasis in original.
"“ Smith, ‘The Economic Driver’, op. cit., p. 27.
*°For an account of the positions of the member states see ibid., pp. 20-22.
Ibid., p. 31.
®"See Moravcsik, op. cit., pp. 68 ff.
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In its present form. West EuroiDean co-operation in armaments production and 
procurement is only by extension an element of West European security co- 
oiDeration, for its progress is neither particularly deiDendent on any broader co­
operative developments nor paiticularly critical in the short term to any of the 
IDolitical or military asiDects of security co-oiDeration, Nevertheless, the multilateral 
and bilateral governmental and industrial initiatives accelerating the restructuring of 
European annaments production and procurement are combining with economic 
imperatives to bring about changes in tliis field of considerable long-term 
significance. A truly unified European armaments market (...) would certainly be a 
vital and dynamic element in West European security co-operation.'*"
Important, difficulties remain for the development of European Defence Co­
operation. In particular, the fear that this will foster an American withdrawal from 
Europe, the limited political appeal of the enterprise, institutional difficulties (not least 
with neutral countries) and the existence of conflicting interests, make this field of co­
operation a very difficult one. '^* “The political game leads to a situation in which West 
European states pursue, on the one hand, a policy of 'Europeanization’, and on the 
other hand, look for political tools to slow down the Europeanization process,” ®^
As in the case of the EU considered as a single foreign policy actor, or in that of the 
Franco-German partnersliip, the case of European security and defence co-operation 
shows the existence of many uncertainties concerning the future. These uncertainties 
show how difficult it is to predict the future behaviour of the European states. 
European integration limits the unpredictable element in these relations, but 
predictability is not sufficiently developed, yet. The future evolution of the continent 
remains difficult to assess. The security agenda of the next decade will be very different 
fi om the one of the past. Thi eats of etlino-nationalism, and societal insecurity are now 
top of the security agenda.^® Insecurity has now new dimensions: (a) differentials of 
power create tensions and fears among the nations; (b) modernity creates fears about a
'*"lan Gambles, ‘Prospects for West European Secinity Co-operation’, ririe/p/z; Papers, no. 244, 1989, 
p. 45.
'^'See Trevor Taylor, European Defence Cooperation  (London: RHA, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1984), pp. 28-42.
®"Peter Schmidt, ‘The ‘National Factor’ and the CXrrrent Change’, in Peter Schmidt (ed.). In the Midst 
o f  Change: On the Development o f  West European Security and Defence Cooperation  (Baden- 
Baden; Nomos Veriagsgeselschaft, 1992), p. 230.
®"Sec Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstmp and Pierre Lemaitre, Identity/, Migt'ation and the 
New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993).
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loss of identity and (c) immigration and social-economic problems can produce violent 
reactions that are difficult to co n tro l.T h e  reaction of the European states to these 
new questions is not possible to predict as yet. “The continent is therefore at once too 
divided to be an area of common security, and too unified not to be an area of common 
insecurity.” ®^
^^Pierre Hassner, La violence et la paix : de la bombe atomique au nettoyage ethnique (Paris: Esprit,
1995), p. 322.
®®Domiiiiqiie David, ‘La Communauté entre la paix et la guerre’, Politique étrangère, no. 1, 1993, p. 
82.
Conclusion
The study of a neglected concept such as that of pluralistic security community is 
rewarding, particularly it is very useflil in explaining the peacefid co-existence of states 
at the intemational level. Even if no definitive answer is found to the great questions 
discussed in this dissertation (peace and war, unity and diversity...), there is reasonable 
ground for optimism. It is possible to assert that the fiilfilment of the conditions 
examined above can result into the establishment of a steady framework of peace.
Pluralistic security community theory has many short-comings, not least the unclear 
relationship between the formation of the community and force:
III his writing on integration, Deiitscli has evolved a theoretical framework based on 
a consensual approach. Integration occurs as peoples (...) find areas of commonality 
of interest and expectations of joint reward. Force is consigned to a minimal role.
Wliile core areas themselves are identified, we find little place in Deutsch’s writings 
for the coercive capabilities wliich are often employed in the integrative process. To 
understand the unification of Germany without the ‘blood and iron’ of Bismarck; 
the unification of the United States without the conquest of tlie South in the Civil 
War; the building of modem Russia without the force employed by the Tsars and 
their successors (...) is once again to ignore an important set of variables.*
This uneasy relationship with force and the difficulty (even the impossibility) of 
distinguisliing cause from effect are the two main problems of security community 
theoiy. Despite these problems, this theory remains of the utmost importance being the 
main contribution to the exegesis of international pluralism. International pluralism is, 
in turn, the main way of explaining the existence of long-term peace in large areas of 
the world.
International pluralism, in the form of a pluralistic security conmiunity, is achieved 
through the fiilfilment of three essential conditions. Firstly, the compatibility of major 
values is an important guarantee of peace. Peoples sharing the same beliefs and values 
are not likely to be war-like, This is more tme for some specific values that have a
'Robert L. Pfalzgraff Jr., ‘Karl Deutsch and the Stiafy of Political Science’, Political Science 
Reviewer, vol. 2, Fall 1972, pp. 105-106.
141
Conclusion 142
pacifying influence. Such values were found to be not broad concepts such as 
democracy or the rule of law as such, but rather the values fimdamental for the 
existence of democracy, namely, individualism and the values of market economies 
(maximisation of profit and expansion of trade) such values make war unattractive.
The second essential condition is mutual responsiveness. This condition is essential 
for the mere reason that states can be considered as integrated only if their demands 
and needs are understood and given real weight in the process of decision-making. 
This process has to be mutual since if not tliere can be no guarantee of its endurance. 
Mutual responsiveness comes about after a process of learning and understanding that 
makes conflict resolution ever easier. Mutual responsiveness is all the more important 
since the establishment of a solid pattern of co-operation is likely to be a self- 
perpetuating operation. Once a process of co-operation has began, mutually rewarding 
experiences produce trust and a virtuous circle of collaboration is on motion, and is 
difficult to reverse.
The final essential condition for the emergence of a pluralistic security community is 
mutual predictability of behaviour. Tn a region that is integrated, the behaviour of 
member states follows stable patterns and is easily predictable. For this condition to be 
tme, actions announced have to be consistent and credible. This occurs when 
announced actions are effectively completed and if and when there are reliable 
expectations that actions professed will be implemented. Mutual predictability of 
behaviour means that the eternal fear that there will be a breach of trust among the 
part ners no longer prevails. This is a radical change from the condition of international 
anarchy.
The fiilfilment of these tliree conditions is certainly a pacifying factor. Pluralism is 
possible when there is no real reason for going to war over some dispute since the 
disadvantages outweigh any possible gain. Trust, shared values and the credibility of 
the commitments undertaken make conflict resolution possible. And even if a conflict 
is not effectively settled, there is little chance that it will lead to violence.
If the pacifying influence of these conditions is beyond doubt, their mere fulfilment 
does not guarantee eternal peace or the end of political violence. There is always a 
possibility that unforeseen circumstances and a change in beliefs and attitudes will
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jeopardise the whole acliievement. The fulfilment of these conditions does not 
guarantee any particular kind of integration either. There is no real reason why these 
conditions will lead to common institutions or to the formation of a federal entity. 
Scandinavia has been a pluralistic security community for centuries without having 
common institutions. Pluralistic security community theory is one possible theory of 
integration and the existence of many other approaches is necessary since, a single 
approach is unable to explain such a complex phenomenon. Pluralistic security 
community theory is just an island of '“middle range' theory”  ^ The development of 
these middle range theories could lead to a more general theory, but such progress is 
still very difficult:
Whether we can build bridges between these islands and arrive at, say, a general 
theoiy of ixilitical change which incorporates, among other components, a theory of 
integration, is a question wliich ought logically to await the emergence of a body of 
falsifiable general propositions about integration.^
The approach above is a modest contribution to the study of integration. The ambition 
of the approach was to underline key issues and to show how the achievement of 
lasting peace at the international level is made possible.
Steady peace is something which is broadly achieved in Western Europe, even 
though there are still some uncertainties and problems. The establishment, of peace in 
Europe is the least debatable success of European integration.




Between 1870 and 1945 millions had died because of conflict between the French 
and their neighbours to the east, yet on 9 May 1950 Robert Schuman, the French 
Foreign Minister, could talk of the contribution that, an organised and living Europe 
could bring to civilization by maintaining peace. He and Monnet, who submitted the 
plan to him, tackled that central problem of Franco-German relations, specifically 
advocating the rassemblement of the nations of Europe and, crucially, ‘the 
elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken 
must in the first place concern these two countries. ' Of course, Schuman also went 
on to say that by establishing solidarity of production of coal and steel it is plain that 
‘any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but 
materially impossible’. That central aim has now been achieved.'*
Difficulties and shortcomings still remain but it is beyond doubt that war is out of a 
question among the states of the European Union. “In other words, several parts of the 
Community which have been violently opposed to each other for decades have been 
brought into a new pattern and environment of relationships.”  ^ The youngest 
generation of Europeans, in particular, have lived through an era of peace and stability 
that has transformed Europe. “The experience of a peacefid postwar era may, in short, 
have socialized the next generation of European leaders so as to make a high degree of 
integration a realistic aspiration for the near future.”^
In a broader perspective, “postwar Europe, and Western Europe in particular, 
remains the richest source of liistorical evidence by which to judge theoretical 
explanations and prescriptions.”  ^This is the main reason why it is so interesting to test 
the fi-dfilment of the conditions in the European Union, The empiiical tests have been 
chosen with a concern for clarity. They are one possible way of testing the reality of 
the integrative process in Europe, other tests are possible.
The results of the tests show the difficulty of determining the degree of integration, 
although a degree of achievement is acknowledged. There are important limitations 
and doubts about the degree of integration achieved. Certainly, the European Union is 
characterised by compatibility of major values, mutual responsiveness and mutual
'‘Sir Wilham Nicoll and Trevor C. Salmon, Underslanding the New European Communities (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester-Whealsheaf, 1994), p. 314.
^Ibid., p. 314.
**Pentiand, op. cit., p. 62.
^Ibid., p. 25.
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predictability of behaviour. However, the degree of achievement and the endurance 
capacity of the achievement is difficult to assess. The tests conducted can only give 
some indications about the degree of integration but they cannot guarantee that the 
findings are totally reliable, Nevertheless, all three tests conducted seem to point to the 
direction of the existence of a pluralistic security community. The degree of 
achievement seem sufficient to guarantee the absence of violent conflicts in the 
foreseeable future.
The existence of a pluralistic security community in the European Union does not 
imply that any particular form of ffiture integration will prevail. European integration 
still has an unknown destination.® The interaction of politics and economics in the 
process makes its end result even more difficult to determine. “[European 
integration’s] goal is political. Its instruments are economic. But its essence, its raison 
d'être, is cemented by the acquis communautaire, by the supremacy of binding 
supranational legislation over national legislation; and by the decisionmaking authority 
of supranational institutions and their rules.”  ^The existence of a continuing process of 
integration seems to guarantee that at least the realisation of a pluralistic security 
community will not be put into doubt.
The existence of a pluralistic security community does not eliminate the problems of 
conflict and political violence as such. The dilemmas of international relations remain. 
In particular, the stability of peaceful relations in the pluralistic security communities 
make it very tempting to try to export this reality abroad. But this temptation is 
dangerous and success is difficult. Peace and stability can only progress step by step 
and it is a fallacy to expect a rapid change of attitudes and conditions anywhere in the 
world. If too much is expected from this theoiy, deception can prove fatal to what, has 
been achieved so far.
®See Andrew Shonfield, Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination (Harmondswortii: Penguin, 
1973).
^Juliet Lodge, ‘Towards a political union?’, in Juliet Lodge (ed.), The European Community and the 
Challenge o f  the. Future (London; Pinter, 1993), p. 382.
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Tlie Europeans and the North Americans can only blame themselves if  the world 
lakes them at their word; since tliey are the ones who have proclaimed human rights 
in the course of the last 200 years. These are demands that should apply to everyone, 
without exception and difference. Their universalism recognises no difference in 
proximity or distance; it is unconditional and abstract. The duty, which they place 
on eveiyone, is in principle without limits. In tliis, their theological nucleus is 
displayed, which has smvived all secularisation. Everybody is supposed to be 
resix>nsible for everyone else; in tliis demand the duty to become like God is 
incorporated, since it presupposes omnipresence and omnipotence. But since our 
abilities to act are finite, the gulf between demands and reality becomes even wider.
Soon the border of objective deception will be trespassed upon then universalism 
will prove itself to be a moral trap.*®
There is therefore a. real need for humility. The limitations of the theory should, 
nevertheless, not conceal the fact that the concept of pluralistic security community is 
very helpftd.
It is to Karl Deutsch's everlasting credit that he opened the way for an explanation of 
international pluralism, although as has been demonstrated above, operationalising this 
theory and concepts is a different task (and not one he really undertook himself). This 
approach seems very promising and its instructive power, as experienced in the 
empirical study of the situation in the European Union, is considerable. This thesis 
aimed at demonstrating both the utility of the notion of security community and its 
relevance in the case of the European Union. The predictive power of the theory is 
limited but peaceful relations are far easier to achieve and to preserve if the essential 
conditions examined above are fiilfilled and respected. This means that the most 
convenient path to peace is the progressive convergence of the states towards some 
shared values and practices. This path is long and strenuous but it remains the most 
certain way of ensuring peace.
*®Hans Magnus Enzensberger, ‘Ausblicke auf den Bürgerkrieg’, Der Spiegel, no. 25, 1993, pp. 173- 
174. For more details about these ideas see Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Aussichien auf den 
Biirgerlcrieg (Frankfort: Suhrkamp, 1993).
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